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COMMUTING LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE SENTENCES: THE 
NEED FOR REASON AND JUSTICE OVER POLITICS 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In the last thirty years, life without parole (LWOP) sentences have flourished in the United States.  Of 
course the very reason for a LWOP sentencing scheme is to incarcerate the convicted defendant until death. 
But under the Pardon Clause of the Constitution, as well as under state laws granting the Governor the 
pardoning power, inmates serving LWOP sentences might be eligible for early release by commutations.1 
On the one hand, the possibility of clemency could be regarded as an impermissible loophole that could be 
used on a case-by-case basis to undermine the certainty of a LWOP sentencing system. On the other hand, 
those who are concerned about prison overcrowding, and those who want to reward a prisoner who has 
rehabilitated himself, would certainly favor the increasing use of clemency to provide early release for 
many LWOP inmates.   
 
This dissertation tests whether commuting LWOP sentences is a fair early release procedure. This 
dissertation will also provide suggestions on how to regulate the commutation power as applied to LWOP 
inmates so as to make it consistent with the principles behind a LWOP sentencing scheme. This dissertation 
concludes that while commuting LWOP sentences can be justified under certain circumstances, the 
application of commutation in many American jurisdictions is arbitrary and inconsistent with the premises 
of LWOP. The dissertation provides suggestions for bringing more fairness into the commutation process 
as applied to LWOP inmates.  
 
 
  
                                                          
1 U.S.C.A. CONST. Art. II, § 2, cl. 1. The clause provides: “The President … shall have Power to Grant 
Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.” 
 iii 
Table of Contents 
Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 1 
I. Commuting LWOP Sentences .................................................................................... 3 
A. LWOP Sentencing in America ............................................................................................ 3 
1. Prior to the Late 1960s: No Gradation of LWOP Sentences ............................................. 3 
2. Schick v. Reed: Commuting the Death Penalty to a LWOP Sentence ............................ 4 
3. The 1970s: Emergence of LWOP Sentences as An Alternative to the Death 
Penalty .................................................................................................................................................................. 5 
4. The Sentencing Reform Era: Expanding the Applicability of LWOP Sentences ....... 8 
5. From the 1980s: Increasing Imposition of LWOP Sentences ....................................... 14 
B. Commutation: A Form of Clemency .............................................................................. 17 
1. Prior to the Late 18th Century: Development of Pardoning Power .......................... 20 
2. From the Late 18th Century to the Mid-19th Century: Emergence and 
Constitutionality of Commutation ......................................................................................................... 21 
3. The Use of Commutation ............................................................................................................. 22 
4. Summary: the Decline of the Use of Commutation and Its Possible Explanation 26 
C.  Data on Commutations of LWOP Sentences .............................................................. 27 
1. Before the 1970s: Commutation Used as Parole to Release Parole-Ineligible Life 
Inmates .............................................................................................................................................................. 27 
2. After the 1970s: the Decline in Commuting LWOP Sentences ..................................... 28 
3. Increasing Commutation Applications From LWOP Inmates in the Future ........... 31 
II.  Commuting LWOP Sentences: Undermining the LWOP Sentencing 
Scheme? ..................................................................................................................................... 34 
A. Diminished Certainty of LWOP Sentencing Caused by Commutation .............. 34 
B. The Rationale for --- and Limitations on --- LWOP Sentencing ........................... 36 
1. Murder Cases: Retribution and Deterrence ......................................................................... 37 
2. Habitual Offenders: Deterrence and Incapacitation......................................................... 38 
3. Drug Laws: Deterrence and Retribution ............................................................................... 40 
C. The Rationale and Development of Parole ................................................................ 41 
1. Basis of Parole: Rehabilitation .................................................................................................. 41 
2. Early Stages: Failed Application of Rehabilitative Ideal Under Unconstrained 
Parole Scheme ................................................................................................................................................ 42 
3. Changes to the Parole System to Employ the Rehabilitative Ideal ............................. 43 
4. Sentencing Reform Era: Modern Challenges and Elimination of Parole .................. 44 
5. Modern Parole System: Moderate Application of Rehabilitative Ideal .................... 46 
D. Rationales for Commutation ........................................................................................... 47 
1. Justice-Enhancement .................................................................................................................... 47 
2. Utilitarian Use of Clemency ........................................................................................................ 52 
3. Redemptive Use of Clemency .................................................................................................... 52 
4. Disuniformity in Application of Standards for Issuing Clemency .............................. 53 
E. The Tension Between Certain Grounds for Commutation and a LWOP 
Sentence ............................................................................................................................................... 56 
III. The Need for a System of “Guided Discretion” in Commuting LWOP 
Sentences .................................................................................................................................. 60 
A. Commuting LWOP Sentences: An Unfettered Discretionary Power ................. 60 
B. The Historical Trend Toward Guided Discretion in Sentencing ........................ 63 
1. Wide Judicial Discretion in the Indeterminate Sentencing Era ................................... 63 
 iv 
2. Limiting Judicial Discretion in the Sentencing Reform Act ........................................... 64 
3. Advisory Sentencing Guidelines After Booker ................................................................... 67 
C. Guided Discretion: The Cornerstone of Fair Sentencing ....................................... 69 
1. Definition and Premise ................................................................................................................. 69 
2. Guided Discretion: An Approach That Better Promotes Consistency in 
Sentencing, Without Sacrificing Individualized Sentencing ........................................................ 71 
3. Guided Discretion:  An Approach that Better Guarantees Proportionality ............ 73 
D. The Need for a “Guided Discretion” Scheme in Commuting LWOP Sentences
 ................................................................................................................................................................. 79 
IV. Guidelines for Commuting LWOP Sentences ................................................. 81 
1. Grounds for Commutation ............................................................................................... 81 
1.1 Excessive Punishment ................................................................................................................ 81 
1.2 Battered Woman Syndrome .................................................................................................... 83 
1.3 Substantial Assistance to Authorities .................................................................................. 85 
1.4 Terminal Illness ............................................................................................................................ 86 
2. Prohibited Grounds for Commutation ......................................................................... 87 
2.1 Rehabilitation ................................................................................................................................ 87 
2.2 Meritorious Services ................................................................................................................... 87 
2.3 Prison Overcrowding ................................................................................................................. 88 
3. Written Reasons .................................................................................................................. 88 
4. Procedures for Considering Commutation Petitions ............................................. 89 
V. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................... 92 
Bibliography .................................................................................................................... 93 
 
  
 v 
Acknowledgements 
 
I would never have been able to finish my dissertation without the guidance of my committee 
members, help from friends, and support from my family. Special thanks to Professor Thomas Lee, 
Professor Daniel Capra, and Dean Toni Fine for all their kindness and assistance.  
 1 
Introduction 
 
Larry Lee Fisher was 34 years old when convicted on April 14, 1994, of Robbery in the Second 
Degree and sentenced to serve life without the possibility of parole as required by Washington’s Persistent 
Offender Accountability Act, the so-called “Three Strikes” law. After ten years of imprisonment, he was 
granted a Conditional Commutation authorized by Governor Christine O. Gregoire. Under the 
commutation, Mr. Fisher’s sentence is going to end at December 23, 2015, as long as he fulfills all the 
terms described in this Conditional Commutation.2 
 
According to the Governor, the following facts justified Mr. Fisher’s commutation:3 a) Mr. Fisher has 
served a far longer sentence than the maximum sentence for his third conviction without the three strikes 
law;4 b) Mr. Fisher has shown remorse to his past crime;5 c) Mr. Fisher has successfully participated in 
appropriate programs, such as mental health treatment and substance abuse programs;6 d) Mr. Fisher has 
shown considerable rehabilitation by participating in positive programs offered in prison.7 
 
The commutation is conditional --- Mr. Fisher is subject to a number of obligations, including the 
successful performance in re-entry programs both before and after release,8 and the fulfillment of life-long 
obligations concerning post release supervision.9 Furthermore, Fisher’s commutation could be revoked if 
he commits an offense of any type or violates the post release conditions set forth in this commutation 
order.10 
 
                                                          
2 See Diana Hefley, Clemency in 3-strikes cases gives inmate shot at release, HERALDNET, Jan. 8, 2013, 
http://www.heraldnet.com/article/20130108/NEWS01/701089913?page=single; see also  
CONDITIONAL COMUTATION OF LARRY LEE FISHER, HERALDNET, 
http://heraldnet.com/assets/pdf/DH12998818.pdf. [hereinafter CONDITIONAL COMMUTATION] 
 
3 See id. CONDITIONAL COMMUTATION. 
 
4 As the Commutation states, “Mr. Fisher is now 54 years old. To date, Mr. Fisher has been incarcerated on 
Snohomish County Superior Court Cause No. 94-1-00147-1 for over 18 years. The maximum sentence for 
Robbery in the Second Degree in Washington State, without the three strikes law, is 120 months”. Id. at 1. 
 
5 As the Commutation states, “Mr. Fisher accepted legal responsibility and expressed remorse for all of his 
past crimes and apologized for his actions to his victims and the state of Washington at his Clemency 
Board hearing”. Id. 
 
6 As the Commutation states, “Mr. Fisher recognizes that his criminal behavior was due to his abuse of 
alcohol and drugs and untreated mental illnesses. During his incarceration, he has participated in mental 
health treatment and substance abuse programs”. Id. 
 
7 As the Commutation states, “Mr. Fisher has shown considerable rehabilitation during his period of 
incarceration. He has taken advantage of positive programming opportunities offered in prison”. Id. at 2. 
 
8 Mr. Fisher should successfully complete a period of re-entry programs. These programs contain a period 
of re-entry program in total confinement, a successive period of work release program in a lower level of 
custody, and the final term of community custody under the supervision of the state with a dozen of 
conditions. Id. at 2-3. 
 
9 Mr. Fisher should comply for the whole life with the post release conditions, which include regularly 
reporting to a correctional officer, abstaining from alcohol, drugs, and firearms, having no contact with the 
victims or their family member, and etc. Id. 
 
10 Id. at 3-4. 
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The conditional commutation issued to Mr. Fisher is very much like a parole release warrant, the 
issuance of which is grounded on the petitioner’s successful rehabilitation during incarceration, requires the 
petitioner to serve a period of post release supervision and provides for revocation of parole release based 
on the petitioner’s violations of law. But when such a parole-like conditional commutation is granted to 
LWOP inmates, it will produce a systematical inconsistency in the application of LWOP sentences. While 
functioning as a parole release in allowing the LWOP inmates to leave prison, commuting the sentences of 
LWOP inmates undoubtedly conflicts with the premise of a LWOP sentencing scheme, which is 
established to prohibit inmates who are sentenced to life sentence from being released on the ground of 
rehabilitation. 
 
Although the new development of commuting the sentences of LWOP inmates can be thought of as a 
recognition of developing standards of human decency, this article addresses the concern that the current 
application might cause conflicts that would prejudice the value of consistency and finality in the criminal 
justice system. This article argues that the commutation power as applied to LWOP inmates should be 
subject to standards that guide executive discretion. This article will provide suggestions on how to regulate 
the commutation power as applied to LWOP inmates so as to make it consistent with the principles behind 
a LWOP sentencing scheme, and to integrate that power with other methods of providing early release such 
as parole. 
 
Part I of this article describes and analyzes the new phenomenon of commuting sentences of LWOP 
inmates. Part I includes a discussion and analyzes the history of the clemency power and the history of the 
development of the life without parole sentence. Part II discusses whether the commutation of LWOP 
inmates is by its nature inconsistent with the intended certainty of LWOP sentencing. Part III proposes a 
system of guided discretion to assure that an executive, when deciding whether to commute a LWOP 
sentence, is acting properly within substantive sentencing choices and procedural protections; this part 
concludes that a system of guided discretion, analogous to that employed at sentencing by a district court 
under the Sentencing Guideline, will best assure that commutation decisions will be fair and consistent with 
established sentencing policy. Part IV sets forth model commutation guidelines and explanatory notes, to 
provide an example of a system of guided discretion --- one that will tend to assure that commutation 
decisions are made for reasons that do not undermine the LWOP sentencing scheme, and are made free of 
any stain of outside influence or personal politics.  
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I. Commuting LWOP Sentences 
 
A. LWOP Sentencing in America 
 
1. Prior to the Late 1960s: No Gradation of LWOP Sentences 
 
From the early 20th Century to the late 1960s, life sentences without parole eligibility were rarely 
used in America. In this period, the rehabilitative ideal dominated American penal philosophy and the 
indeterminate sentencing regime took hold,11 resulting in judges and parole authorities having the most 
power to decide how long a convict would serve his or her sentence.12 Life sentences were imposed either 
in the form of an indeterminate sentence with a fixed minimum term of years of imprisonment, e.g., 25 
years to life,13 or in a mandatory form without any minimum term fixed. In both types of life sentences, the 
parole board14 had the authority to permit such prisoners parole release. States running a mandatory life 
sentence would set a minimum term after which the parole authority would be allowed to consider early 
release for lifers.15 By 1970, only 7 states --- Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, 
Pennsylvania and West Virginia --- precluded parole eligibility for those sentenced to life.16 
                                                          
11 See Nancy Gertner, A Short History of American Sentencing: Too Little Law, Too Much Law, or Just 
Right, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 691, 695 (2010) [hereinafter Gertner, A Shot History]. 
 
12 Judges had the authority to sentence convicted defendants either to probation or to prison, while parole 
boards decided when prisoners were released. See Michael Tonry, Twenty Years of Sentencing Reform: 
Steps Forward, Steps Backward, 78 JUDICATURE 169, 170-71 (1995) [hereinafter Tonry, Twenty Years]. 
Both the sentencing court and the parole board had wide discretion under this regime. See CYNDI BANKS, 3 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE ETHICS, THEORY AND PRACTICE, 113 (2013). 
 
13 See MARC MAUER, RYAN KING & MALCOLM YOUNG, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE MEANING OF 
“LIFE”: LONG PRISON SENTENCES IN CONTEXT, 4 (2004), available at 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_meaningoflife.pdf [hereinafter MAUER, THE 
MEANING OF “LIFE”]. 
 
14 Parole is a conditional release of an inmate before the expiration of his or her full term of imprisonment. 
The idea of parole is to encourage inmates to become law-abiding persons by rewarding them early release 
on their good conduct during the incarceration. See 10 PAUL F. CROMWELL, ROLANDO V. DEL CARMEN & 
LEANNE FIFTAL ALARID, COMMUNITY BASED CORRECTIONS (2002). The concept of parole was introduced 
to the United States from Europe in the late 19th century. Parole was first used in the United States in New 
York in 1876. In 1907, New York became the first state that formally adopted a parole system. By 1942, all 
states and the federal government had such parole systems. See SAMUEL WALKER, POPULAR JUSTICE: A 
HISTORY OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1998); see also TODD R. CLEAR, GEORGE F. COLE & MICHAEL 
DEAN REISIG, AMERICAN CORRECTIONS (2010).   
 
At the federal level, the federal Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 abolished parole. The rationale for 
abolishing parole was that the discretion exercised by parole boards was one of the major causes of 
disparity in sentencing. See STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG AND DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE: INVESTIGATIVE CASES AND COMMENTARY 1550 (10th ed. 2014). 
 
15 In Rhode Island, a state that did not adopt indeterminate sentencing, a life sentence was a mandatory 
sentence. But the state allowed the parole board to release lifers after they had served a minimum term of 
twenty years of imprisonment. See Edward Lindsey, Indeterminate Sentence Release on Parole and 
Pardon, 6 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 807, 808 (1915). 
 
16 The listing of states is based on a data collection produced by the Death Penalty Information Center 
(DPIC). But two corrections have to be made to that data. First, the State of Maine should be recognized as 
a state that prohibits parole eligibility for life sentences in 1976. Maine took several back and forth steps in 
precluding parole eligibility for lifers. Maine enacted life sentences in 1841. When the parole law was 
 4 
2. Schick v. Reed: Commuting the Death Penalty to a LWOP Sentence 
 
The first move to impose the LWOP sentence was made by the President, using the pardoning power 
under Article II of the Constitution17 to grant conditional commutations18 to some convicted defendants 
who were sentenced to death. In the landmark case of Schick v. Reed,19 the Supreme Court endorsed the 
executive branch’s use of determinate life sentencing conditioned on no parole eligibility. In 1954, Master 
Sergeant Maurice L. Schick was sentenced to death by a military court-martial for killing an eight-year old 
girl.20 In 1960, President Eisenhower commuted his sentence from death to life imprisonment with the 
condition that he would not thereafter be eligible for parole. 21  Schick challenged the validity of the 
condition of no-parole attached to his life sentence.22 He argued that President Eisenhower had exceeded 
                                                                                                                                                                             
established in 1913, the Parole Board of Maine was established and authorized to release all offenders on 
parole including lifers. Subsequently, the Act of 1944 removed the Parole Board's authority in cases of 
“any person convicted of an offense the only punishment for which prescribed by the law is imprisonment 
for life...” (R. S. ch. 136, § 12). However, later revisions in the law extended the possibility of parole to 
prisoners serving life sentences. Lifers could achieve parole eligibility after 30 years (P. L.1953, ch. 382). 
In 1969, the 30 years’ minimum was reduced to 15 years (P. L.1969, ch. 280). However, Maine abolished 
parole in 1976. See DONALD ANSPACH, PETER LEHMAN & JOHN CRAMER, MAINE REJECTS THE 
INDETERMINACY, A CASE STUDY OF FLAT SENTENCING AND PAROLE ABOLITION 17 (1984), available at 
National Criminal Justice Reference Service, 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/94367NCJRS.pdf. Since then, a person sentenced to life in 
Maine has not been eligible for parole. 
  
Secondly, the State of Nebraska precluded parole eligibility for lifers when the parole law was 
enacted in 1969. As noted in Poindexter v. Houston, 275 Neb. 863 (2008), under Nebraska law, NEB. REV. 
STAT. § 83–1,110, a defendant serving a life sentence for first degree murder was not eligible for parole 
until the Board of Pardons commuted his life sentence to a term of years. See Thomas Davidson, Year That 
States Adopted Life Without Parole (LWOP) Sentencing, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER (Aug. 2, 
2010), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/year-states-adopted-life-without-parole-lwop-sentencing; see also 
Gilbert v. State, 549 A.2d 737, 738, at n. 2, n. 3. (Me., 1988); see also LARRY LINKE & PEGGY RITCHIE, 
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CORRECTIONS, RELEASING INMATES FROM PRISONS: PROFILES OF STATE 
PRACTICES, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CORRECTIONS 43 (2004), http://static.nicic.gov/Library/021386.pdf. 
 
17 U.S.C.A. CONST. Art. II, § 2, cl. 1. The clause provides: “The President … shall have Power to Grant 
Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.” 
 
18 A commutation generally means a reduction of sentence, which derives from the pardoning power vested 
in the Constitution. As stated in In re Opinion of the Justices, 190 Mass. 616, 78 N.E. 311 (1906), “[t]he 
commutation of a sentence is a pardon upon condition that the convict voluntarily submits to a lighter 
punishment.” A conditional commutation is one applied only if certain stated circumstances are satisfied. 
As stated in Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 262 (1974), conditions could be applied in “[v]arious types, … 
[in] both penal and nonpenal … nature”. Typical conditions were that the felon be confined at hard labor 
for a stated period of time, or that he serve in the Armed Forces. See Schick, 419 U.S. at 262, n. 3. Another 
condition commonly set is that the commuted convict must behave as a law-abiding citizen. See 3 U. S. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES, 216 (1939) 
[hereinafter U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S SURVEY]. In Schick, the Court held that 
conditional commutation of the death sentence to a no parole eligible life sentence is constitutional. See 
Schick, 419 U.S. at 268. 
 
19 Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256 (1974).  
 
20 Id. at 257. 
 
21 Id. 
 
22 Id. at 257, 267. 
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his Article II commutation powers in attaching the stipulation.23 The Court rejected his claim and upheld 
the conditional commutation.24 Though “the Court [was] actually dealing with the scope of the President’s 
[clemency] power,”25 by upholding the constitutionality of the conditional commutation, the Court was 
clearly of the view that there was a need for determinate true life sentences at least in certain 
circumstances.26 
 
3. The 1970s: Emergence of LWOP Sentences as An Alternative to the Death Penalty 
 
The next foray into determinate LWOP sentencing occurred when the Supreme Court reviewed the 
constitutionality of the death penalty. In 1972 the Supreme Court held, in Furman v. Georgia,27 that the 
application of the death penalty under then-existing statutes was unconstitutional --- as those statutes could 
be applied in an arbitrary and capricious manner. 28  In response to Furman, states imposing capital 
punishment were pushed to rewrite their death penalty statutes, and “roughly two-thirds of the States 
promptly redrafted their capital sentencing statutes in an effort to limit jury discretion and avoid arbitrary 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
23 Id. at 257, 259.  
 
24 Schick, 419 U.S. at 268. 
 
25 See Julian H. Wright, Life-Without-Parole: An Alternative to Death or Not Much of a Life at All? 43 
VAND. L. REV. 529, 535 (1990). 
 
26 The specific need for attaching a no parole eligibility condition to the commutation of a death penalty to 
a life imprisonment was made necessary by the nationwide adoption of the parole laws, which, in most 
states, were applied to prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment. The executive’s specification of the no 
parole condition purported to preclude the parole board’s discretionary decision to release the commuted 
lifers on parole. Early in the 20th Century when parole emerged in the United States, in some states, such 
as California, the governor had at times commuted a death sentence to life imprisonment without 
possibility of parole. See 3 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S SURVEY, supra note 18, at 216. 
 
Before parole laws were enacted in the United States, the executive had no need to specify the no 
parole condition in commuting a death sentence to a determinate life imprisonment. In Ex parte Wells, in 
which the Supreme Court reviewed whether the President could grant a conditional pardon where President 
Fillmore pardoned Wells on the condition that Wells remain in prison for life, the Supreme Court reasoned 
that “ [a] conditional pardon when accepted by a convict is the substitution, by himself, of a lesser 
punishment than the law has imposed upon him, and he cannot complain if the law executes the choice he 
has made.” Ex parte Wells, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 307, 315 (1855). As Wells’s conditional pardon was actually 
a commutation, Wells was interpreted by subsequent cases to mean that the President has power to 
commute sentences under the pardoning power vested in the Constitution. See Ex parte Harlan, 180 F. 119 
(C.C.N.D. Fla. 1909); Harlan v. McGourin, 218 U.S. 442 (1910); Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480 (1927). 
Since there were no parole laws when Wells was commuted, the executive order of commutation simply 
confined the commuted murderer in prison until his death. 
 
27 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). 
 
28 Id. at 239-40. In a 5-4 decision, the five Justices in the majority could not produce a common rationale, 
and could only agree on a short ruling that the imposition of the death penalty constituted cruel and unusual 
punishment under the Eighth Amendment. But the Court in Furman did not rule the death penalty per se 
unconstitutional, and thus left room for state lawmakers to rewrite death penalty sentencing statutes to pass 
constitutional muster. In some states, death penalty statutes already had been declared unconstitutional 
under state constitutional provisions analogous to the Eighth Amendment. The California Supreme Court, 
for example, struck down California's death penalty statute prior to Furman on the ground that it violated 
article I, § 6 of the California Constitution's prohibition of “cruel or unusual punishments.” People v. 
Anderson, 6 Cal.3d 628, 656-57, 493 P.2d 880, 899, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, 171 (1972). 
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and inconsistent results.”29 Four years later, after a temporary moratorium on executions, the Supreme 
Court in Gregg v. Georgia,30 upheld the constitutionality of death penalty sentencing statutes so long as 
they 1) set forth standards that guided the discretion of the sentencer, 2) bifurcated the guilt and sentencing 
phases, and 3) were sufficiently narrowed to certain crimes and perpetrators.31 But the Court rejected the 
mandatory death penalty without any other alternative sentencing choice in Woodson v. North Carolina,32 
in which the Court held that mandatory death penalty statutes violated the Eighth Amendment.33 
 
In response to Woodson, States that maintained the death penalty had to provide non-death 
alternatives in capital cases.34 In this context, LWOP, as distinguished from the traditional parole-eligible 
life sentence, was enacted as an independent gradation of punishment and specifically used as an 
alternative to the death penalty. By 1994, of the 38 death penalty states, 35 26 provided for a LWOP 
sentence as an alternative to capital punishment, either as the sole alternative to the death penalty or as an 
alternative to the death penalty accompanied with the other alternative of traditional life sentence with 
                                                          
29 Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 44 (1984); see also Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 70-72 (1987) 
(discussing general history of death penalty legislation in years following Furman). 
 
30 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). Gregg is used to refer to the series of cases the Supreme Court 
delivered on July 2, 1976 in setting forth the constitutional death penalty sentencing schemes. The series of 
cases are Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976), and Jurek v. 
Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). 
 
31 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek 
v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). Regarding the bifurcated sentencing procedure, which divides the trial of 
capital cases into guilt-innocence phase and sentencing phase, the Court in Gregg did not discuss whether 
the judge or the jury enjoyed the decisive power in entering a sentencing decision. In Ring v. Arizona, the 
Court held that the Sixth Amendment requires a jury to find the aggravating factors necessary for imposing 
the death penalty. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 608 n. 6, 609 (2002).  
 
32 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).  
 
33 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976). North 
Carolina made “death the mandatory sentence for all persons convicted of first-degree murder.” See 
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 286-7 (1976). Louisiana also enacted the same mandatory 
sentence for first-degree murder. See Roberts, 428 U.S. at 331. The Court reasoned that the mandatory 
death penalty statutes impermissibly disregarded the circumstances of the particular offense and the 
character and propensities of the offender, and were inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency. 
See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 301-4; Roberts, 428 U.S. at 333, 335-36. 
 
34 The term “capital case” refers to a case in which the sentence of death might be employed. The Supreme 
Court struck down the death penalty for the crime of rape, in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), on the 
ground that the death penalty is grossly disproportionate and excessive for the crime of rape “which does 
[not] involve the unjustified taking of human life” (Coker, at 598), and in Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 
407 (2008), on the ground that it is unconstitutional to impose the death penalty for the crime of raping a 
child, when the victim does not die and death was not intended (Kennedy, at 413). Thus the death penalty is 
reserved for the most serious crime --- murder. Different states provide different names to specify the 
offense that would be subject to the death penalty. Arizona uses the name of first degree murder. See ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-751(A) (2013). Washington uses the name of aggravated first degree murder. See 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.030 (Westlaw 2013). Arkansas uses the name of capital murder. See Ark. 
Stat. Ann. § 5-4-602 (1987). Georgia uses the name of murder. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-1 (Westlaw 
2013). Utah uses the name of aggravated murder. See UTAH CODE ANN. §76-5-202 (Westlaw 2013). 
 
35 Data is derived from a database produced by the Death Penalty Information Center (DPIC). See States 
With and Without the Death Penalty, THE DPIC, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-
penalty (last visited Nov. 20, 2014). 
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parole eligibility.36 The remaining 12 states provided a traditional life sentence with parole eligibility as the 
sole alternative to the death penalty. Eventually, traditional life sentences with parole eligibility as the sole 
alternative to capital punishment disappeared. By 2013, of the 32 death penalty states,37 24 provide the 
LWOP sentence as the only alternative to the death penalty,38 and 8 provide both LWOP sentence and the 
traditional life sentence with parole eligibility as alternatives to the death penalty.39 The federal and military 
justice systems provide the options of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole, life imprisonment 
without the possibility of parole, and death in the capital case.40 
 
Meanwhile, in the states that abolished the death penalty after Furman, the sentence of LWOP was 
deemed to be the most appropriate substitution to the death penalty in punishing the most serious murder 
crimes.41 In these states, there are two approaches to employ the sentence of LWOP in cases involving the 
most serious murder crimes --- providing mandatory LWOP sentence or providing LWOP sentences with 
alternative sentences. By 2013, of the 18 no-death-penalty states, (except for Alaska, which doesn’t have 
the sentence of LWOP), 8 provide mandatory LWOP sentences in the most serious murder cases,42 and 9 
                                                          
36 See Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S.154, 168 n.7 (1994).  
 
37 See supra note 35 (That data indicates that between 1993 and 2013, 6 states have moved away from the 
death penalty).  
 
38 See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46(e) (Westlaw 2013); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-751(A) (Westlaw 2013); 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-601(b)(1) (Westlaw 2013); CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 190.3 (Westlaw 2013); 
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1.3-1201 (Westlaw 2013); DEL. CODE ANN., Tit. 11, § 4209(a) (Westlaw 
2013); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.082(1) (Westlaw 2013); IDAHO CODE § 18-4004 (Westlaw 2013); IND. CODE 
ANN. § 35-50-2-3(a) (Westlaw 2013); KAN. STAT. ANN. §21-4635 (a) (2005); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. 
Art. 905.6 (Westlaw 2013); MO. REV. STAT. § 565.020.2 (Westlaw 2013); NEB. REV. STAT. §§28-105, -
303, 29-2520 to -2524 (Westlaw 2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(V) (Westlaw 2013); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. §15A-1371(a1) (Westlaw 2013); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2929.03(A) (Westlaw 2013); ORE. REV. 
STAT. § 163.105 (Westlaw 2013); 61 PA. CONS. STAT. §331.21 (Westlaw 2013); S.C. CODE ANN. §16-3-
20(A) (Westlaw 2013); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 24-15-4 (Westlaw 2013); TENN. CODE ANN. §39-2-202(b) 
(Westlaw 2013); TEX. PENAL CODE § 12.31(a) (2005); VA. CODE ANN. §53.1-151(B1) (Westlaw 2013); 
WYO. STAT. §§ 6-2-101(b), 7-13-402(a) (Westlaw 2013). 
 
39 See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-1 (Westlaw 2013); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §532.030(4) (Westlaw 2013); MISS. 
CODE ANN. §99-19-103 (Westlaw 2013); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-202(2) (Westlaw 2013); NEV. REV. 
STAT. § 175.554(4) (Westlaw 2013); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.9(A) (Westlaw 2013); UTAH CODE 
ANN. §76-5-202 (Westlaw 2013); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.030 (Westlaw 2013). Regarding the 
State of Vermont, although the US Department of Justice currently categorizes Vermont as a non-death 
penalty state (and has since 1988), Vermont maintains the death penalty as punishment for treason and has 
three statutes governing death penalty procedure. See TRACY SNELL, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT, 2012 - STATISTIC TABLES, http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cp12st.pdf; see also VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §2303(a) (Westlaw 2013).  
 
40 See Steven J. Mulroy, Avoiding “Death by Default”: Does the Constitution Require a “Life Without 
Parole” Alternative to the Death Penalty? 79 TUL. L. REV. 401, 410 (2004). 
 
41 The term “the most serious murder crimes” is intended to encompass the “capital crimes” that used to be 
punished by the death penalty in the respective jurisdictions. As the death penalty is no longer applicable in 
non-death penalty states, the term of “capital crimes” is no longer a legal term in these states. For example, 
Connecticut renames the crime of “capital felony” as “murder with special circumstances”, when 
Connecticut abolished the death penalty in 2012. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-54b; PA 12-5—SB 
280.  
 
42 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a–35a (Westlaw 2013); HAW. REV. STAT. § 706-656 (Westlaw 2013); 
IOWA. CODE. ANN. § 902 (Westlaw 2013); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-203 (Westlaw 2013); MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 265, § 2 (Westlaw 2013); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 791.234 and § 791.244 
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provide alternatives to the LWOP sentence --- either a traditional life sentence with parole eligibility, or a 
certain term of imprisonment.43 
 
4. The Sentencing Reform Era: Expanding the Applicability of LWOP Sentences 
 
The wide acceptance of LWOP sentences as an alternative to the death penalty led to a rise in LWOP 
statutes in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Beginning in the 1970s, the punishment philosophy generally 
shifted from a prime focus on rehabilitation to include consideration of retribution or “just deserts”.44 The 
indeterminate sentencing that was based on the rehabilitative ideal was widely rejected45 and the goal of 
sentencing turned to assuring the certainty and severity of punishment. 46  Consequently, the Federal 
government and many states shifted from indeterminate to determinate sentencing 47  by implementing 
multiple sentencing reforms, including enacting sentencing guidelines,48 enacting mandatory minimum 
                                                                                                                                                                             
(Westlaw 2013); MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 609.106 (Westlaw 2013); WIS. STAT. ANN § 973.014 and § 939.50 
(Westlaw 2013). 
 
43 See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1.1, 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-8-1 and 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 5/5-4.5-20(a) (2012); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1251 and tit. 34-A, § 5801 (Westlaw 2013); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (Westlaw 2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2 (Westlaw 2013); N.Y. PENAL 
LAW § 70.00 (McKinney 2013) and N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27 (McKinney 2013); N.D. CENT. CODE 
ANN. § 12.1-32-01 (Westlaw 2013); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-19.2-1 and § 11-23-2 (Westlaw 2013); W. 
VA. CODE ANN. § 62-3-15 (Westlaw 2013); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 § 2303 and § 2311(Westlaw 2013). 
 
44 Judge Lynch has briefly described the changes in sentencing goals and sentencing schemes that happened 
in the late twentieth century, as follows:  
 
The late twentieth century saw wholesale changes in sentencing philosophy and practice. The 
conventional wisdom about the primary purpose of sentencing shifted away from rehabilitation as 
a dominant philosophy and toward retribution or “just deserts.” The method of sentencing shifted 
away from broad judicial discretion to be exercised on a case-by-case basis and toward narrower 
authority constrained by rules laid down by legislatures or sentencing commissions. The form of 
sentences changed from indeterminate terms of imprisonment whose actual length would be 
determined by parole boards long after sentence was passed, to fixed or determinate sentences, 
with parole often abolished. The length of sentences increased, as the public sought greater 
security and less mercy, perhaps even less justice. Thus, the law of sentencing changed, from a 
legal regime that was famously characterized by Marvin Frankel in the 1970s as literally lawless, 
to one in which, in many states and especially in the federal jurisdiction, there is an extraordinarily 
rich and complicated body of substantive and procedural sentencing law. 
 
See Gerard E. Lynch, Sentencing: Learning From, and Worrying About, the States, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 
933, 933-934 (2005). 
 
45 See Sanford H. Kadish, Fifty Years of Criminal Law, an Opinionated Review, 87 CAL. L. R. 943, 979 
(1999). 
 
46 See PAUL J. HOFER, ET AL., U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING: AN 
ASSESSMENT OF HOW WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF 
SENTENCING REFORM 11 (2004) (noting that the goals identified in the Sentencing Reform Act for the new 
system including reducing sentencing disparity, assuring certainty and severity of punishment and 
increasing the rationality and transparency of punishment). 
 
47 See Tonry, Twenty Years, supra note 12, at 170. 
 
48 Before the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were established, sentencing guidelines had been used in a few 
states. See ROBIN L. LUBITZ & THOMAS W. ROSS, U.S. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES: REFLECTIONS ON THE FUTURE, NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFERENCE SERVICE 1 (2001), 
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sentence legislation, eliminating parole release,49 narrowing time off for good behavior,50 promoting truth 
in sentencing reform, 51  and enacting “three strikes” laws. 52  In this sentencing reform movement, the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/186480.pdf. In 1984, Congress passed the Sentencing 
Reform Act, which established the Sentencing Commission and delegated the Commission the legislative 
power to establish sentencing guidelines for federal judges. After a long process, the Commission 
promulgated the Sentencing Guidelines, which took effect in 1987. See Richard Husseini, The Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines: Adopting Clear and Convincing Evidence as the Burden of Proof, 57 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1387, 1387 (1990); see also Joseph S. Hall, Guided to Injustice? The Effect of the Sentencing 
Guidelines on Indigent Defendants and Public Defense, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1331, 1338 (1999). The 
goals of the Guidelines are consistency, uniformity and proportionality of sentencing. See UNITED STATES 
SENTENCING COMMISSION, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1 at 2 (1990). 
 
49 Parole is a hallmark of the indeterminate sentencing system. By the mid-1970s, indeterminate sentencing 
and parole were widely attacked because of, among other things, the failure of rehabilitative programs in 
preventing recidivism, sentencing disparities among the persons who had committed the same crime, and 
unwarranted sentencing discretion. See Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, Politics of Sentencing Reform: The 
Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 227 (1993) 
(summarizing the criticism of the flaws in the administration of the parole laws). The Sentencing Reform 
Act of 1984 abolished parole at the federal level. Several states, including California, Maine, Oregon, in the 
1980s, followed the trend in enacting determinate sentencing schemes and abolishing parole. See CAL. 
PENAL CODE §§ 1170, 3000 (2013); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-1 §§ 1151-1264 (2013); OR. REV. STAT. 
§§ 161.535-161.737 (2013). During the 1990s’ truth in sentencing movement, more states, including 
Arizona, Delaware, Kansas, North Carolina, Ohio, Virginia and Wisconsin eliminated discretionary parole 
release. Even in the states that did not formally abolish or eliminate parole laws, the parole board’s 
discretionary authority to release prisoners was limited, as the truth-in-sentencing laws required that 
prisoners serve at least 85 percent of the announced sentence. By the beginning of this Century,16 states 
and the federal government had abolished parole. Another 5 states had abolished discretionary parole for 
certain violent offenses or other felony crimes. See JOHN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME: 
PAROLE AND PRISONER REENTRY 65 (2003); see also LINKE & RITCHIE, supra note 16. In the 16 states that 
still maintain discretionary parole release practices, nearly all of these states have set up restrictive 
standards that parole- eligible prisoners must meet, and most of these states have enacted parole guidelines 
to reduce arbitrary decisionmaking on the part of parole boards. See id. PETERSILIA, at 71-72.  
 
50 “Good time” laws existed before parole laws. Good time laws, known as “commutation laws”, are used 
to help the prison warden maintain prison discipline by rewarding the prisoner certain time off his sentence 
in return for his “good behavior.” See RONALD L. GOLDFARB & LINDA R. SINGER, AFTER CONVICTION: A 
REVIEW OF THE AMERICAN CORRECTION SYSTEM 262 (1973); see also KATE STITH & JOSE A. CABRANES, 
FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 17 (1998). The Federal “Good time” 
law was introduced in 1875. It rewarded prisoners 5 days off per month for maintaining good conduct. See 
Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 145, 18 Stat. 479-80. In the Act of 1910, the good time rate was set to 10 days per 
month. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 4161-62 (1982) (repealed 1984). The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 reduced the 
good time off rate to approximately 54 days per year. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) (1988). 
 
51 Truth in sentencing is a legislative means of restoring public confidence in the criminal justice system by 
requiring offenders to serve their full (or almost full) sentences. The U.S. Congress authorized incentive 
grants to States to build or expand correctional facilities through the Violent Offender Incarceration and 
Truth-in-Sentencing Incentive Grants Program in the 1994 Crime Act (Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 
(1994)).  27 states and the District of Columbia have established truth-in sentencing laws, which require 
that prisoners convicted of selected violent crimes must serve not less than 85% of the announced sentence. 
See U.S. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF STRUCTURED SENTENCING, 
NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFERENCE SERVICE 33 (1999), available at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/strsent.pdf; see also PAULA M. DITTON & DORIS JAMES WILSON, U.S. 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, TRUTH IN SENTENCING IN STATE PRISONS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 
2 (1999), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/tssp.pdf; PETERSILIA, supra note 49, at 68. 
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imposition of the determinate sentence of LWOP was extended in many jurisdictions to non-homicide 
cases, drug cases and “three strikes” law violations.  
 
(a) Non-homicide Serious Felonies 
 
LWOP sentencing was first extended to punish non-homicide felonies during the trend of eliminating 
parole release. In this trend, many traditional parole-eligible life sentences that used to be imposed to 
punish certain non-homicide felonies were upgraded to LWOP sentences. In Florida, LWOP sentences are 
imposed for kidnapping,53 sexual battery,54 lewd or lascivious molestation,55 and armed robbery56, which 
are categorized as life felonies.57 By 2010, at least 37 states provided for LWOP sentences for certain non-
homicide offenses,58 which include kidnapping, sexual battery, burglary, robbery, carjacking, and battery.59 
 
(b) Drug Offenses 
 
During the “War on Drugs”,60 legislatures extended LWOP sentences to punish certain drug offenses. 
Since President Nixon officially declared the nation’s “War on Drugs” at press conference on June 17 in 
                                                                                                                                                                             
52 “Three Strikes” laws, which arose through the 1990s, addressed the public fear of the rising crime rate 
and early release of repeat offenders. See ELSA CHEN, IMPACTS OF THREE STRIKES AND TRUTH IN 
SENTENCING ON THE VOLUME AND COMPOSITION OF CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS, NATIONAL CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE REFERENCE SERVICE 1-5 (2001), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/187109.pdf. Punishing 
a habitual-offender with aggravated penalties, up to life imprisonment, has a long history in the Anglo-
American legal system. These enhancing punishment laws were common in England and the United States 
through the 20th century. But habitual-felon statutes that required LWOP were not used widely until the 
1990s. “[In the early 1990s], several states and the federal government have augmented their habitual 
offender statutes by enacting new, highly publicized ‘three strikes and you’re out’ laws that severely limit 
the discretion of prosecutors and judges.” WALTER J. DICKEY, THREE STRIKES: FIVE YEARS LATER 1 
(1998).  
 
53 FLA. STAT. § 781.01. 
 
54 Id. § 794.011. 
 
55 Id. § 800.04. 
 
56 Id. § 812.13. 
 
57 Florida has five degrees for felony offenses, including felony in the third degree, felony in the second 
degree, felony in the first degree, life felony and capital felony. A capital felony is punishable by death or 
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. A life felony is punishable by forty years to life 
imprisonment, or probation for the remainder of life, and a fine of up to fifteen thousand dollars. See FLA. 
STAT. §§ 775.081, 921.0022. See also Year 2000 State of Florida Crime and Punishment Chart, NATIONAL 
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT LEARNING CENTER, http://www.crimeandpunishment.net/FL/ (last visited Sep. 10, 
2013). 
 
58 See Ashley Nellis, Throwing Away the Key: The Expansion of Life Without Parole Sentencing in the 
United States, 23 FED. SENT. REP. 27, 27 (2010). 
 
59 For example, juvenile offenders in Florida have received LWOP sentences for kidnapping, sexual 
battery, robbery, battery, burglary, and carjacking. See PAOLO G. ANNINO ET AL., JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT 
PAROLE FOR NON-HOMICIDE OFFENSES: FLORIDA COMPARED TO NATION 6 (2009), available at 
http://www.law.fsu.edu/faculty/profiles/annino/Report_juvenile_lwop_092009.pdf. 
 
60 Drug control in the United States began in the 1910’s when the Harrison Narcotics Act was enacted in 
1914. The Supreme Court decision in Webb v. United States, 249 U.S. 96 (1919), which held that 
prescriptions of narcotics for maintenance treatment was not within the discretion of physicians and thus 
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1971, 61  legislatures not only expanded drug offenses, but also increased the lengths of drug offense 
sentences.62 On the federal level, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 198663 mandated that offenders convicted of 
possession with intent to distribute certain quantities of drugs are punishable by life sentence without parole 
eligibility. 64  Mandatory life sentence without parole eligibility is additionally applicable to principals 
convicted of conducting a continuing criminal enterprise involving drug transactions.65 Congress enacted 
the Amendment to the Anti-Drug Abuse Act 66 that increased penalties for drug offenses and created new 
federal offenses. On the state level, New York and Michigan took the lead in establishing tough penalties 
against drug offenses. New York, in 1973, enacted the first state-level tough sentencing law for drug 
offenses,67 known as the Rockefeller Drug Laws. Under these laws, a serious drug offender could be 
sentenced to a life sentence.68 Michigan, in 1973, passed the toughest drug law in the country, the “650-
Lifer Law”,69 which mandated LWOP sentences for the sale, manufacture or possession of 650 grams of 
cocaine or heroin. 70  The constitutionality of the sentence of LWOP was challenged in Harmelin v. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
not privileged under the Harrison Narcotics Act, virtually initiated the drug prohibition era in America. 
Congress continually enacted strict sentencing laws for drug offenses, such as The Boggs Act of 1951, the 
Narcotic Control Act of 1956, and the Single Convention of Narcotic Drugs of 1961. President Richard 
Nixon officially declared the nation’s War on Drugs in 1971. Subsequently, Congress passed a series of 
acts, including the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, The Anti-Drug Abuse 
Acts of 1986 and 1988, The Crime Bill of 1994, and the 1998 Higher Education Act, which resulted in the 
lengthening of sentences for drug offenders and the expansion of drug offenses. See JAMES P. GRAY, 2 
WHY OUR DRUG LAWS HAVE FAILED AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT: A JUDICIAL INDICTMENT OF THE 
WAR ON DRUGS 22, 27 (2011); see also Franklin E. Zimring, Imprisonment Rates and the New Politics of 
Criminal Punishment, in MASS IMPRISONMENT: SOCIAL CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 145 (David Garland 
ed., 2001) (noting that the second phase of prison growth occurred during the period from 1985 to 1992, 
correlating to the war on drugs).  
 
61 President Nixon announced the creation of a Special Action Office for drug abuse prevention. See 
DOUGLAS A. MCWAY, ED., DRUG WAR FACTS (6th ed., 2007).  
 
62 See Margaret P. Spencer, Sentencing Drug Offenders: The Incarceration Addiction, 40 VILL. L. REV. 335 
(1995) (noting that during the drug war, legislators enact legislation against drug crimes with harsher 
penalties). 
 
63 Public Law 99-570. 
 
64 The 1986 Act mandated a sentence of ten years to life, without probation or parole, for first offenders 
convicted of possession with intent to distribute larger quantities of drugs. The designated quantities were 1 
kilogram of heroin, 5 kilograms of cocaine mixture, 100 grams of PCP, 50 grams of crack, 1000 grams of 
marijuana, or 10 grams of LSD. See 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A)(1) (1988). 
 
65 See GRAY, supra note 60, at 27. 
 
66 Public Law 100-690. 
 
67 Act of May 8, 1973. 
 
68 See Peter A. Mancuso, Resentencing after the “Fall” of Rockefeller: The Failure of the Drug Law 
Reform Act of 2004 and 2005 to Remedy the Injustice of the New York Rockefeller Drug Laws and the 
Compromise of 2009, 73 ALB. L. REV. 1535, 1537-39 (2010) (noting that the Rockefeller Drug Laws 
expanded the list of felonies, which in consequence escalated the punishment of certain statutorily 
categorized serious drug offenses to a life sentence without parole). 
 
69 Public Act 368 of 1978. 
 
70 See MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. §§ 333.7401, 7403, 7407 (1978); see also Patrick Affholter & Bethany 
Wicksall, Eliminating Michigan’s Mandatory Minimum Sentences for Drug Offenses, Michigan Senate 1 
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Michigan,71 by a defendant who was convicted under the Michigan law of possessing more than 650 grams 
of cocaine, and sentenced to a mandatory term of life in prison without possibility of parole. A majority of 
the Supreme Court ruled that Harmelin’s sentence, though harsh, was not banned by the Eighth 
Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. Today, LWOP sentences are used to punish drug 
offenders in the federal system and in a handful of states, such as Alabama,72 Michigan,73 Mississippi,74 
Texas75 and Virginia.76 
 
(c) Habitual Offenders 
 
“Three strikes” laws also account for the increasing use of LWOP sentences. “Three strikes” laws are 
designed to mandate enhanced long term imprisonment for offenders who are convicted of a third felony.77 
The penological theory underlying the “three strikes” laws is to incapacitate these habitual offenders, who 
are allegedly unable to be rehabilitated.78 States vary in defining the strike zones and the number of strikes 
that are required to sentence the defendant “out”. Violent crimes always count as a strike, but non-violent 
crimes, such as drug offenses, escape, treason, and etc., are often defined as strikeable offenses too. 
Punishment enhancement is mostly imposed upon the third conviction, but some states impose enhanced 
punishment to a second conviction or a fourth conviction.79 The enhanced punishment for habitual felons 
could reach to life imprisonment with or without parole possibility, depending on the jurisdiction.80 
                                                                                                                                                                             
(2002), 
http://www.senate.michigan.gov/sfa/publications%5Cnotes%5C2002notes%5Cnotesnovdec02affholterwic
ksall.pdf.  
 
71 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991). 
 
72 ALA. CODE § 13A-12-231(3)(d) (1995). 
 
73 MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 333.7401, 333.7403. 
 
74 MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-29-139(f) (West 2011). 
 
75 Dane Schiller, Drug Crime Sends First-Time Offender Grandmom to Prison for Life, CHRON (May 22, 
2012 12:27pm), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/First-time-offender-grandma-doing-life-
for-drug-3547226.php. 
 
76 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-248. 
 
77 See DICKEY, supra note 52. 
 
78 See JOAN R. PETERSILIA, PETER W. GREENWOOD & MARVIN LAVIN, CRIMINAL CAREERS OF HABITUAL 
FELONS (1978); PETER W. GREENWOOD & ALLAN ABRAHAMSEN, SELECTIVE INCAPACITATION (1982); 
Kathleen Auerhahn, Selective Incapacitation And the Problem of Prediction, 37 CRIMINOLOGY 703 (1999); 
KATHLEEN AUERHAHN, SELECTIVE INCAPACITATION AND PUBLIC POLICY: EVALUATING CALIFORNIA’S 
IMPRISONMENT CRISIS (2003). 
 
79 See generally JOHN CLARK, JAMES AUSTIN & D. ALAN HENRY, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, “THREE 
STRIKES AND YOU’RE OUT”: A REVIEW OF STATE LEGISLATION 1 (1997), available at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/165369.pdf (describing the rapid expansion of three strikes laws between 
1993 and 1995); see also Michael Vitiello, Three Strikes: Can We Return to Rationality? 87 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 395, 400 (1997) (noting that “three strikes” laws in different states vary in a number of 
ways). 
 
80 In California, the defendant must be sentenced to “an indeterminate term of life imprisonment” if he has 
two or more prior “serious” or “violent” felony convictions. Such life sentence is parolable on the date 
calculated by the statute. CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 667(e)(2)(A) (West 1999), 1170.12(c)(2)(A) (West 
Supp. 2002). In Mississippi, the Three Strikes law requires that a person convicted of a felony who has two 
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The first so-called “three strikes” law was enacted by Washington State in 1993.81 California enacted 
“three strikes” in 1994, and it was the toughest enhancement statute in the country.82 California law allowed 
enhanced punishment on the second conviction, did not require the previous conviction to be for a violent 
crime, and allowed the third strike to apply to any violent or nonviolent felony.83  Congress enacted “three 
strikes” laws in the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,84 which mandated life 
imprisonment without release for an offender convicted of a federal offense, if the offender had two prior 
state or federal convictions for qualifying offenses. 85  The Three Strikes phenomenon spread quickly. 
Between 1993 and 1995, 24 States and the Federal Government enacted “Three Strikes” laws.86 Arizona 
became the 25th state enacting the “three strikes” law in 200687 and Massachusetts became the 26th state in 
2012.88 Although the enhanced punishment of life sentence imposed in Three Strikes laws have been 
challenged for the alleged violation of the Eighth Amendment, the Supreme Court, in Ewing v. 
California,89 relying on Rummel v. Estelle,90 ruled that a life sentence imposed under the Three Strikes law 
--- even though for relatively minor felonies --- did not violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of 
the Eighth Amendment. Today, all 50 states, the federal government, and the District of Columbia have 
employed either three strikes laws or habitual offender statutes to impose enhanced sentences to criminal 
recidivists.91 The federal government92 and at least 25 states impose LWOP sentences to recidivist felons.93 
                                                                                                                                                                             
prior separate felony convictions and has served one or more years for each prior conviction, with any one 
of such felony convictions being for a crime of violence, shall be sentenced to life imprisonment without 
parole. MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-83 (1994). 
 
81 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.030 (West 1994). 
 
82 A.B. 971, 1994 CAL. STAT. 12 (Codified at CAL. PENAL CODE § 667). 
 
83 See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, GORDON HAWKINS & SAM KAMIN, PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THREE 
STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA 4 (2001). 
 
84 Public Law 103-322 (1994). 
 
85 18 U.S.C. § 3559 (c) (1994). 
 
86 See CLARK, AUSTIN & HENRY, supra note 79.. 
 
87 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-706 (2006). 
 
88 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 279, § 25(b) (2012). 
 
89 Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003). 
 
90 Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S. 263 (1980) (holding that the mandatory life sentence imposed upon 
petitioner, who was convicted of a third felony, obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses, did not constitute 
cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments). 
 
91 AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, A LIVING DEATH: LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR NONVIOLENT 
OFFENSES, 35-36 (2013). 
 
92 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 860, 849, 861, 841(B)(1)(A) (West 2010). 
 
93 The states that impose LWOP sentences to habitual offenders include: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, 
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. See ALA. CODE 1975 §§ 13A-5-9 (c) (3)-(4); ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 13-706 (2006); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-501 (2011); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.082(9); GA.CODE 
ANN. § 17–10–7(b)(2); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 706-661, 706-662; 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-4.5-95, 
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5. From the 1980s: Increasing Imposition of LWOP Sentences 
 
Fueled by the tough-on-crime policy, the sentencing reform movement, and the introduction of drug 
laws and “three strikes” laws, the use of LWOP sentences is on the rise.  
 
The increasing imposition of LWOP sentences could be inferred from its gradual adoption by states 
(See Table 1). In 1970 there were less than 10 states adopting LWOP sentences. In the early 1990s, 30 
states adopted LWOP sentences. A tide of expansion of LWOP sentences resulted from sentencing reform 
in the 1990’s. Since 2005, all American jurisdictions but Alaska, 94  have instituted LWOP sentencing 
schemes. Obviously, the growth of the states adopting LWOP sentencing schemes definitely contributes to 
the past four decades’ increasing imposition of LWOP sentences. 
 
Table 1 
 
 
The increasing imposition of LWOP sentences could be directly drawn from the yearly-recorded 
LWOP inmate population. Though there is no official agency managing the national statistics of the 
number of LWOP inmates, the limited data obtained by the Sentencing Project demonstrates that the 
imposition of LWOP sentences is on the rise (See Table 2). As shown in this graph, the population of 
prisoners serving LWOP sentences rose from 12,453 in 1992 to 49,081 in 2012, which accounts for a 394% 
                                                                                                                                                                             
5/3-3-3 (West 2012); IOWA CODE §§ 902.14(1), 902.1; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:529.1; MD. CODE. CRIM. 
LAW § 14-101(b)(1); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 279, § 25(b) (2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 
333.7413(1) (West 2012); MINN.STAT. § 609.3455; MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-83; MONT. CODE ANN. § 
46–18–219; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 207.010 (2009); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2-415(D)(3); S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 17-25-45; WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.94A.570, 9.94A.030(36); WIS. STAT. § 939.62(2m)(b)2; see also 
CLARK, AUSTIN & HENRY, supra note 79, at 7-8 (listing the three strikes law states that employ LWOP 
sentences, such as Indiana, New Jersey, North Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia). 
 
94 Alaska is the only state that has not provided for LWOP sentencing. See THE DPIC, YEARS THAT STATES 
ADOPTED LWOP SENTENCING (2010), at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/year-states-adopted-life-without-
parole-lwop-sentencing. 
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sentence contained in the death peanlty statutes. The revised DPIC information include: Maine 
enacted LWOP sentences in 1976 when parole was abolished in its 1976 Criminal Code and 
Nebreska enacted LWOP sentences in 1969 when its parole law was established.
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increase. The increase of the LWOP inmate population might be considered a predictable result in light of 
the U.S. march toward mass incarceration over the past decades. But in fact the rate of increase of the 
LWOP inmate population is even higher than the growth of the prison population. 
 
Table 2 
 
 
In the past two decades, the U.S. inmate population has grown exponentially, although --- after the 
national inmate population reached the peak of 1,615,487 in 2009 --- a slight inmate population decrease 
occurred each year between 2009 and 2012 (See Table 3). Between 1992 and 2012 the LWOP inmate 
population increased by 394%, while the population of incarcerated prisoners increased from 882,500 to 
1,571,013, a rate of 178%. This data shows that the growth rate of the LWOP inmate population is more 
than twice that of the national inmate population. According to the data presented in Table 2 and Table 3, in 
1992, LWOP inmates made up 1.41% of the U.S. prisoners. By 2012, LWOP inmates made up 3.12% of 
the US. Prison population. This data also indicates the growth rate of the LWOP inmate population is faster 
than that of the national inmate population. 
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LWOP inmates are disproportionately distributed among states. A handful states incarcerate the major 
population of LWOP inmates. By 2012, LWOP inmates in the five states of Florida, Pennsylvania, 
Louisiana, California, and Michigan, and the federal system account for more than half (61.2%) of the 
LWOP inmate population nationwide (See Table 4).95 In 2004, the seven states of Alabama, California, 
Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Michigan, and Pennsylvania have each incarcerated over 1000 LWOP 
inmates.96 In 2012, the number of jurisdictions with more than 1000 LWOP inmates grew to 11 states: 
Alabama, California, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, North 
Carolina, and Pennsylvania, plus the federal level (See Table 4).97 
 
Table 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
95 ASHLEY NELLIS, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, LIFE GOES ON: THE HISTORIC RISE IN LIFE SENTENCES IN 
AMERICA 5 (2013). 
 
96 See MAUER, THE MEANING OF “LIFE”, supra note 13, at 3. 
 
97 See NELLIS,  supra note 95 at 6 Table B. 
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  Number of LWOP Inmates By Jurisdiction In 2012 
Jurisdiction Total Jurisdiction Total Jurisdiction Total Jurisdiction Total 
Alabama  1,507 Indiana 113 Nebraska 236 South Carolina  988 
Alaska  0 Iowa  635 Nevada  491 South Dakota  181 
Arizona  441 Kansas  21 New Hampshire  79 Tennessee  317 
Arkansas  528 Kentucky  99 New Jersey  70 Texas  538 
California  4,603 Louisiana  4,637 New Mexico  0 Utah  105 
Colorado  606 Maine  55 New York  246 Vermont  14 
Connecticut  70 Maryland  380 North Carolina  1,228 Virginia  774 
Delaware  386 Massachusetts  1,045 North Dakota  27 Washington  623 
Florida  7,992 Michigan  3,635 Ohio  408 West Virginia  276 
Georgia  813 Minnesota  102 Oklahoma  780 Wisconsin  229 
Hawaii  47 Mississippi  1,518 Oregon  180 Wyoming 28 
Idaho  122 Missouri  1,063 Pennsylvania  5,102 Federal 4,058 
Illinois 1,600 Montana  53 Rhode Island 32 Total 49,081 
Source: Data obtained from Ashley Nellis, The Sentencing Project, Life Goes On: The Historic Rise in Life Sentences 
in America (2013). 
Notes: Hawaii and Virginia did not respond to several requests for data in 2012; therefore, 2008 figures are provided 
for these states.   
 
It is foreseeable that the LWOP inmate population will steadily grow for a long time, for there are 
hardly any releasing schemes that would allow a LWOP inmate to be released from confinement. A LWOP 
inmate could possibly leave prison in only two ways: death or getting his/her sentence commuted or 
pardoned.98 But the growth rate of the LWOP inmate population will become slower than that of the past 
two decades, provided that legislatures and the Supreme Court do not expand the current application of 
LWOP sentences. This is because the two major reasons for the increase in LWOP inmates --- expansion of 
LWOP-eligible crimes and wide expansion of jurisdictions applying LWOP sentences --- have already 
occurred. 
 
 
B. Commutation: A Form of Clemency  
 
Clemency,99 which is sometimes confused with the more narrow term “pardon”,100 generally refers to 
the practice of mercy or leniency to remit criminal condemnations against an individual.101 In the United 
                                                          
98 The executive clemency power to commute or pardon is the only scheme that could grant early release to 
an individual who has suffered a LWOP sentence imposed by the court. The following section will discuss 
the executive power to commute.  
 
99 Clemency is a broad term in the context of the criminal justice system, referring to all actions of grace 
granted by the chief executive. Its fundamental feature is mercy and leniency. It comes from the ancient 
practice of pardon, which is an act of forgiveness. See Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: 
Wresting the Pardoning Power from the King, 69 TEX. L. REV. 569, 573 (1991) [hereinafter Kobil, Quality] 
(noting that the clemency power is the power to remit punishment as an act of mercy); see also 3 OXFORD 
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 309 (2d ed. 1989) (Clemency is defined as “[m]ildness or gentleness of temper, as 
shown in the exercise of authority or power; mercy, leniency”); see also 3 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S SURVEY, supra note 18, at 1-9 (historical review of the  development of the pardon 
power). 
 
100  Pardon is the oldest form of clemency. In this article, pardon is referred to a particular form of 
clemency. See Kathleen M. Ridolfi, Not Just an Act of Mercy: The Demise of Post-Conviction Relief and a 
Rightful Claim to Clemency, 24 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 43, 44 n. 9. (1998) (noting that “pardon” is 
a distinct form of clemency).  
 
101 See Kobil, Quality, supra note 99, at 575-78. Chief Justice Marshall defined the pardoning power as “an 
act of grace, proceeding from the power intrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the 
 18 
States, the clemency power is vested by federal and state constitutions in the executive.102 The Pardon 
Clause of the Constitution provides that “the President … shall have Power to Grant Reprieves and Pardons 
for Offences Against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.”103 Because the text of the Pardon 
Clause in the Constitution is written in general terms, the Supreme Court has served the role of interpreter 
to enhance the meaning and operation of the Pardon Clause. Under the Supreme Court’s construction, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed.” 
United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 160 (1833). 
 
102 See Clifford Dorne & Kenneth Gewerth, Mercy in a Climate of Retributive Justice: Interpretations from 
a National Survey of Executive Clemency Procedures, 25 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 413, 
413-14 (1999); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NAT’L GOVERNORS’ ASS’N CENTER FOR POLICY 
RESEARCH, GUIDE TO EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY AMONG THE AMERICAN STATES (1988) [hereinafter U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDE TO EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY] (containing information about the practice of 
clemency and an earlier study of clemency procedures). 
 
103 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
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clemency in the United States can now be grant in five different forms:104 pardons,105 commutations,106 
amnesties,107 reprieves,108 and remissions of fines and forfeitures.109 
                                                          
104 Most commentators agree that clemency in America could be granted in one of five forms. See James N. 
Jorgensen, Federal Executive Clemency Power: The President’s Prerogative to Escape Accountability, 27 
U. RICH. L. REV. 345, 348 (1993) (listing five forms of clemency); see also Kobil, Quality, supra note 99, 
at 575 (listing five forms of clemency). Some believe there are ten types of clemency available to 
executives. But these ten types of clemency power can be generalized into the five common types. See 
WILLARD HARRISON HUMBERT, THE PARDONING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT 22 (1941). In practice, in 
addition to the five common types, some States have special forms of clemency. Florida recognizes the 
restoration of Florida civil rights, resident rights, and the right to own and possess a firearm as forms of 
clemency. Minnesota offers “pardon extraordinaire” and the expungement of records as forms of clemency. 
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDE TO EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY, supra note 102, at164-65; see also 1 U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S SURVEY, supra note 18 (recording state clemency procedures). 
 
105 A pardon is the broadest of the clemency mechanisms and it effectively nullifies both a conviction and a 
sentence. See James R. Acker & Charles S. Lanier, May God--or the Governor--Have Mercy: Executive 
Clemency and Executions in Modern Death-Penalty Systems, 36 CRIM. L. BULL. 200, 204 (2000). The 
Supreme Court ruled in Ex Parte Garland that a pardon "reaches both the punishment prescribed for the 
offense and the guilt of offender, and where pardon is full, it releases the punishment, and blots out of 
existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law, the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the 
offense. If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities consequent upon 
conviction from attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores 
him to all his civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity. 
There is only this limitation to its operation: it does not restore offices forfeited, or property or interests 
vested in others in consequence of the conviction and judgment". Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall) 333, 
380 (1866). In Ex Parte Wells, the Court ruled that a pardon could be granted with a condition in a case 
where President Fillmore pardoned Wells on the condition that Wells remain in prison for life. See Ex 
Parte Wells, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 307 (1855). 
 
106 Commutation is the substitution of a milder punishment for the heavier one imposed by the court. See 
Kobil, Quality, supra note 99, at 576; see also GOLDFARB & SINGER, supra note 50, at 343 (noting that 
commutations are often granted to shorten the offender’s sentence to time served or to make her 
immediately eligible for parole). In Ex Parte Wells, the Court affirmed the commutation as a specific form 
by holding that “the President’s power to do so [to commute a death sentence to a life sentence] exists 
under the Constitution of the United States.” See Ex Parte Wells, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 315. In Biddle v. 
Perovich, the Court held that commutation could be effected without the consent of the recipient. See 
Biddle, 274 U.S. at 487. 
 
107 Amnesty usually refers to clemency granted to a large number of offenders, many of whom have not yet 
been prosecuted. See JOHN M. MATHEWS, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM 168 (1st ed. 1932) 
(noting that amnesty differs from pardon in that it applies to whole classes of persons or communities rather 
than to individuals). The Supreme Court, in Armstrong v. United States, ruled that the pardoning power 
included the power to grant amnesty. See Armstrong v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall) 154 (1872). In 
United States v. Klein, the Court ruled that amnesty could be granted with a condition by holding that the 
President could “annex to his offer of pardon any conditions or qualifications he should see fit.” United 
States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall) 128 (1872). 
 
108 A reprieve is generally understood to be a “temporary postponement of punishment.” See Kobil, 
Quality, supra note 99, at 578; see also Molly Clayton, Forgiving the Unforgivable: Reinvigorating the 
Use of Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 54 B.C. L. REV. 751, 755 (2013) (noting that a reprieve is a 
limited form of clemency that postpones or delays a scheduled punishment). In Ex parte United States, the 
Supreme Court declared that “reprieve … is the withdrawing of a sentence for an interval of time.” Ex 
Parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 43-44 (1916). 
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Commutation is a form of executive clemency power that reduces the judicially imposed sentence to a 
less severe sentence.110 Commutation is different from pardon. Pardon releases the punishment and blots 
out the existence of guilt.111 Pardon must be accepted or it is nugatory.112 In contrast, “commutation merely 
substitutes lighter for heavier punishment. It removes no stain, restores no civil privilege, and may be 
effected without the consent and against the will of the prisoner”.113 
 
1. Prior to the Late 18th Century: Development of Pardoning Power 
 
At the time the Pardon Clause was written into the U.S. Constitution, the only form of executive 
clemency was the “pardon” --- it was not broken down into pardon, commutation and so forth. But acts of 
commutation were certainly not unknown. In ancient and Medieval times, the criminal justice system was 
so underdeveloped that the death sentence was unfairly applied to a wide range of crimes,114 and self-
defense, accident and insanity did not justify or excuse the criminal conduct.115 The pardoning power was 
often the remedy for reducing the unfair harshness of the imposed sentence --- today that would be known 
as commutation.116  
 
Pardon in ancient Athens rested with the people and was very rarely used.117 Romans developed a 
more functional pardoning system and skillfully used the pardon power to control public unrest.118 England 
                                                                                                                                                                             
109 Remission of fines and forfeitures is the power to remove the disabilities that prevent a person from 
exercising any power over his property, unless the property has been vested in another person. See Illinois 
Central Railroad v. Bosworth, 133 U.S. 92, 103 (1890).  
 
110 See Margaret Colgate Love, Of Pardons, Politics, and Collar Buttons: Reflections on the Presidents 
Duty to Be Merciful, 27 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1483, 1500-06 (2000) [hereinafter Love, Reflections] (noting 
that a commutation is an executive act of mercy or leniency in mitigating the consequences of a sentence 
against an individual); Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480 (1927) (affirming the president’s commutation 
power); People ex rel. Patrick v. Frost, 133 App. Div. 179, 117 N. Y. Supp. 524 (2d Dep’t 1909) (affirming 
the governor’s commutation power). 
 
111 Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall) at 380. 
 
112 In re Charles, 115 Kan. 323, 222 Pac. 606, 608 (1924). 
 
113  Id. 
 
114 In the 18th Century, the death penalty in England was widely applied to offenses against public order, 
against the administration of justice, against property and against person. See LEON RADZINOWICZ, 1 A 
HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION FROM 1750 77-78 (1948). 
 
115 See SOL RUBIN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION 653 (2nd ed. 1973). 
 
116 In England, by 1819, at least 220 offenses were capital offenses. Because of the use of the pardoning 
power, only a small percentage of death-sentenced defendants were executed. For example, in 1818, only 
97 of the 1,254 defendants sentenced to death in England were executed. See KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, 
PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 17 (1989). 
 
117 In Athens, the signature of 6,000 people was required for a pardon. See id. at 16; see also 3 U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S SURVEY, supra note 18, 8-9. 
 
118 See MOORE, supra note 116, at 16-17 (“The Romans were accustomed to pardoning (and executing) 
criminals on coronation days and local holidays, when the colonial rulers were most interested in subduing 
crowds”). 
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adopted the pardon scheme as a central component of the royal prerogative of the Crown,119 and planted the 
scheme in the American colonies.120 After America gained independence, the new republic of the United 
States incorporated the pardoning scheme121 by writing the Pardon Clause into Article II, section 2 of the 
Constitution.  
 
2. From the Late 18th Century to the Mid-19th Century: Emergence and Constitutionality of 
Commutation  
 
Commutation was not distinguished from the pardoning power until punishment was more finely 
graded from death to life imprisonment to a term of years or even days.122 Before the American colonies 
gained independence, the range of punishments only included corporal punishment, transportation and the 
death penalty.123 In that context, a pardoned convict could be either set free with no condition124 or subject 
to the condition of branding, transportation, hard labor or penal servitude.125 Beginning in the late 18th 
century, the establishment of prison as the standard method of punishment initiated the new era of fine 
gradations in sentencing.126 Accordingly, pardons could be granted with the condition of enforcing a lesser 
                                                          
119 See Stanley Grupp, Some Historical Aspects of the Pardon in England, 7 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 51, 55 
(1963) (noting that in England, the pardon power was essential to the Crown); see also Kobil, Quality, 
supra note 99, at, 585-89 (noting that to avoid the Crown’s pardoning power’s arbitrariness, the British 
parliament finally implemented restrictions on the pardoning power); 2 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A 
HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 88-89 (1883) (noting that pardon was regularly considered in 
all cases in which the death penalty was imposed). 
 
120 See CHRISTEN JENSEN, THE PARDONING POWER IN THE AMERICAN STATES 3-4 (1922) (noting that in 
most Colonial charters the King delegated the pardon power and made provisions for its exercise); see also 
3 FRANCIS NEWTON THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND 
OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATE, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (1909) (demonstrating that the pardon power was delegated by the charters of 
the colonies in the Colonial era).  
 
121 See William F. Duker, The President's Power to Pardon: A Constitutional History, 18 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 475, 500-506 (1977). 
 
122 See Elkan Abramowitz & David Paget, Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 136, 
138 (1964). 
 
123 See HARRY ELMER BARNES & NEGLEY K. TEETERS, NEW HORIZONS IN CRIMINOLOGY 285-321 (3rd ed. 
1959) (noting the treatment of offenders in ancient and medieval times). 
 
124 In the Middle Ages, Germanic law provided that a condemned man could be spared if a pure virgin of 
good repute demanded marriage to him. In Switzerland, a wife who had borne seven sons, one by one, was 
allowed to cut the rope of a condemned man and so pardon him. By another custom, the criminal could be 
spared if the rope broke during the hanging. See RUBIN, supra note 115, at 658-59. 
 
125 See Clive Emsley, Tim Hitchcock & Robert Shoemaker, Crime and Justice - Punishments at the Old 
Bailey, OLD BAILEY PROCEEDINGS ONLINE, available at 
http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/static/Punishment.jsp#benefit-of-clergy (last visited October 1, 2014); see 
also BARNES & TEETERS, supra note 123, at 296 (noting that England began to use the punishment of 
transportation when the first law authorizing deportation was passed in 1597); FREDERIC WILLIAM 
MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 480 (1919) (noting that the King of England had 
the power to grant a conditional pardon by pardoning a condemned criminal on condition of his going into 
penal servitude). 
 
126 Prior to 1776, there were no prisons that were used to incarcerate convicts. Though there had been 
prisons in the form of dungeons for centuries in England before then, they were used only for detention or 
custody for those awaiting trial. See RUBIN, supra note 115, at 22; see also BARNES & TEETERS, supra note 
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term of years of imprisonment.127 Under the doctrine that “the greater power includes the lesser”,128 such 
conditioned pardon was gradually recognized as a distinctive form of clemency, known as commutation.  
 
As more and more states disassociated the power of commutation from the power to pardon, Pardon 
Clauses were amended. In 1846, New York took the lead in specifying the pardoning power of 
commutation in the state constitution, providing that “The Governor shall have the power to grant 
reprieves, commutations and pardons after conviction, for all offenses except treason and cases of 
impeachment …”129 Other states followed.130 Today, 40 states have specifically included the commutation 
power in their constitutions.131 In the states with constitutions that do not mention commutation, the power 
to commute sentences is held to be a specific form of the clemency power. On the Federal level, the Pardon 
Clause has not been amended to specify commutation as a permissible form of the president’s pardoning 
power, but the Supreme Court, in Biddle v. Perovich,132 has ruled that the Pardon Clause includes the 
President’s power to commute sentences. 
 
3. The Use of Commutation 
 
The use of commutation can be divided into three phases. The first phase is the period prior to the 
introduction of parole in America in the late 19th Century. During this period, the major early release 
schemes were operated in two forms: 1) good-time laws, which allowed inmates early release on the 
ground of good conduct; and 2) executive power to pardon.133 Pardon was widely used in the form of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
123, at 328-29. Pennsylvania established penal reform in its first constitution of 1776 by providing that 
imprisonment at hard labor substituted for corporal punishment other than capital punishment. Under the 
Act of 1786, the Act of 1789, and the Act of 1790, “comprehensive and humane system of imprisonment at 
labor became known as the penitentiary, a ‘Pennsylvania System’, and was largely followed in other 
states.” WILLIAM W. SMITHERS, TREATISE ON EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY IN PENNSYLVANIA 30 (1909). 
 
127 In other words, “when capital punishment was the mandatory penalty fixed for most crimes instead of 
imprisonment for a term of years, commutation could not be used.” GOLDFARB & SINGER, supra note 50, at 
343. 
 
128 Ex parte Wells, 18 How. 307 (U. S. 1855); In re Charles, 115 Kan. 323, 226 Pac. 606; McDowell v. 
Conch, 6 La. Ann. 365 (1851); State ex rel. Daniel v. Rose, 29 La. Ann. 755 (1877); In re Opinion of the 
Justices, 210 Mass. 609, 98 N. E. 101 (1912); In re Opinion of the Justices, 190 Mass. 616, 78 N. E.311 
(1906); In re Kennedy, 135 Mass. 48, 51 (1883); In re Court of Pardons, 97 N. J. Eq. 555, 562, 129 Atl. 
624, 627 (1925); Cook v. Freeholders of Middlesex, 26 N. J. L. 320, 329 (1857); Contra: Ex parte Janes, 1 
Nev. 819 (1865); State v. Twitty, 11 N. C. 193 (1825). 
 
129 N.Y. CONST. 1846, art. IV, § 5 provides, “The Governor shall have the power to grant reprieves, 
commutations and pardons after conviction, for all offenses except treason and cases of impeachment …” 
 
130 MICH. CONST. 1850, art. 5, § 11 provides, “He may grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, for all 
offenses except treason and cases of impeachment …” PA. CONST. 1874, art. IV, § 9, provides, “He shall 
have power to remit fines and forfeitures, to grant reprieves, commutations of sentence and pardons, except 
in cases of impeachment …” 
 
131 The 10 states that do not have commutation written in their constitutions are Connecticut, Florida, 
Kansas, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Texas, Vermont, and Virginia. See 
SIMONE R. RICHARDSON, EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY BY PARDON: A GUIDE TO PARDON SUCCESS ch. 9 (2011).  
 
132 Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480 (1926). 
 
133 Parole as an early release scheme was adopted and developed in America in the late 19th Century. See 
supra note 14.  
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commutation in this period to discharge prisoners in order to control the size of the prison population.134 
According to William Crawford, an English commissioner who in 1833 visited all but two American 
prisons, half of the inmates at that time were discharged through commutations.135 From 1790 to 1820, 
Pennsylvania granted 896 pardons, most of which were commutations. 136  Between 1828 and 1866, 
Massachusetts granted commutation to 12.5 percent of all prisoners.137 
 
The second phase in the exercise of the commutation power is the period between the adoption of 
parole scheme in the early 20th Century, and the 1970s, when the death penalty was brought to 
constitutional review.138 During this period, because granting early release on the basis of rewarding good 
behavior in prison was promoted by the parole system, the need for commutation was significantly 
reduced.139 In this era, the ideal of rehabilitation dominated American sentencing schemes, and parole was 
applied to all imprisonment sentences, even life sentences.140 Consequently, the commutation power was 
generally used in only one context --- commuting death penalty sentences to sentences of LWOP. In 
Florida, between 1924 and 1966, out of 255 death cases, 59 (23.1%) were commuted.141 From 1961 to 
1970, out of 1,155 death sentences nationwide, 182 were commuted --- a ratio of 15.8%.142 Meanwhile, 
commutation in this era was also applied to prisoners who were sentenced to life in those few states where 
statutes did not provide parole release for life sentences. Commutation in this context was used to relieve 
the harshness of the statutory life sentence, which did not take consideration of individualized sentencing.  
For example, the Pennsylvania 1941 Parole Act precluded parole eligibility for all offenders who had 
received a life sentence.143 In Pennsylvania, commutation became the method for making lifers eligible for 
parole, in order to avoid harshness in the sentencing scheme. Between 1932 and 1967, 607 lifers in 
                                                          
134 Michael Serrill, Determinate Sentencing: The History, the Theory, the Debate, 3 CORRECTIONS 
MAGAZINE 3, 5 (1977). 
 
135 See BLAKE MCKELVEY, AMERICAN PRISONS: A STUDY IN AMERICAN HISTORY PRIOR TO 1915, 18 
(1968). 
 
136 See SMITHERS, supra note 126, at 36. 
 
137 See WALKER, supra note 14, at 101-02. 
 
138 The Case of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), which invalidated then- existing death penalty 
statutes and consequently forced the states to revise their death sentence provisions, not only marked an 
important point in the American history of death penalty sentencing reformation, but also marked the point 
of decline in the commutation of death penalty cases.  
 
139 Ronald S. Everett & Deborah Periman, “The Governor's Court of Last Resort:” An Introduction to 
Executive Clemency in Alaska, 28 ALASKA L. REV. 57, 69 (2011) (noting that from 1900 to the mid-1970s, 
when the philosophy of rehabilitation dominated America’s penological theory, the indeterminate sentence 
coupled with parole became more common and consequently the need for pardon changed). 
 
140 See infra notes 230-232 and accompanying text. 
 
141 Margaret Vandiver, Quality of Mercy: Race and Clemency in Florida Death Penalty Cases, 1924-1966, 
27 U. RICH. L. REV. 315, 322 (1992). 
 
142 Hugo Adam Bedau, The Decline of Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 255, 264 (1990-1991). 
 
143 Pennsylvania established a parole law in the Act of 1941 (P.L.861, No.323), which, by section 17 
authorized the Board to grant parole to those serving terms of life imprisonment, but by section 21, barred 
convicts sentenced to death or life imprisonment from being released on parole. See JON E. YOUNT, 
PENNSYLVANIA: PAROLE AND LIFE IMPRISONMENT, 9 (2004) 
http://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/yount/PA_parole.pdf.  
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Pennsylvania were released on parole when their sentence was commuted.144 In addition, commutation was 
also used to accelerate the parole eligibility in cases where prisoners were required to serve a minimum 
term of imprisonment before parole was eligible.145 The Pennsylvania 1941 Parole Act provided that a 
convict could be released on parole after “the expiration of the minimum term of imprisonment fixed by the 
court in its sentence or by the Pardons Board in a sentence which has been reduced by commutation.”146 
 
The third phase in the use of commutation is the modern era. In this period, commutation has 
experienced a decline as a result of two major movements in sentencing reform --- 1) the return of death 
penalty statutes; and 2) the 1980s sentencing reform movement toward determinate sentences. The decline 
in commutations has been noted by several concerned commentators.147 The commutation of death penalty 
sentences has shrunk dramatically.148 Of course during the period between Furman and Gregg, there could 
be no such commutations because the death penalty had been struck down.149 But when the death penalty 
was reinstated, the likelihood of commutation was substantially reduced from the pre-Furman period.   
From 1979 through 1988, of the 2,535 death sentences imposed, only 63 were commuted --- a ratio of 
2.5%. This ratio is significantly lower than the 15.8% rate of commutations in the pre-Furman period. The 
decline in commuting death sentences has been attributed to the reforms in death penalty sentencing --- 
individuality, proportionality, narrowing, etc. --- that were implemented to accommodate the Court’s 
decision in Furman. 150 Executives apparently determined that these reforms had reduced the need for 
commuting death penalty sentences on grounds of harshness and unfairness.151  
                                                          
144 See id. at 10, citing THE PENNSYLVANIA PRISON SOCIETY, THE NEED FOR PAROLE OPTIONS FOR LIFE-
SENTENCED PRISONERS (July 6, 1993). 
 
145 See GOLDFARB & SINGER, supra note 50, at 344. 
 
146 Pennsylvania 1941 Parole Act § 21.  
 
147 See Margaret Colgate Love, Fear of Forgiving: Rule and Discretion in the Practice of Pardoning, 13 
FED. SENT. REP. 125, 126 (2001) [hereinafter Love, Fear of Forgiving] (noting the numbers of 
commutations each year began to drop off beginning with the Reagan Administration); see also Elizabeth 
Rapaport, Retribution and Redemption in the Operation of Executive Clemency, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
1501, 1509 (2000) (noting clemency is less frequently used than in the past). 
 
148 See Daniel T. Kobil, How to Grant Clemency in Unforgiving Times, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 219, 223, n. 20 
(2003) [hereinafter Kobil, Grant Clemency] (listing research that has recognized the decline of executive 
clemency in capital cases); see also Michael A.G. Korengold et al., And Justice for Few: The Collapse of 
the Capital Clemency System in the United States, 20 HAMLINE L. REV. 349, 359 (1996) (noting that in the 
post-Gregg period, commutations in capital cases have been granted less frequently); LINDA E. CARTER, 
UNDERSTANDING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT LAW 256 (2004) (noting the use of executive clemency in 
commuting capital punishment steadily decreased from 1972 to the present); Bedau, supra note 142, at 255; 
Adam M. Gershowitz, The Diffusion of Responsibility in Capital Clemency, 17 J.L. & POL. 669, 675-77 
(2001); Austin Sarat, Memorializing Miscarriages of Justice: Clemency Petitions in the Killing State, 42 
LAW & SOC'Y. REV. 183, 186 (2008). 
 
149 After the Court struck down the death penalty in Furman in 1972, the death penalty statutes were 
suspended and the U.S. was thus led to a period of de facto moratorium on the death penalty. This short 
period of death penalty moratorium also brought the halt of commutations of death sentences. See Bedau, 
supra note 142, at 263. 
 
150 See supra notes 27-34 and accompanying text. 
 
151 As shown by a study conducted in the pre-Furman era, the reasons that led to commutation of death 
sentences during that time included doubt about guilt; sentencing disparities; lack of fair procedures in 
investigation or trial; lack of consideration of mitigating circumstances; rehabilitation of inmates; lack of 
consideration of the defendant’s mental or physical deficiencies either during or after the commission of the 
crime; recommendations of the prosecution and the trial judge; political pressure and publicity; and the 
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Moreover, after the sentencing reform movement launched in the 1980s, commutation was 
significantly constrained as applied to parole-ineligible life sentences. For example, Pennsylvania 
previously granted a large number of commutations to lifers to make them eligible for parole. From 1967 to 
1978, there were 346 commutations granted to parole-ineligible lifers.152 However, beginning in 1979, 
commutation of life sentences in Pennsylvania declined dramatically. Only 40 LWOP sentence 
commutations were granted between 1979 and 2012.153  
 
Table 5 
 
 
 
Although there are no empirical studies demonstrating the atrophy of the use of commutation in the 
states nationwide, the decline of commutation at the federal level can be documented. As shown in the 
above graph, commutation at the federal level was frequently used in the early 20th Century. After reaching 
a peak in 1920, the use of commutation steadily declined. Starting from the 1970s, the President rarely 
granted commutations, with the exception that President Clinton granted 40 commutations in 2001 before 
he left office. During the 8 years of George W. Bush’s administration from 2001 to 2009, only 11 
commutations were granted. In President Obama’s first term, he granted only one commutation. 154 
                                                                                                                                                                             
clemency authorities’ views against capital punishment. See Abramowitz & Paget, supra note 122, at 160-
77. 
 
152 From 1967 to 1970 there were 95 life sentence inmates granted commutation. See Michael “Mikal” 
Wilson, Lifers Incorporated, http://www.realcostofprisons.org/materials/GLI-
Commutation_Committee.pdf; From 1971 to 1978, there were 251 commutations granted to life sentence 
inmates. See Applications for Commutation of Life Sentence, PA BOARD OF PARDONS, 
http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/statistics/19543/commutation_of_life_sentence_1
971_-_present/765885 (last updated October 8, 2014).  
 
153 See Applications for Commutation of Life Sentence, PA BOARD OF PARDONS, 
http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/statistics/19543/commutation_of_life_sentence_1
971_-_present/765885 (last updated October 8, 2014). 
 
154 See OFFICE OF THE PARDON ATTORNEY, CLEMENCY STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.justice.gov/pardon/statistics.htm (Updated August 2014). 
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However, at the end of 2013, President Obama granted commutations to 8 federal inmates who were 
convicted of crack cocaine offenses that he deemed to be unduly harsh --- 6 of the 8 were sentenced to life 
without parole.155 It is noteworthy that these recent efforts of President Obama to grant more commutations 
are retroactive relief for a particular group of drug offenders, who would have received significantly shorter 
terms of imprisonment if they had been sentenced under the current law, the Fair Sentencing Act of 
2010. 156  As confirmed by then-Attorney General Holder, President Obama plans to grant more 
commutations to non-violent drug convicts who would have spent less time in prison under current law.157 
 
4. Summary: the Decline of the Use of Commutation and Its Possible Explanation 
 
Generally speaking, the use of commutation has gone through a marked decline from its emergence to 
the present day. There are several hypotheses to consider in explaining the decline. First, prior to the 
adoption of the parole system, commutation was largely used to release prisoners early in order to control 
the size of the prison population. As the function of discharging prisoners (and controlling the prison 
population) was taken over by parole boards, the use of commutation would logically decrease.  Executives 
could relieve themselves from the burden of reviewing a large number of early release applications, leaving 
them to the parole boards, and could focus on reviewing the applications from the inmates who were 
sentenced to death or life imprisonment.  
 
Second, the number of death penalty inmates qualified for commutation was reduced by the 
implementation of death penalty statutes that narrowed the penalty and provided for substantive and 
procedural protections in its implementation --- including guided discretion, bifurcated guilt and sentencing 
phases, and mandatory consideration of individualized circumstances and mitigation factors. 158  Also, 
appeal from a death penalty sentence is mandatory and appellate courts have usually conducted searching 
review, especially as compared to review of other criminal cases. 159  It is not surprising, then, that 
executives might be unwilling to commute capital sentences imposed under all these restrictions. 160  
 
Third, the “tough-on-crime” political environment, pervasive in the political culture of the last three 
decades, probably chills an executive’s willingness to grant commutations --- especially those executives 
who are seeking another term in office or in another office.161 Governors, and the President, undoubtedly 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
155 See Charlie Savage, Obama Commutes Sentences for 8 in Crack Cocaine Cases, N.Y. TIMES. Dec. 19, 
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/20/us/obama-commuting-sentences-in-crack-cocaine-
cases.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 
156 See id. 
 
157 See Josh Gerstein, Holder: Obama to Dramatically Expand Drug Clemency, POLITICO, updated April 
21, 2014, http://www.politico.com/story/2014/04/eric-holder-barack-obama-drug-clemency-105865.html. 
 
158 See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text. 
 
159 See Bedau, supra note 142, at 269 (noting that appellate courts play a significant role in rectifying the 
unfairly imposed death sentence). 
 
160 See id. (noting that “the performance of trial and appellate courts in capital cases is a powerful factor in 
rationalizing gubernatorial refusal to commute death sentences”) (footnote omitted). 
 
161 See id. (noting that one reason that could explain the decline of death penalty commutations is that a 
governor who commutes a death sentences may be committing political suicide); see also Rachel E. 
Barkow, The Ascent of the Administrative State and the Demise of Mercy, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1332, 1349 
(2008) (noting that the “tough-on-crime” policy resulted in a dramatic decline in the number of clemencies 
granted in most jurisdictions); Kathleen Cokie Ridolfi & Seth Gordon, Gubernatorial Clemency Powers: 
Justice or Mercy? 24 CRIM. JUST. 26, 33 (2009) (noting that the political trend of harsher sentences makes 
executives unwilling to use the clemency power); Paul Cobb, Reviving Mercy in the Structure of Capital 
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fear that a commutation will paint them as soft-on-crime, costing them, or other members of their party, 
elections or reelections.162 The most famous example arose in the 1988 presidential campaign between 
then-Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis and then-Vice President George H.W. Bush.163 Before the 
campaign, Governor Dukakis had released on furlough the inmate Willie Horton, who had been sentenced 
to a life sentence without parole for murder. Horton committed a homicide shortly after his release. 
Attacked as a soft-on-crime politician by Bush, Dukakis lost his president campaign. Obviously, this 
prevailing political sense of being tough on crime has led to fewer executives willing to grant 
commutations, especially to LWOP inmates.   
 
 
C.  Data on Commutations of LWOP Sentences  
 
 LWOP sentences are designed to incarcerate prisoners until they die in prison. However, LWOP 
sentences could be commuted to a lesser sentence under the executive’s pardoning power. Although it is 
difficult to collect national data demonstrating the number of commutations of LWOP sentences, the 
practice of some individual states and the federal government is available to give some indications of how 
frequently (or infrequently) LWOP sentences are commuted.  
 
The practice of commuting LWOP sentences began in the early 20th Century. The frequency of the 
use of commutations to LWOP inmates is tightly tied to the underlying sentencing policy. Accordingly, 
when sentencing policy shifted from rehabilitation to tough-on-crime, the use of commutations went 
through a dramatic decline. 
 
1. Before the 1970s: Commutation Used as Parole to Release Parole-Ineligible Life Inmates 
 
Before the 1970s, commutation of parole-ineligible life sentences164 was routinely granted as a result 
of the prevalence of the rehabilitation ideal. From the beginning of the 20th century to the mid-1970s, 
American sentencing philosophy was dominated by principles of prisoner rehabilitation and 
reintegration.165 It was widely believed that the offender’s “sickness”, presented as propensity to commit a 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Punishment, 99 YALE L. J. 389, 394 (1989) (noting that the executives’ unwillingness to exercise the 
pardoning power is caused by political considerations); Love, Fear of Forgiving, supra note 147, at 126 
(noting that there is a common sense that the exercise of pardoning power could get executives into 
political trouble); Clayton, supra note 108, at 777 (noting that the “tough on crime” atmosphere leads to 
executives’ fear of using the clemency power); Rapaport, supra note 147, at 1509 (contending that the 
reemergence of retribution ideology in contemporary America is the principal cause of the decline of 
clemency). 
 
162 See Bedau, supra note 142, at 268 (noting that politicians’ fear of being marked by his/her rival as “soft 
on crime” deters the commutation of death sentences); see also Clayton, supra note 108, at 777 (noting that 
one of the factors that resulted in the decline of the clemency grants is the “tough-on-crime” political 
atmosphere). 
 
163 See Clayton, supra note 108, at 777 (describing the presidential campaign between then-Massachusetts 
Governor Michael Dukakis and then-Vice President George H.W. Bush). 
 
164 The term here used to refer to life sentences which are not eligible for parole is “parole-ineligible life 
sentences”, instead of “LWOP sentences”, because before the mid-1970s, the sentence of LWOP was not a 
distinguished gradation of punishment. Legislators enacted the sentence of LWOP as an independent 
punishment in the 1970s in order to provide an alternative to the reinstated death penalty. See notes 18-25 
and accompanying text. 
 
165 See Francis T. Cullen & Paul Gendreau, Assessing Correctional Rehabilitation: Policy, Practice, and 
Prospects, in 3 CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2000: POLICIES, PROCESSES, AND DECISIONS OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM 109, 109 (Winnie Reed & Laura Winterfield eds., 2000), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/criminal_justice2000/vol_3/03d.pdf. 
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crime, could be “cured” through proper rehabilitation. 166 Driven by the enthusiasm towards the 
rehabilitative ideal, parole release was available to almost all prisoners, including those who were 
sentenced to life imprisonment. In that context, a life sentence mostly meant that lifers could be released 
after the completion of a term from 8 to 20 years’ of imprisonment.167 Only in very rare circumstances was 
a life sentence was excluded from parole release. For example, the Pennsylvania 1941 Parole Act did not 
allow parole release for lifers. 168  But in accordance with the then-prevailing rehabilitation ideal, 
commutation was routinely granted to those parole-ineligible life inmates in order to make them eligible for 
parole release.  In Pennsylvania, between 1932 and 1967, there were 607 lifers released on parole after their 
sentence was commuted. 169  In Connecticut, before 1980, “[m]ore than seventy-five percent of 
Connecticut’s prisoners serving life sentences had their eligibility for parole accelerated by the Board 
through a grant of clemency and ninety percent of those inmates were then granted parole within their first 
year of eligibility.”170 
 
2. After the 1970s: the Decline in Commuting LWOP Sentences  
 
Beginning in the 1970s, as discussed above, the rehabilitative ideal lost its intellectual and political 
dominance; the predominant sentencing policy changed to crime prevention and punishment, i.e., “tough-
on-crime.” As described earlier, legislatures enacted mandatory minimums, truth-in-sentencing laws, and 
"three strikes and you're out" schemes. In this environment, governors who were concerned about their 
political careers were of course reluctant to grant commutations. Consequently, commutation of LWOP 
sentences was extremely constrained. So for example, commutations of LWOP sentences in Pennsylvania 
dropped from 951 (for the period between 1932 and 1978)171 to 40 (for the period form 1979 to 2012).172 
Governors in Massachusetts at one time routinely commuted LWOP inmates. From 1970 to 1990, there 
were 102 commutations of LWOP sentences granted.173 But from 1991 to 2010, there have only been 4 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
166 See Alfred Blumstein, American Prisons in a Time of Crisis, 4 LAW, SOC'Y & POL'Y 13, 13-14 (Lynne 
Goodstein & Doris Layton MacKenzie eds., 1989); Michael Vitiello, Reconsidering Rehabilitation, 65 
TUL. L. REV. 1011, 1016 (1991). 
 
167 Kentucky law, 1914 Ky. Acts, provided that lifers could apply for release on parole after a minimum of 
8 years of imprisonment was served. The Rhode Island statute, 1915 R.I. Acts & Resolves, provides for 
parole after a minimum of 20 years of imprisonment was served. 
 
168 Pennsylvania established a parole law in the Act of 1941 (P.L.861, No.323), which, by section 17 
authorized the Board to parole those serving terms of life imprisonment, but by section 21, barred convicts 
sentenced to death or life imprisonment from being released on parole. See Yount, supra note 143. 
 
169 See Yount, supra note 144. 
 
170 Dumschat v. Board of Pardons, 618 F.2d 216, 219 (2d Cir. 1980) (per curiam). 
 
171 From 1932 and 1967, there were 607 parole-ineligible lifers commuted. See supra note 164. From 1967 
to 1970, there were 95 life sentence inmates granted commutation. See Michael “Mikal” Wilson, Lifers 
Incorporated, THE REAL COST OF PRISONS PROJECT, http://www.realcostofprisons.org/materials/GLI-
Commutation_Committee.pdf (last visited October 1, 2014); from 1971 to 1978, there were 251 
commutations granted to life sentence inmates. See Applications for Commutation of Life Sentence, PA 
BOARD OF PARDONS, 
http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/statistics/19543/commutation_of_life_sentence_1
971_-_present/765885 (last updated Mar. 8, 2012). 
 
172 See Applications for Commutation of Life Sentence, PA BOARD OF PARDONS, 
http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/statistics/19543/commutation_of_life_sentence_1
971_-_present/765885 (last updated Mar. 8, 2012). 
 
173 See Chris Black, Horton Case Keeping the Jail Cells Shut, THE BOSTON GLOBE, July 8, 1990. 
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commutations of LWOP sentences.174 Connecticut, which used to grant a large number of commutations to 
LWOP inmates,175 has prohibited all commutations to LWOP inmates since 1981.176  
 
 Other available data yields similar results --- commutation of a LWOP sentence has been a rarity in 
the past few decades. 177  In California, from 1965 to 1990, no commutation was issued to a LWOP 
inmate.178 The available data shows that there was only one commutation of a LWOP sentence issued in 
California in 2010.179 In Michigan,180 from 1983 to 1993, the governor commuted the sentences of LWOP 
inmates convicted of first degree murder on an average of one per year.181 In Nebraska, the state ordinarily 
issues commutations, but in a very limited number, to LWOP inmates to allow them to apply for parole 
release.182 From 1970 to 1990, a total of only 32 commutations were issued to life sentence inmates in 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
174 See GORDON HAAS & LLOYD FILLION, CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY COALITION, LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE: 
A RECONSIDERATION, 17 (2010), available at http://www.realcostofprisons.org/materials/Haas_LWOP.pdf. 
 
175 See supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
 
176 In a formal reply to the chairman of the Board of Pardons and Paroles, the attorney general of 
Connecticut clearly states that commutation is not allowed for a sentence that is ineligible for parole. See 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, OPINION NO. 2007-17, 1 (2007). 
 
177 The states differ in recordkeeping and access to grants of commutation. In most states, information 
about commutation can be accessed only upon formal request.  Some states publicize general information 
of commutation on their official websites, but not information about, for example, the number of clemency 
grants or the details of any particular clemency grant. See California Clemency Policy, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
POLICY FOUNDATION, http://www.cjpf.org/clemency/find-your-state/california (last visited October 2, 
2014) (noting that commutations in California are not automatically publicized and might be obtained upon 
formal request); see also Applications for Commutation of Life Sentence, PA BOARD OF PARDONS, 
http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/statistics/19543/commutation_of_life_sentence_1
971_-_present/765885 (last updated Mar. 8, 2012) (Pennsylvania publicizes the number of life sentences 
commuted by the Governor at the end of each term of office). The author directly contacted the relevant 
Board in all 50 states about their data, and received data from about 20 states.  
 
178 Editorial, No Parole Means What It Says, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, April 13, 1990 (citing a 
governor's study covering all commutations of death and LWOP sentences). 
 
179 Sara Kruzan, a Californian who was sentenced to life without parole for killing her abusive pimp, was 
granted clemency by Governor Jerry Brown. See Governor Grants Clemency to Sara Kruzan; Kruzan's Life 
Without Possibility of Parole Sentence Commuted, NATIONAL CENTER FOR YOUTH LAW, 
http://www.youthlaw.org/press_room/press_releases/2011_press_releases/governor_grants_clemency_to_s
ara_kruzan_kruzans_life_without_possibility_of_parole_sentence_commuted/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2013); 
see also Paige St. John, Jerry Brown AllowsRelease of Woman Imprisoned at 16 for Killing Pimp, LOS 
ANGELES TIMES, Oct. 26, 2013, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/oct/26/local/la-me-pc-sara-kruzan-
20131026. 
 
180 The mandatory life law for first degree murder in Michigan has existed since 1931. It provides that 
“conviction for first-degree murder carries penalty of life without possibility of parole and no lesser 
sentence may be imposed.” MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.316. 
 
181 Richard C. Dieter, Sentencing for Life: Americans Embrace Alternatives to the Death Penalty, in THE 
DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES 116, 119 (Hugo A. Bedau ed., 1997). 
 
182 Nebraska does not have a sentence entitled LWOP. But the flat life sentence, which is imposed without 
a fixed minimum sentence, has been practically used as a life without parole sentence since 1969. The law 
of Nebraska provided that “Every committed offender shall be eligible for release on parole upon 
completion of his minimum term less reductions granted in accordance with this act, or, if there is no 
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Nebraska. After almost two decades’ in which no commutations were issued, the governor of Nebraska 
issued 4 commutations for LWOP inmates between 2009 and 2013.183 In Vermont, there have been only 2 
commutations issued to LWOP inmates as of 2012.184 In some states, no commutation of a LWOP sentence 
has ever been issued.  For example, in Montana, there are 45 inmates serving a LWOP sentence as of 2012 
and no commutation has been issued to those inmates yet.185 New Mexico has had no chance of issuing 
LWOP sentence commutations until recently, because it was not until 2012 that the first LWOP sentence 
was issued in New Mexico.186 
 
According to the limited accessible information, it is reasonable to believe that, in the past few 
decades, among the limited number of commutations of LWOP inmates, most of the commutations went to 
those convicted of murder, though LWOP sentences are applied to first degree murders, habitual offenders, 
and drug offenders under current laws. (The exception would be the drug defendants’ sentences recently 
commuted by President Obama.) For example, in the states of Massachusetts and Nebraska, the limited 
commutations to LWOP inmates could only be issued to murderers, for LWOP sentences in these states are 
applied only to first degree murder.187 In Nevada, a LWOP inmate who was convicted of murder was 
commuted in 1999.188 In 2013, one LWOP first degree murder sentence was commuted in Louisiana189 and 
one in Illinois. 190  In states that impose a LWOP sentence on habitual offenders or drug offenders, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
minimum, at any time.” NEB. REV. STAT. § 83–1,110 (1) (Cum. Supp. 1969). This statute was interpreted in 
Poindexter v. Houston, to mean that a person receiving a flat life sentence for first degree murder in 
Nebraska is not eligible for parole until the Nebraska Board of Pardons commutes his or her sentence to a 
term of years. See Poindexter v. Houston, 275 Neb. 863, 868 (2008) (noting that the minimum term of 
Poindexter’s life sentence was indefinite and thus it was impossible to apply the parole law to his life 
sentence). In Nebraska, a flat life sentence with no parole eligibility is applied only to class IA felony. See 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105. 
 
183 Figure is obtained from the Nebraska Board of Pardons upon the author’s inquiry. 
 
184 Figure is obtained from the Vermont Department of Corrections upon author’s inquiry.  
 
185 Figure is obtained from Montana Department of Corrections upon author’s inquiry. 
 
186 Figure is obtained from New Mexico Corrections Department upon author’s inquiry. 
 
187 In Massachusetts, parole is not eligible for prisoners serving a life sentence for murder in the first 
degree. See M.G.L.A. 127 § 133A. In Nebraska, a prisoner serving a life sentence for first degree murder is 
not eligible for parole. See supra note 183. 
 
188 Joel Kinney, sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for a fatal shooting in a barroom 
robbery in Las Vegas in 1980, had his sentence commuted in 1999 and was allowed to apply for parole 
immediately. By then, he had served 19 years on his sentence. See Man Serving Life Sentence Wins 
Clemency from Pardons Board, LAS VEGAS SUN, Dec. 8, 1999, 
http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/1999/dec/08/man-serving-life-sentence-wins-clemency-from-pardon-
board/. 
 
189 Shelby Arabie, who was sentenced to life sentence for killing during a drug deal gone sour in 1984, had 
his life sentence reduced to 45 years of imprisonment in July of 2013. By then, he had served 29 years of 
his sentence. In Louisiana a life sentence is life-long unless the parole board releases the prisoner. See 
Lauren McGaughy, Jindal Commutes Sentence of Angola Lifer Shelby Arabie, NOLA.COM | THE TIMES 
PICAYUNE, Jul.12, 2013, 
http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2013/07/jindal_angola_commutes_life_se.html; see also MAUER, 
THE MEANING OF “LIFE”, supra note 13, at 6 (noting that in Louisiana parole is not available for a life 
sentence). 
 
190 Peggy Jo Jackson, who was sentenced to life without parole for killing her abusive husband in 1987, was 
freed on parole when she was granted commutation in 2013. See Blake Wood, Illinois Innocence Project 
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commutation appears to be especially rare. One LWOP sentence commutation was issued to a drug 
offender in 2012 in Washington.191 There was one commutation issued to a drug offense LWOP inmate in 
2008 in Florida.192  
 
On the federal level, since life sentences became LWOP sentences in 1987,193 very few have been 
commuted. As of 2012, only one commutation was granted to a LWOP inmate,194 which was issued in 
2008, by former President George W. Bush, to a drug offender, who was sentenced to LWOP in 1996.195 
However, as discussed above, President Obama in 2013 broke the tradition and issued grand commutations 
to 6 federal LWOP inmates who were convicted of drug offenses.196 As endorsed by the Department of 
Justice, the President intends to issue more commutations on harsh drug offenses before the end of his 
Term.197 Thus, more commutations will be likely issued to LWOP inmates who were convicted of drug 
offenses --- bringing front and center the question of what standards should be applied to evaluate the cases 
of LWOP inmates fairly and equitably.  
 
3. Increasing Commutation Applications From LWOP Inmates in the Future 
 
In sum, during the past decades, under the prevailing tough-on-crime policy, executive commutations 
issued to LWOP inmates were stringently constrained. However, it is reasonable to think that in the 
foreseeable future there will be more applications for commutation coming from LWOP inmates.  
 
First, the steadily growing LWOP inmate populations will expand the pool of inmate candidates that 
will have a strong incentive to apply for commutations. Given that legislatures so far appear reluctant to 
repeal the LWOP sentencing laws, the number of new LWOP inmates will likely always be higher than the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Helps Free Peggy Jo Jackson From Prison, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 29, 2013, 
http://interact.stltoday.com/pr/local-news/PR032913035212376; see also University of Illinois Springfield 
Innocent Project, The Peggy Jo Jackson Case, 
http://www.uis.edu/innocenceproject/cases/exonorees/peggyjojackson/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2012). 
 
191 Larry Lee Fisher, a drug offender, after serving almost 20 years of his life sentence, got his sentence 
commuted in 2012 by Governor Chris Gregoire. See Diana Hefley, Clemency in 3-Strikes Case Gives 
Inmate Shot at Release, HERALD NET, Jan. 8, 2013, 
 http://www.heraldnet.com/article/20130108/NEWS01/701089913?page=single. 
 
192 Information is obtained from Florida Department of Corrections upon author’s inquiry. 
 
193 A life sentence became LWOP when Congress abolished parole in the Comprehensive Crime Control 
Act of 1984 (Pub. L. No. 98-473 § 218(a)(5)) for federal crimes committed beginning in November 1987. 
 
194 Figure is obtained from the website of U.S. Department of Justice. The published federal clemency 
recipients’ list could only be retrieved from 1989, which demonstrates that at that point only one LWOP 
inmate received a commutation. According to the statistics published by the Department of Justice, there 
were no commutations issued in 1987 or 1988.  See OFFICE OF THE PARDON ATTORNEY, CLEMENCY 
RECIPIENTS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/pardon/recipients.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 
2013); see also OFFICE OF THE PARDON ATTORNEY, CLEMENCY STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.justice.gov/pardon/statistics.htm (Updated August 2014). 
 
195 See OFFICE OF THE PARDON ATTORNEY, COMMUTATIONS GRANTED BY GEORGE W. BUSH (2001-2009), 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/pardon/bush-comm.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2013) (Reed 
Raymond Prior’s life sentence was commuted to expire on February 23, 2009 and was subject to ten years’ 
supervised release). 
 
196 See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
 
197 See supra notes 157-158 and accompanying text. 
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number of LWOP inmates leaving prison either by death or commutation. Moreover, new LWOP 
sentencing laws will have more offenders sentenced to LWOP. For example, Massachusetts passed a 
habitual offender law in 2012, which provides a LWOP sentence for defendants convicted of three 
designated felonies.198 As shown above, the population of prisoners serving LWOP inmates has steadily 
risen in the past three decades.199 So it follows that executives will be considering an ever-increasing 
number of applications for clemency filed by LWOP inmates.  
 
Second, it is also likely that more drug offenders sentenced to life without parole will be seeking (and 
possibly eligible for) commutation. The commutations issued to drug offenders by President Obama at the 
end of 2013 has sent a message that sentencing fairness for non-violent drug offenders should be rethought 
--- if necessary, by commutation.200 Under criteria announced by the Department of Justice, non-violent 
drug offenders who have served at least 10 years of their prison sentence are qualified to apply for 
commutation.201  
 
Third, as more LWOP inmates will have completed a significant portion of their prison time, they will 
become more likely to have their sentences commuted. The accessible records and the news reports 
regarding LWOP sentence commutations,202 indicates that commutations are more likely to be issued to 
those who have completed a significant amount of years of imprisonment. For example, a commuted 
LWOP inmate in Nevada served 19 years of his sentence before he was commuted in 1999.203 A commuted 
LWOP inmate in Louisiana served 29 years of his sentence.204 Another commuted LWOP inmate in Illinois 
severed 26 years of his sentence.205 Obviously, as time passes by, there will always be new LWOP inmates 
who reach the level of having served a significant term of their imprisonment. Thus, the population of 
LWOP inmates qualified for commutation will steadily increase every year. 
 
So it appears that the question of commuting LWOP sentences will become a substantial legal and 
public policy question at both the State and Federal level. However, there are a number of questions related 
to granting leniency to LWOP inmates that must be answered before the executive branch is well prepared 
to decide whether to grant or to deny this new wave of commutation applications from LWOP inmates. 
First, does commutation conflict with the sentencing policy that is used to support LWOP sentences? On 
the one hand, commutation, as a form of clemency, is widely recognized as an expression of mercy 
exercised by the executive branch by shortening the length of a judicially-imposed sentence. On the other 
                                                          
198 2012 MASS. ACTS § 41. 
 
199 See table 2 in this article. 
 
200 The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 initially created a severe sentencing disparity for crack cocaine and 
powder cocaine offenses. Offenders, who were arrested for possessing crack cocaine, faced much more 
severe penalties than those in possession of powder cocaine. The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (Public Law 
111-2000) reduced the disparity between the amount of crack cocaine and powder cocaine that would 
trigger certain federal criminal penalties, from a 100:1 weight ratio to an 18:1 weight ratio.  
 
201 See Announcing New Clemency Initiative, Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole Details Broad New 
Criteria for Applicants, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, April 23, 2014, 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2014/April/14-dag-419.html. 
 
202 It is hard to access concise statistics from official resources regarding the terms of imprisonment that 
commuted LWOP inmates have served before they were granted commutation. The most accessible 
information could be derived from news reports. 
 
203 See supra note 184. 
 
204 See supra note 185. 
 
205 See supra note 186. 
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hand, the sentencing policy of LWOP sentences is to provide a most certain and most grave punishment for 
a selected group of serious offenders. It would appear that a decision to make a certain crime punishable by 
such a serious and certain sentence leaves little room for decisions based on mercy; any such decision 
would appear to undermine the very purpose of a LWOP sentencing scheme. Second, if the practice of 
commuting LWOP inmates can ever be supported, are there any standards that will prevent the executive 
from exercising the clemency power arbitrarily?  The clemency power proved at various points in history to 
be a significant tool for curing the injustices of harsh and undifferentiated sentencings. But the clemency 
power has been exercised with few if any standards or guiding principles since the power was adopted in 
the federal and state constitutions. Executives often make the clemency decisions on the base of their own 
personal sense of justice or according to the political factors thought relevant at the time.206  
 
The following parts of this article will explore whether commutating LWOP inmates is a justified 
practice, and will provide suggestions about how to provide some relief for LWOP prisoners by 
commutation in a principled fashion without substantially undermining the system of justice.   
 
  
                                                          
206 See Beau Breslin & John J.P. Howley, Defending the Politics of Clemency, 81 OR. L. REV. 231, 232 
(2002) (“the clemency process involves an elected official and her or his appointees who regularly take into 
account the potential reaction of the news media, political allies and adversaries, special interest groups, as 
well as the implications for a future political career, whenever he or she makes a decision.”). 
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II.  Commuting LWOP Sentences: Undermining the LWOP 
Sentencing Scheme? 
 
A LWOP sentence is by definition designed to permanently incarcerate an inmate. But in some 
instances, a LWOP sentence may not mean life-long incarceration. As state and federal constitutions have 
vested the executive with the pardoning power, a LWOP inmate could walk out of prison by way of 
executive commutation. That possibility raises an obvious tension between the LWOP sentencing scheme 
and the executive’s power of commutation. Is the practice of commutation a loophole of the LWOP 
sentencing scheme? The concern is that the certainty of the LWOP sentencing scheme --- and the 
legislative decision that conviction of certain crimes should be subject to that certainty --- will be 
undermined by executive decisionmaking. This section will address that tension and discuss whether there 
is a rationale that supports the practice of commutation of LWOP sentences. 
 
A. Diminished Certainty of LWOP Sentencing Caused by Commutation 
 
While the legislature bars the door against the LWOP inmates’ release on parole, the back door of 
executive clemency might be open for possible release. For example, the Oklahoma Board of Pardon and 
Parole recommended that Cathy Sue Lamb’s sentence of life without parole be commuted to life. Lamb had 
been convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to LWOP in 1991.207 If the Board’s recommendation 
was approved by the Governor, Lamb would have been eligible for parole in 2006. 208  Although this 
commutation recommendation was declined by Governor Keating, it raised awareness that the certainty of 
LWOP sentences might be undermined by the executive’s commutations. 
 
Ron McDaniel, a member of the Homicide Survivors Support Group, advocated that, “Life without 
parole is life without parole. You're given the impression that they (the convicted inmates) will die in 
prison.”209 Many Oklahoma prosecutors became aware of this loophole for the first time and expressed the 
hope that commutation of LWOP sentences would occur rarely or never.210 The Oklahoma state legislature 
enacted a law to make it tougher for LWOP inmates to gain release through commutation. As provided by 
the new law, a LWOP inmate whose sentence is commuted to life has to serve 38 years and 3 months’ 
imprisonment before being eligible to obtain clemency.211 The legislature could not prevent commutation 
of LWOP sentences, but did act to limit their impact. 212 
                                                          
207 Bob Doucette, Loophole Lets Inmates Seek Parole Board Changes Life Sentence Policy, NEWSOK, 
March 9, 2002, http://newsok.com/loophole-lets-inmates-seek-parole-board-changes-life-sentence-
policy/article/2784964. 
 
208 Oklahoma law in 1987 added LWOP sentences as the optional sentence for first degree murder. 1987 
OKLA. SESS. LAW SERV. 96 § 1. Oklahoma law also provides that a LWOP sentence for first degree murder 
could be commuted. 1987 OKLA. SESS. LAW SERV. 96 § 4. Additionally, Oklahoma law provides that 
inmates, who committed a crime prior to July 1, 1998, are eligible for parole release after the completion of 
one-third of their sentences. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57 § 332.7 (1998). Under the policy of the Oklahoma 
Board of Pardon and Parole, any inmate serving forty-five years or more, including a life sentence, shall be 
considered for parole or clemency after serving fifteen years. Fields v. State, Okla. Crim. App., 501 P.2d 
1390, 1394 (1972). 
 
209 Bob Doucette, Loophole Lets Inmates Seek Parole Board Changes Life Sentence Policy, NEWSOK, 
March 9, 2002, http://newsok.com/loophole-lets-inmates-seek-parole-board-changes-life-sentence-
policy/article/2784964. 
 
210  Id. 
 
211 The new law provided that offenders who committed a listed crime on or after March 1, 2000, are 
eligible for parole upon serving eighty-five percent (85%) of the sentence, excluding those offenders 
serving a sentence of life without parole. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 12.1 (1999). As the policy regards the 
serving time of a life sentence as 45 years, the 85% of the life imprisonment comes to 38 years and 3 
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 A number of other examples indicate the tension between LWOP sentencing and executive 
commutation. In 1994, Reginald McFadden, whose sentence was commuted from LWOP to a life sentence, 
committed a series of murders right after he was released on parole.213 McFadden’s murder charge might 
well have cost then-Governor Mark Singel the race for his second term of office. Another well-publicized 
case, as discussed above was that of Willie Horton, who, while serving a LWOP sentence, raped and killed 
a woman on a furlough granted by Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis.214 Even though Horton was 
granted a furlough, not commutation, the societal and political pushback against release of LWOP inmates -
-- no matter whether it was temporary or permanent --- was evident. Another example is that of Maurice 
Clemmons, who was released immediately after his LWOP sentence was commuted, and then found 
responsible for the November 29, 2009 murder of four Seattle-area police officers.215 
 
The tension between the certainty of LWOP sentencing and the possibility of commutation --- and the 
public outcry occurring when commuted lifers commit crimes --- has led some Governors to establish a 
policy of prohibiting commutation of LWOP inmates. New York Governor Mario Cuomo, when explaining 
his repeated vetoes of death penalty legislation, emphasized that life imprisonment without the possibility 
of parole means a sentence of death in incarceration with no chance of release by parole or clemency.216 
Connecticut Governor Malloy also delivered the same message by stressing, “Let’s throw away the key and 
have them [LWOP inmates convicted of murder] spend the rest of their natural lives in jail.”217 In these 
cases, the certainty and permanence of LWOP is posited as a justification for rejecting the death penalty --- 
and it can be assumed that any possibility that such a sentence would be reduced would correspondingly 
undermine the argument against the death penalty.  
 
But even in death penalty states, the certainty of a LWOP sentence is stressed, as the sentence serves 
as an important alternative. Thus, a former assistant attorney general from Alabama has stated that “life 
without parole in Alabama means just that --- no parole, no commutation, no way out until the day you die, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
months. See Required Service of 85% of Sentence Where Life Imprisonment is An Option, Vernon's Okla. 
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213 Reginald McFadden, a Pennsylvania LWOP inmate, had his sentence commuted to life with the 
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214 See Margaret Colgate Love, Reinventing the President’s Pardoning Power, 20 FED. SENT. REP. 5, 7 
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period.”218 And in the State of Washington, commutation of LWOP sentences for aggravated first degree 
murder is prohibited by statute.219  
 
Indeed the certainty of a LWOP sentence as an alternative could in some way be seen as benefiting a 
capital defendant. The Supreme Court has held that if the executive has the power to commute a LWOP 
sentence, a jury in a capital case can be informed of that fact.220 And several states require courts to instruct 
the jury of possible clemency in capital cases should they decide on a sentence of LWOP.221 As one 
commentator has stated: 
 
Ample empirical evidence exists that jurors' fear of the offender's future release via parole 
plays a substantial, if not predominant, role in capital sentence deliberations. Sometimes this fear 
is the primary factor in the jury's decision to impose a death sentence. One study involving a 
review of 280 Georgia trials in which the jury returned a death verdict revealed that jurors asked 
questions about defendants' parole eligibility if given a life sentence in twenty-five percent of the 
cases.222 
 
So if LWOP is subject to clemency (for anything other than proof of innocence) there is a risk that the 
capital punishment consideration may be skewed in favor of death.  
 
The above facts and circumstances indicate a concern that the governor’s power of commutation 
might undermine LWOP sentencing policy --- a policy based on punishment, deterrence, and the perceived 
need of consistency and finality in sentencing for certain crimes. The following sections will analyze 
whether commuting LWOP sentences constitutes a loophole that undermines the policy of LWOP 
sentencing. 
 
 
B. The Rationale for --- and Limitations on --- LWOP Sentencing 
 
LWOP sentences are intended to be permanent. Life sentence without possibility of parole “means 
denial of hope; it means that good behavior and character improvement are immaterial; it means that 
whatever the future might hold in store for the mind and spirit of [the convict], he will remain in prison for 
the rest of his days.”223 This description of LWOP sentences provides what is at first glance a shocking 
                                                          
218 Dieter, supra note 181, at 116. 
 
219 WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.030 (1981). 
 
220  California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983) (proper to inform jury of the risk to society of the defendant’s 
future dangerousness).  
 
221 See, e.g., Art. I, §16 of the Louisiana Constitution (allowing the legislature to enact a law “to require a 
trial court to instruct a jury in a criminal trial that the governor is empowered to . . . commute or modify a 
sentence of life imprisonment without benefit of parole to a lesser sentence which includes the possibility 
of parole . . . or may allow the release of an offender either by reducing a life imprisonment or death 
sentence to the time already served by the offender or by granting the offender a pardon.”). The statute 
authorized by the Louisiana Constitution is La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 905.2(B). The constitutional 
provision was made necessary after the Louisiana Supreme Court invalidated the statute on the ground that 
it violated the capital defendant’s right to fair treatment under the Louisiana Constitution. State v. Jones, 
639 So. 2d 1144 (La. 1994).  For more on the use of clemency-possibility instructions in capital cases, see 
Blaine LeCesne, Tipping the Scales Toward Death: Instructing Capital Jurors on the Possibility of 
Executive Clemency, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 1051 (1997). 
 
222 Blaine LeCesne, Tipping the Scales Toward Death: Instructing Capital Jurors on the Possibility of 
Executive Clemency, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 1051, 1062 (1997). 
 
223 Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d 944, 944 (Nev. 1989). 
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impression: that the rehabilitative purpose of a punishment is rejected. To understand the rationale of 
LWOP sentences and the rejection of rehabilitation as a factor in punishment, it is necessary to learn about 
the emergence and development of LWOP sentencing schemes. 
 
1. Murder Cases: Retribution and Deterrence 
  
As discussed above, the emergence of LWOP sentences is attributed largely to its role as a substitute 
for the death penalty. After the Supreme Court ruled the mandatory death penalty unconstitutional,224 state 
legislatures found LWOP sentences to be a “next-best” alternative to the death penalty. By 2013, all of the 
32 death penalty states have provided LWOP sentences as the only alternative to the death penalty for 
defendants convicted of capital crimes.225  
 
There are two aspects of early correctional practice that could explain the start of LWOP sentences as 
an alternative to the death penalty: lifers’ traditional routine early release on parole, and the traditional 
practice of parole exclusion for murderers. Before the 1970’s, a life sentence did not mean incarcerating an 
inmate for a lifelong term. From the time that the parole system was set up in this nation in the late 19th 
century, parole release was per se available to all convicts who were sentenced to serve an indeterminate 
term of imprisonment, including those sentenced to serve life sentences. Prisoners committed for life were 
allowed to apply for release on parole after the completion of a certain term of imprisonment, for example, 
20 years in Rhode Island,226 8 years in Kentucky,227 10 years in Louisiana, 11 years in Illinois, 10 years in 
Michigan, 10 years in New Mexico, and 20 years in Pennsylvania.228 There is no doubt that the parole 
release of lifers had significantly deviated a life sentence from its supposed severity. So when the time 
came to devise a sentence that would serve as an alternative to the death penalty, it is no surprise that 
legislatures began to think differently about the parole eligibility for life sentences. Lawmakers were 
unlikely to be interested in having a murderer sentenced to life as an alternative to the death penalty, and 
then be released on parole after a completion of 10 or 20 years of imprisonment. In this context, the 
sentence of LWOP was invented to prevent the possibility of parole from undermining a punishment 
intended to be severe enough to provide an alternative to the death penalty. 
 
In addition, the sentence of LWOP could be thought to be derived from the traditional practice of 
excluding parole possibility for murderers. When the rehabilitative ideal flourished in the nation in the first 
half of the 20th Century, it was not applied to offenders who were sentenced to death; offenders who were 
sentenced to death were legislatively excluded from parole release. Before Furman, conviction of a large 
array of crimes --- not only first degree murder, but crimes such as rape, kidnapping, robbery, burglary, 
arson, and train-wrecking was punishable by death.229 That broad coverage indicates that many legislatures 
traditionally considered that offenders who have committed these severe crimes did not deserve the chance 
of rehabilitating themselves. Following that line of thought, it is reasonable to assume these legislatures 
determined that murderers, having committed the most severe crime there is, do not deserve the chance of 
rehabilitation. Thus, when there arose the need to find an alternative punishment to the death penalty, 
which was constrained to the most severe crime of murder, such alternative punishment should, in the logic 
of the legislature, be a parole ineligible sentence. In that context, the sentence of LWOP derives from the 
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traditional concept that murderers, who have committed the most severe crime, do not deserve, or have 
forfeited, the chance of rehabilitation.  
 
Accordingly, LWOP sentences, as primarily invented to be a substitute for the death penalty, are 
created to punish the most severe crime of murder. In that sense, when the sentence of LWOP is applied to 
punish the crime of murder, the legislature is indicating that it serves the penal goals of retribution and 
deterrence: retribution in that the legislature has concluded that the severe punishment is proportionate to 
the severe crime; deterrence in the sense that such a severe punishment could deter individuals from 
committing such severe crimes.230  
 
2. Habitual Offenders: Deterrence and Incapacitation 
 
Beginning in the 1980s, as discussed above, LWOP was expanded to include habitual offenders and 
drug crime offenders. 231  As discussed above, under three strikes laws, habitual offenders, who are 
convicted of three or more serious criminal offenses, may be subject to a LWOP sentence.232 For example, 
the California law was designed “to ensure longer prison sentences and greater punishment for those who 
commit a felony and have been previously convicted of serious and/or violent felony offenses.” 233 
Although the Three Strikes laws have been subject to proportionality challenges based on the Eighth 
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, 234  the Supreme Court has basically 
concluded that the constitutional prohibition on grossly disproportionate sentences does not extend to 
noncapital sentences --- except, perhaps in egregious cases where the crimes, though cumulative, are trivial. 
 
In Solem v. Helm,235 the Court applied proportionality review on the basis of “objective criteria”236 
and overturned the life sentence without possibility of parole for a defendant who had committed seven 
                                                          
230 There is no intent here to get involved in the arguments over whether or not the retribution or deterrence 
goals are theoretically justified or empirically provable. Rather the goal is to consider the grounding of 
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231 See the historical treatment in Section I, supra. 
 
232 See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.  
 
233 CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 667(b). 
 
234 In the landmark case of Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), the Supreme Court ruled that a state 
cannot apply the death penalty on the crime of raping an adult woman because to do so would violate the 
proportionality requirement of the Eighth Amendment. The proportionality review originated in capital 
cases, but the Court has not established a clear or consistent path for courts to follow in determining 
whether a particular sentence for a term of years is subject to the proportionality review. The Court has 
gone back and forth in applying the proportionality review in noncapital cases, including Rummel v.Estelle, 
445 U.S. 263 (1980), Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), and Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 
(1991). These cases stand for the proposition that the Eighth Amendment has a “narrow proportionality 
principle” as applied to non-capital sentences. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 996. In Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 
11 (2003), and the companion case Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003), the Court rebuffed 
proportionality challenged to “Three Strikes” laws.  
 
The Court says that the proportionality review for non-capital offenses is “narrow” but it means 
“very narrow” as in “so narrow as to never apply.” The Court in Solem did strike down a LWOP sentence 
for a habitual offender, but that case has certainly been narrowed by cases such as Harmelin and Ewing. 
What was notable in Solem is that the defendant had committed non-violent, relatively trivial felonies. 
Consequently, the likelihood of a successful proportionality argument against a non-capital sentence, 
including one imposed under a Three Strikes law, is to say the least remote.  
 
235 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983). 
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nonviolent and relatively trivial felonies. But in the most recent case of Ewing v. California,237 the Court 
rejected a proportionality challenge to California’s Three Strikes law238, as applied to a repeat felon with a 
lengthy felony and misdemeanor record, to 25 years to life imprisonment for his conviction of felony grand 
theft of three golf clubs valued near $1,200. A plurality of three Justices (O’Connor, Kennedy, and Chief 
Justice Rehnquist) determined that the sentence was “justified by the State’s public safety interest in 
incapacitating and deterring recidivist felons, and amply supported by [the petitioner’s] long, serious 
criminal record,”239 and declared that the case was not the “rare case” that would be subject to “gross 
disproportional[ity]” review.240 In Ewing the Court declared that the Three Strikes Law was a “rational 
legislative judgment, entitled to deference, that offenders who have committed serious or violent felonies 
and who continue to commit felonies must be incapacitated.”241 
 
These crucial cases reflect the Court’s reluctance to tie the hands of state legislatures,242 who are 
entitled to make their own judgments on what sentences provide for sufficient deterrence and incapacitation 
of habitual offenders.243 While the Court in Solem struck down the sentence of LWOP when imposed on a 
habitual criminal who committed non-violent and minor felonies, Ewing indicates that a sentence of LWOP 
is permissible as to a recidivist felon who has at least one conviction for a serious or violent felony. In that 
context, when a LWOP sentence is constitutionally applied under Three Strikes laws, the purposes of the 
sentence of LWOP are the same as that of life sentences with parole possibility: deterrence and 
incapacitation of repeat offenders. As stated in Rummel, “the primary goals [of a recidivist statute] are to 
deter repeat offenders and, at some point in the life of one who repeatedly commits criminal offenses 
serious enough to be punished as felonies, to segregate that person from the rest of society for an extended 
period of time.”244 The length of the incapacitation is “based not merely on that person's most recent 
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offense but also on the propensities [a recidivist] has demonstrated over a period of time during which he 
has been convicted of and sentenced for other crimes.”245 
 
3. Drug Laws: Deterrence and Retribution 
 
As discussed in Section I, the expansion of LWOP sentencing is also seen in anti-drug laws. As 
applied in some states, LWOP sentences can be imposed on drug only offenders, 246  habitual drug 
offenders,247 or habitual offenders with a drug offense conviction.248 Although there are challenges against 
the constitutionality of LWOP sentences as applied to drug offenders, the Supreme Court in Harmelin v. 
Michigan249 ruled that a mandatory sentence of LWOP on a first offender for possession of a large quantity 
of drugs was not constitutionally disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment. There was no opinion for 
the Court, but the controlling opinion is that of Justice Kennedy’s concurrence.250 In the concurring opinion, 
Justice Kennedy applied the constitutional proportionality approach in examining whether the sentence of 
LWOP was grossly disproportionate to the crime of possession of more than 650 grams of cocaine. He 
stressed the pernicious effects of large-scale drug activity on society, and stated that “the Michigan 
Legislature could with reason conclude that the threat imposed to the individual and society by possession 
of this large an amount of cocaine --- in terms of violence, crime, and social displacement --- is momentous 
enough to warrant the deterrence and retribution of a life sentence without parole”.251 Thus Justice Kennedy 
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recognized the state legislature’s authority to impose a sentencing policy that excluded any consideration of 
rehabilitation, at least for certain crimes.252  
 
On the opposite of the expanding scope of LWOP sentences, the Supreme Court has recently limited 
the use of LWOP sentencing for juvenile offenders. In Graham v. Florida253, the Court banned the use of 
LWOP sentences for juveniles who committed non-homicide offenses. And in Miller v. Alabama254, the 
Court held that a mandatory sentence of LWOP on a juvenile offender is unconstitutional even for those 
juveniles who commit even the most serious murders. The rationales of Graham and Miller can be 
summarized as follows: 1) LWOP as applied to juveniles is especially serious given the likely term of years 
of such a sentence as applied to a youth, with no hope for release;255 2) such a serious penalty requires 
individualized sentencing for defendants as is the case with the death penalty; 256  and 3) a juvenile’s 
“diminished culpability” and “great prospects for reform” must be considered.257 Although these rulings 
have imposed substantial limitations on the use of LWOP sentences upon juveniles,258 there is no indication 
that the Supreme Court is launching a full-scale review of LWOP sentences under the Eighth Amendment. 
Graham and Miller are, on their face, limited to review of LWOP sentences on individuals who committed 
crimes as juveniles. When an individual commits a crime as an adult, the LWOP sentence will be reviewed 
under the far more deferential standards of Harmelin and Ewing.    
 
The above overview of the development of LWOP sentencing indicates that a LWOP sentence is 
designed to serve the purposes of retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and certainty and finality in 
sentencing. Obviously, the rehabilitation goal is rejected. This rejection of rehabilitation as a goal of 
sentencing can be explained by the fact that legislatures often “accord different weights at different times to 
the penological goals of retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.”259 To understand the 
rejection of the rehabilitation goal in LWOP sentencing --- and the complication raised by the possibility of 
clemency --- it is necessary to analyze the process of parole. 
 
 
C. The Rationale and Development of Parole 
 
1. Basis of Parole: Rehabilitation 
 
The concept of parole, along with the indeterminate sentencing scheme, grew from the penological 
ideal of rehabilitation. As discussed by Francis Allen, rehabilitation is a belief that an important purpose of 
punishment is to effect a change in the character, attitudes and behavior of convicted offenders so as to 
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strengthen the community's social defense but also to contribute to the welfare of the individual.260 To put it 
simply, the purpose of parole is to provide an opportunity for an inmate to rehabilitate his character and 
become a law-abiding person.261 
 
2. Early Stages: Failed Application of Rehabilitative Ideal Under Unconstrained Parole Scheme  
 
The practice of parole is a successor of an early correctional practice of “ticket-of-leave”, which was 
originally implemented by Britain in its Australian colony.262 It allowed prisoners to win early release 
based on their good behavior.263 The American prison system adopted the early release idea in the 1870s, 
beginning with the establishment of the Elmira Reformatory.264 The concept was that a prisoner could be fit 
for release only after being reformed by training and education provided by the reformatory.265 This new 
understanding of lawbreakers’ reformatory treatment was also called the “rehabilitative ideal”, 266 upon 
which the correctional system was eventually refashioned. The most remarkable changes were the 
development of indeterminate sentencing and the establishment of the parole system. Prisoners would 
undergo three phases to gain freedom --- restraint custody, reformatory treatment, and conditional release 
on parole before absolute discharge.267 The state of New York, in 1877, first introduced the indeterminate 
sentence and the possibility of parole,268 and the practice of indeterminate sentencing and parole spread 
rapidly in the nation in the first two decades of the 20th century. By 1900, twenty states had implemented 
parole statutes. By 1922, forty-four states, Hawaii, and the federal government had adopted a parole 
system.269  
 
However, at the beginning of the development of parole and reformation, the rehabilitation ideal was 
not applied in practice quite the same as was intended. “Neither of the two essential tasks of parole, the 
fixing of prison release time or post-sentence supervision, was carried out with any degree of competence 
or skill.”270 The paroling authority maintained great discretionary power in granting or refusing parole 
based on an investigation and consideration of each case, but the state statutes did not provide any clear 
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rules on what such investigation and consideration should be.271 The state parole statutes did not articulate 
the need for after-care and supervision over the parolee after release from incarceration.272 The promise of 
early release was used to obtain the inmates’ institutionalized good conduct in custody. Parole became a 
tool “to make better prisoners rather than better residents of the community”.273 Moreover, in places like 
California, parole release was used on a regular basis not to promote rehabilitation but rather to relieve 
prison overcrowding.274 So the rehabilitative ideal that generated the system of parole was never faithfully 
implemented in these early stages.275 
 
3. Changes to the Parole System to Employ the Rehabilitative Ideal 
 
Starting in the late 1910s, it became clear that the public and policy makers wanted the use of parole 
to be more protective of society and more useful to paroled offenders, rather than a routine release 
process.276  New Jersey took the lead in implementing a system that furthered the rehabilitation ideal 
seriously. It established a procedure that focused more on the reeducation and training of individuals in 
correctional and penal institutions.277 Soon states began to establish correctional treatment programs inside 
prisons, including individual and group counseling, therapeutic milieus, behavioral modification, 
vocational training, work release and furloughs, and college education.278 Also, parole supervision and 
after-care service towards the rehabilitation of offenders became the mission assigned to paroling 
authorities.279 The rehabilitative ideal --- that lawbreakers could be changed into law-abiders --- dominated 
the country until the 1970s.280 In short, the parole system in America started as a practical alternative to 
executive clemency, then came to be used as a mechanism for controlling prison growth, and gradually 
developed a distinctively rehabilitative rationale, incorporating the promise of help and assistance as well 
as surveillance.281 
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4. Sentencing Reform Era: Modern Challenges and Elimination of Parole 
 
In the early 1970s, the rehabilitative ideal and indeterminate sentencing faced significant attacks from 
a number of fronts.282 On the one hand, the effectiveness of the rehabilitative program was called into 
question.283 Rehabilitative efforts were tagged as “nothing works,” given the statistics of inmates who 
returned to crime.284 On the other hand, the discretionary power of parole boards was criticized as it led to 
arbitrariness and disparities.285 Meanwhile, crime rates were rising in America. “Law and order” became 
the controlling policy, and the predominant sentencing purpose shifted from rehabilitation to “just 
deserts”.286 As discussed above, determinate sentencing and abolition of parole were widely embraced. The 
abolition of parole began with Maine in 1975.287 By 1984, at least eleven states and the federal government 
had abolished parole. 288  Jurisdictions that abolished parole generally adopted determinate sentencing 
schemes, allowing only very narrow discretion to judges. The majority of states that abolished parole 
allowed early release by good-time reductions, and maintained the after-release supervision.289  
 
It is noteworthy that, in states without a parole release system, alternative methods of managing the 
prison population were invented. States developed accelerated release programs for certain categories of 
offenders in case the prison populations reached certain specified limits above maximum capacity.290 For 
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example, the Michigan Emergency Overcrowding Act required that when prisons went over their official 
capacity for thirty days, all parole eligibility dates are to be moved forward by ninety days.291 Additionally, 
the rehabilitative ideal, which used to be served by parole and post-release supervision, is promoted by 
“supervised release”. The Federal Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, aiming to ensure “honesty in sentencing 
and to reduce sentencing disparity,” 292  abolished indeterminate sentencing and parole and created 
supervised release. Supervised release is analogous to a special parole release scheme. As emphasized by 
Congress, supervised release is designed to “ease the defendant’s transition into the community after the 
service of a long prison term for a particularly serious offense, or to provide rehabilitation to a defendant 
who has spent a fairly short period in prison for punishment or other purposes but still needs supervision 
and training programs after release.”293 However, supervised release is different from parole in that it is 
ordered by the court at the time the sentence is imposed, while parole is an administrative decision made 
subsequent to the court’s sentence, which in effect reduces the judicially imposed sentence in favor of a 
discretionary administrative decision, and allows the parolee to serve the remainder of his sentence in the 
community.294 Supervised release has also been adopted by a number of states that abolished their parole 
systems.295  
 
States that did not abolish parole introduced parole guidelines, sentencing guidelines, and determinate 
sentencing legislation for one or more categories of offense.296 The U.S. Board of Parole first adopted 
parole guidelines in 1974. The introduction of parole guidelines was to overcome the criticisms of 
uncontrolled discretion, disparities, and lack of explicit criteria and reasons for grant or denial of parole.297 
Under the parole guidelines, the parole release determination was based on two major considerations: 
offense seriousness and a “salient factor score” indicating the risk of reoffending.298 States that maintained 
parole systems severely restricted parole to insure that prisoners, or certain classes of prisoners, served a 
large proportion of their sentences, typically eighty-five percent.299 All parole states have provided parole 
supervision.300 
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5. Modern Parole System: Moderate Application of Rehabilitative Ideal 
 
After a century’s experiment, the practice of parole has evolved significantly, adapting to social and 
political changes. Basically, the modern parole system is still based on the purpose of rehabilitation. But 
that purpose has been tempered by considerations of fairness and consistency in sentencing. Release 
decisions are now less arbitrary and more rationalized based on the more formalized parole decision 
considerations, including review of institutional behavior, crime severity, criminal history, incarceration 
length, mental illness, and victim input.301 Moreover, parole decisions are more moderate because weight is 
given to the concept of “just deserts”.302 Crime severity and criminal history now heavily influence the 
parole decisionmaking process.303 Finally, more efforts have been put into supervision after release to 
enhance offenders’ reintegration into the community.304 Successful reentry is the major goal in the states 
with parole systems as well as the jurisdictions with a supervised release scheme. While it is true that the 
states and the federal government have provided numerous post-release conditions to protect the 
community,305 it is also true that they have provided post-release support and services to assist inmates 
returning to the community.306 It is notable that post-release supervision has significantly expanded in the 
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era of sentencing reform. The portion of prisoners released to community supervision has risen from 50-
60% for the period from 1923 and 1960 to more than 80% by the end of the 20th Century.307 
 
 
D. Rationales for Commutation 
 
The rationales that would justify the exercise of the clemency power --- of which commutation is a 
part --- are best revealed in the history of the adoption and exercise of that power. At common law, the 
clemency power was maintained by the King, who could “either before attainder, sentence, or conviction, 
or after, forgiveth any crime, offence, punishment, execution, right, title, debt, or duty, temporal or 
ecclesiastical.”308 Based on its historical practice, it is commonly recognized that clemency is an act of 
mercy or leniency in the exercise of authority or power.309 Thus, the fundamental feature of clemency is 
mercy in alleviating the punishment an individual has received.   
 
However, mercy itself cannot sufficiently justify the use of clemency power in all cases, because any 
act of mercy must be evaluated within the broader system of punishment and its values of deterrence, 
retribution, and consistency.310 Moreover if the clemency power is used merely on the executive’s personal 
whim in the “name” of mercy --- for example, the clemency power in history was often exercised on to 
promote the King’s own personal objectives 311  --- such a pretextual exercise conflicts with the legal 
principle of the rule of law, which requires that a nation should be governed by law instead of a person’s 
unconstrained power. Unconstrained discretion in the exercise of clemency raises concerns of inequitable 
treatement: why was mercy shown to one person but not to all in similar circumstances? 312 The risk is real 
that an executive’s use of the clemency power could be exercised not to promote justice but rather to 
promote the executive’s subjective interests in certain individual cases --- perhaps because that individual 
has money or influence that others do not have. Thus, besides the fundamental feature of mercy, there must 
be more specific features that could define and justify the exercise of clemency power in the system of 
criminal justice. This section will consider the possible rationales that have been found in history and 
commentary to support the proper exercise of clemency.  
 
1. Justice-Enhancement 
 
The first rationale that justifies the exercise of the clemency power is justice-enhancement.313 This 
rationale is well-revealed in some of the historical uses of the clemency power. The concept of clemency 
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originated from the mediaeval era when the criminal law was extremely harsh and rigid. At that time, the 
King’s pardoning power was the only resource for a defendant seeking to obtain mercy from a harsh 
punishment, often for what would now be considered a minor crime.314 As Blackstone has described, the 
pardon power was “to soften the rigors of the general law, in such criminal cases as merit an exception 
from punishment.”315 The need for a safety valve to protect against unjust punishment was one of the 
principal reasons that clemency is included in the U.S. Constitution. As Hamilton asserted, the “benign 
prerogative of pardoning” was essential to make exceptions in favor of “unfortunate guilt”.316 Thus, the use 
of clemency --- though an act of mercy --- is justified when it is used for the purpose of ensuring that 
justice was administered. Such justice-enhancing use of clemency is also well-illustrated in the famous 
lifeboat case of the Queen v. Dudley and Stephens.317 In that hard case, the defendants killed and ate the 
cabin boy after they had been drifting at sea on a small emergency boat with no food or drink for days. The 
court rejected the defendant’s claim of necessity, convicted them of murder and sentenced them to death.318  
But to ease the harshness of the sentence imposed to the defendants under the circumstance, the Crown 
commuted the punishment to six months’ imprisonment.319  
 
 The justice-enhancing use of clemency should not be an intrusion on the justice-delivering function 
that the judicial system preserves. Consequently the clemency power, as a justice-enhancing device, should, 
be exercised only after the exhaustion of judicial relief --- as a remedial mechanism to correct the unjust 
results that are beyond the reach of a fallible judicial system. The Supreme Court in several cases has 
recognized the justice-enhancing function of clemency --- and its applicability only when the judicial 
system itself cannot provide relief. In Ex parte Grossman, 320  the Court emphasized that “executive 
clemency exists to provide relief from harshness or mistake in the judicial system.” 321  In Herrera v. 
Collins, the Court acknowledged that, when the judicial system failed to provide a just result, executive 
clemency serves as a last measure safety valve to protect innocent defendants and the integrity of the 
judicial system.322 As Justice Rehnquist declared, executive clemency is the fail-safe in the legal system 
that prevents miscarriages of justice. 323  In Dretke v. Haley, 324  Justice Kennedy observed that, “[t]he 
                                                                                                                                                                             
rendered her due.” Meanwhile, clemency could also be used in a way that is “justice-neutral” --- unrelated 
to principles of justice. See Kobil, Quality, supra note 99, at 579, 622. 
 
314 See Melvin M. Belli, The Story of Pardons, 80 CASE AND COMMENT, 26, 29 (1975); see also Samuel 
Williston, Does a Pardon Blot out Guilt? 28 HARV. L. REV. 647, 659 (1915). 
 
315 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries, 390-91. 
 
316 THE FEDERALIST No. 74, at 447 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961). 
 
317 Regina v. Dudley & Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884). 
 
318 Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. 
REV. 269, 318-19 (1996) (“Justifications are said to identify acts that produce morally preferred states of 
affairs.... Excuses, in contrast, are said to identify circumstances in which an act is wrongful but the actor 
blameless.” (footnotes omitted). 
 
319 See SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 136 n.2 (6th ed. 1995). 
 
320 Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87 (1925). 
 
321 See id. at 120-21.  
 
322 Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 412-17 (1993). 
 
323 Id. at 411-12. 
 
324 Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386 (2004). 
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clemency power can correct injustices that the ordinary criminal process seems unable or unwilling to 
consider”.325 
 
 The judicial system is unfortunately not perfect. Even though it provides safeguards to limit the 
possibility of wrongful conviction or unjust sentences --- including appellate and habeas corpus review --- 
it might still happen occasionally that an individual defendant would not receive just results. Legislatures 
certainly do not always enact just criminal laws and procedures: examples include harsh sentencing for 
crack offenses and the automatic death penalty statutes discussed earlier in this article. But even if the laws 
are flawlessly formed, a particular result can be problematic because of various forms of human error, 
including prosecutorial and judicial bias,326 and underfunded or simply incompetent defense lawyers.327 
Furthermore, even if both the system and its personnel are operating properly, newly discovered evidence 
might retroactively indicate an unjust result --- but the time limit on a newly discovered evidence claim 
could result in the denial of any judicial relief.328 
 
It follows that clemency --- when operating in furtherance of justice-enhancement --- is appropriate as 
a fail-safe mechanism in a narrow band of cases: cases where there has been a fundamental error and, most 
importantly, that error cannot be corrected by the system of appellate review, habeas corpus, or any other 
form of collateral relief. That narrow band of cases falls into two categories: excessive sentencing and 
wrongful conviction. 
  
First, clemency --- specifically commutation --- could be used to lessen a sentence that is excessive 
even though not disproportionately so under the limited protection provided by the Supreme Court.329 The 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
325 See id. at 399 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 
326 See, e.g., David C. Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: 
An Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent Findings from Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1638, 
1742-44 (1998) (revealing that race played a significant role in influencing capital sentencing); Batson v. 
Kentucky, 476 U.S.79  (racial discrimination in peremptory challenges of jurors); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 
510 (1927) (biased judge). 
 
327 See James S. Liebman et al., Capital Attrition: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973-1995, 78 TEX. L. 
REV. 1839, 1839-41 (noting that thirty-nine percent of the reversals of capital convictions or sentences in 
state court and twenty-seven percent of those in federal court were due to incompetent lawyering and 
ineffective assistance of counsel); McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 56 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from 
denial of certiorari) (relying on studies to conclude that “compensation for attorneys representing indigent 
capital defendants is perversely low”). 
 
328 In Herrera v. Collins, petitioner Herrera claimed his innocence based on newly discovered evidence ten 
years after the case was initially tried. The Supreme Court refused the petitioner’s request for an 
evidentiary hearing based on his new evidence, and ruled that Herrera had previously received all the 
judicial process he was due. The Court held that a claim of actual innocence based on newly discovered 
evidence is not ground for federal habeas relief. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993).  
 
Jurisdictions commonly have time limits on newly discovered evidence claims, the rationale being 
to promote finality and that any such claims beyond the time period can be resolved through the clemency 
process. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 33  (“Any motion for a new trial grounded on newly discovered evidence 
must be filed within 3 years after the verdict or finding of guilty.”). 
 
329 As noted by Professor Ridoifi, clemency should be used to temper harsh results in a retribution-based 
judicial system. Kathleen V. Ridoifi, Not Just an Act of Mercy: The Demise of Post-Conviction Relief and 
Rightful Claim to Clemency, 24 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 43, 85-86 (1998) (arguing that clemency is 
an appropriate response when an unjust sentence is imposed as a result of changing standards or judicial 
confusion); see also MOORE, supra note 116, at 129-130 (arguing that retribution principles are the only 
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well-known use of clemency to avoid a harsh sentencing result comes from England, in which the death 
penalty was regularly commuted because the death penalty was the sole punishment for all felonies.330 A 
modern example would be President Obama’s recent use of the clemency power to commute the sentences 
of certain defendants who were sentenced under the outdated sentencing laws for non-violent drug 
convictions, and received extremely harsh --- though statutorily permitted and constitutionally valid --- 
sentences in drug cases.331  Similarly, the outgoing governor of Ohio, Richard Celeste, commuted the 
sentences of twenty-five battered women who were convicted of killing or assaulting their abusive 
mates.332 That grant of clemency was appropriate as it corrected sentences that were rendered before the 
criminal law of self-defense was adequately taking into account the relevance of battered women 
syndrome.333 Clemency might also be useful if a sentence was issued in error and that error cannot be 
corrected through judicial review, because the time for such review has expired.334 
 
Second, clemency properly can be used to correct wrongful convictions that are out of the reach of the 
judicial system. 335 It is true that the judicial system has provided multiple remedial procedures to avoid an 
unfair result that could be caused by errors in fact finding, the trial’s procedure, or the judge’s interpretation 
of law. Where those procedures are in place, executive clemency is not necessary, and its application can 
                                                                                                                                                                             
justification for punishment, and thus clemency should only be exercised where the punishment exceeds the 
crime). 
 
330 See MOORE, supra note 116, at 17. 
 
331  The reason given by President Obama for the commutations was to reduce the harsh sentences on these 
drug offense inmates, who would have received a significantly shorter sentence under the current law, as 
established by the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010. See Charlie Savage, Obama Commutes Sentences for 8 in 
Crack Cocaine Cases, N.Y. TIMES. Dec. 19, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/20/us/obama-
commuting-sentences-in-crack-cocaine-cases.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 
332 Joan Krause, Of Merciful Justice and Justified Mercy: Commuting the Sentences of Battered Women 
Who Kill, 46 Fla. L. Rev. 699, 703 (1994). 
 
333 Doctor Lenore Walker first developed “Battered Woman Syndrome”, which refers to the effects of 
physical or psychological abuse on many women. This syndrome helps to explain how women become 
entrapped in abusive relationships. See LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 17-40 
(1984); see also Lenore E. Walker, Battered Women and Learned Helplessness, 2 VICTIMOLOGY 525, 525 
(1978). Beginning in the 1980s, in most jurisdictions, courts began admitting expert testimony on the 
battered woman syndrome in the trial court as part of a claim of self-defense. Subsequently, a number of 
states have passed legislation that allows the use of expert testimony on the syndrome. See Note, 
Developments in the Law-Legal Responses to Domestic Violence: Battered Women Who Killed Their 
Abusers, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1574, 1582-86 (1993). 
 
334  See, e.g., United States v. Gilbert, 640 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2011), where Gilbert was subjected to an 
enhanced sentence as a career offender, but a subsequent Supreme Court decision determined that the 
career offender enhancement did not apply to cases like Gilbert’s. However, the defendant could not obtain 
habeas relief because his petition would have been considered a successive petition, barred by 28 U.S.C. 
§2255(h). Given the fact that Gilbert could obtain no judicial relief for what amounted to an error in 
sentencing, clemency could be considered an appropriate and even necessary avenue for relief.  
 
335 Professor Kathleen Ridoifi argues that clemency may be properly used as to mete out justice when the 
system proves itself incapable of reaching a just result. See Kathleen V. Ridoifi, Not Just an Act of Mercy: 
The Demise of Post-Conviction Relief and Rightful Claim to Clemency, 24 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 
43, 78 (1998); Professor Henry Weihofen expressed the same idea, that clemency should be used to correct 
the wrongs that the judicial system is incapable of correcting. See Weihofen, supra note 311, at 118. Since 
1989, there have been at least 1,326 wrongful convictions. National Registry of Exonerations, 
www.law.mich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/detaillist.aspx (last visited November 1, 2014). 
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be thought to intrude improperly on the designed plan of the legislature --- clemency could operate as an 
evasion of the procedural requirements instituted by the legislature to assure fair and equitable process for 
all claimants, as well as finality and certainty of judicial results. But those remedies of direct and collateral 
review do not provide relief for claims of newly discovered innocence evidence after a certain time 
period. 336  So in some cases there will be no way within the judicial system to overturn wrongful 
convictions that are possibly caused by eyewitness misidentification, unavailable or improper forensic 
science, false confessions, and the like.337 Until legislatures enact new laws that would provide efficient 
avenues to those wrongfully convicted individuals in proving their innocence with evidence discovered 
significantly after trial,338  clemency should be used to provide a last ditch remedy for correcting the 
wrongful convictions. In Herrera v. Collins, the Supreme Court clearly delivered the message that 
executive clemency plays the significant role of “the fail safe” in the criminal justice system.339 The Court 
noted that executive clemency is a historic remedy for preventing miscarriages of justice where judicial 
process has been exhausted.340 Thus, those claims of actual innocence based on evidence discovered too 
late for the judicial review process can properly be addressed through executive clemency.341   
 
It should be noted that the form of clemency addressed to wrongful convictions is a pardon. This 
dissertation, while discussing the clemency power in broad strokes, is concerned specifically with the 
issues and controversies that arise when an executive is deciding whether to commute the sentence of a 
criminal who has been sentenced to life without parole. Granting a pardon to a LWOP inmate, on the 
ground of unjust conviction, raises no issues any different from granting a pardon to any other person who 
has been unjustly convicted. Therefore in Part IV, which sets forth standards for commuting LWOP 
sentences, unjust conviction is not considered.   
                                                          
336 It is very hard for wrongfully convicted individuals to meet time limitations for filing new trial motions 
on the ground of newly discovered innocence evidence. According to the statistics presented in Herrera, 
the time limits in most states could range from 60 days to three years. Only 15 states allow new trial 
motions based on newly discovered evidence to be filed more than three years after conviction. See 
Herrera, 506 U.S. at 410-11; see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 33 (three-year time period). 
 
337 See The Causes of Wrongful Conviction, INNOCENT PROJECT, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/, (last visited Jun. 24, 2014); see also C. Ronald Huff, Arye 
Rattner & Edward Sagarin, Guilty Until Proved Innocent: Wrongful Conviction and Public Policy, 32 
CRIME & DELINQ. 518, 524-33 (1986); Arye Rattner, Convicted but Innocent: Wrongful Conviction and the 
Criminal Justice System, 12 L. & HUMAN BEH. 283, 285-86 (1988); Ronald J. Tabak & J. Mark Lane, The 
Execution of Injustice: A Cost and Lack-of-Benefit Analysis of the Death Penalty, 23 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 59, 
99-105 (1989). 
 
338  It should be noted that legislatures have enacted new laws to address --- at least with respect to DNA 
evidence --- the problem of inadequate appellate protection to those wrongfully convicted individuals who 
could not file new trial motions based on newly discovered evidence. Congress passed the Innocence 
Protection Act (IPA) (18 U.S.C. § 3600) in 2004 to permit DNA testing for federal inmates who assert their 
innocence. The statutes provide that exculpatory results excuse any time bar that would otherwise preclude 
a new trial or resentencing motion. 47 states have adopted a similar provision. See Myrna S. Raeder, 
Feature, Postconviction Claims of Innocence, 24 CRIM. JUST. 14, 15 (2009). Where these statutes are 
operative, clemency is not necessary to remedy an unjust conviction, and indeed the use of clemency where 
statutory relief is applicable seems both unnecessary and intrusive on the legislative solution. Of course, 
these statutes are not protective if DNA was not found or collected at the scene of the crime. Crimes like 
robbery and drug offenses are unlikely to have been subject to DNA collection. The statutes do not cover 
newly discovered evidence such as eyewitnesses or physical evidence.  
 
339 See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 415. 
 
340 See id. at 411-12. 
 
341 See id. at 417. 
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2. Utilitarian Use of Clemency 
 
The second rationale that has been found to justify the exercise of the clemency power is the 
utilitarian use of clemency.342 The utilitarian grounds for clemency were emphasized by Hamilton in the 
Federalist Papers as the principal reason for providing the President the power to pardon. As noted by 
Hamilton, a well-timed offer of pardon to people in rebellion could be essential to the preservation of the 
government.343 The most notable utilitarian use of clemency has been exercised by American presidents in 
those very limited occasions where it was required to promote public policy, such as to preserve the peace 
and stability of the country. For example, President Washington pardoned several people involved in the 
Pennsylvania Whiskey Rebellion; President Adams pardoned the participants in a Pennsylvania 
insurrection; President Carter pardoned certain people who had not registered for the mandatory draft 
during the Vietnam War; President Ford pardoned President Nixon; and President George H.W. Bush 
pardoned certain officials involved in the Iran-Contra scandal.344  
 
The utilitarian use of clemency has also been seen in other cases. For instance, the English Crown 
employed pardons to provide cheap labor for its colonies; felons were pardoned with the condition that they 
agreed to travel to the colonies and work on the plantations.345 The English Crown also used pardon to 
promote criminal justice interests --- an accomplice could be pardoned if he provided testimony that would 
incriminate codefendants. 346  In modern times, medical clemency is systematically used to release 
terminally ill inmates.347 “Utilitarian” in this sense could be a cynical attempt to reduce expenses, but could 
also be looked at as a compassionate act that would promote the public good. Generally speaking, the 
utilitarian use of clemency is for the sake of state interest or state welfare. 
 
3. Redemptive Use of Clemency 
 
The third rationale that has been argued to justify the use of the clemency power is to award 
redemption, i.e., to promote the rehabilitative ideal. Professor Elizabeth Rapaport is the leading scholar 
advocating the use of clemency in promotion of redemption. She criticizes the retributivist model for 
                                                          
342 Professor Kobil divided the clemency power into “justice enhancing” and “justice neutral” categories.  
“Justice neutral” refers to a use of clemency for a purpose other than reaching a just result as to the 
particular individual. That would include the use of clemency on utilitarian grounds. See Kobil, Quality, 
supra note 99, at 579 (referring to the “justice-neutral” use of clemency); see also Kobil, Grant Clemency, 
supra note 148, at 222 (2003) (Professor Kobil noted that “Yet few, myself included, would argue that such 
utilitarian remissions of punishment [by clemency] are illegitimate”, and  “clemency should be used to 
further [redemptive] goals as well”). 
 
343 THE FEDERALIST No. 74, at 449 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961) (“But the principal 
argument for reposing the power of pardoning in [the President] is this: in seasons of insurrection or 
rebellion, there are often critical moments when a well-timed offer of pardon to the insurgents or rebels 
may restore the tranquility of the commonwealth.”). 
 
344 See Brian M. Hoffstadt, Normalizing the Federal Clemency Power, 79 TEX. L. REV. 561, 589-90 (2001) 
(exemplifying the cases where presidents exercised the pardon power in pursuit of restoring domestic 
tranquility). 
 
345 See Kobil, Quality, supra note 99, at 588. 
 
346 See Kobil, Quality, supra note 99, at 589. 
 
347 For example, the State of Virginia provides clemency for terminally ill offenders who (1) are diagnosed 
as terminally ill, (2) are not eligible for parole (because terminally ill inmates who are eligible for parole 
can seek relief through the parole board), and (3) have family or other persons willing and able to assume 
responsibility for the offender’s care. See Virginia Department of Corrections Operating Procedure No. 
820.2 (2014), https://vadoc.virginia.gov/about/procedures/documents/800/820-2.pdf. 
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failing to consider a prisoner’s post-conviction achievements. She emphasizes that clemency should also be 
used to promote the “‘redemptive’ goals of criminal justice: rehabilitation and reconciliation of the 
offender, victim, and community.” 348  Rapaport argues that the redemptive value of commutation is 
consistent with the contemporary goals of reducing crime rates, recidivism rates and crime control costs.349  
She concludes that the clemency process should credit individual inmates who undergo positive personal 
transformations.350  
 
A good example of the possible redemptive use of clemency is the case of Precious Bedell. Bedell 
was convicted of murder for the death of her child. During her time at the state's Bedford Hills Correctional 
Facility, Bedell became a success story of rehabilitative incarceration and an inspiration to other inmates. 
She earned her bachelor's and master's degrees, worked her way into a position of trust at the prison's 
Children's Center, started a Parents as Reading Partners program and helped write handbooks about foster 
care, imprisoned parent's rights and responsibilities, and rage control.351 Although Bedell did not receive 
clemency, her case has been trumpeted as an outstanding example of the success of rehabilitation, 
supporting an argument that clemency should be used to encourage and promote such outstanding conduct.  
 
 Besides a case of successful rehabilitation, heroic service might be another way that would 
demonstrate the transformation and self-improvement of the inmate, arguably justifying the use of 
clemency on the ground of redemption. For instance, Dr. Samuel Mudd, who had been involved in the 
Lincoln assassination, was pardoned for his heroic service of fighting a yellow fever epidemic in prison.352  
Today, the redemptive purpose of clemency is more often disfavored,353 but it has not been completely 
rejected. A number of states and the federal government prescribe rehabilitation as a consideration in the 
clemency decision.354 
 
4. Disuniformity in Application of Standards for Issuing Clemency 
 
In sum, use of the clemency power has been supported on three grounds: justice-enhancing, 
utilitarianism (i.e., promoting social policy, such as peace and stability), and redemption. These three 
rationales have been applied to support the exercise of commutation both at the state and the federal level.  
But American jurisdictions vary greatly in regulating the discretion that the Executive has to award 
                                                          
348 Rapaport, supra note 147, at 1503. Other scholars also express the same idea that clemency should be 
justified to award an inmate’s redemption. See Samuel T. Morison, The Politics of Grace: On the Moral 
Justification of Executive Clemency, 9 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 33 (2005); see also Love, Reflections, supra 
note 110, at, 1483; Love, Reinventing, supra note 214, at 12 (promoting pardon can be used to recognize 
and reward rehabilitation). 
 
349 Rapaport, supra note 147, at 1530. 
 
350 Id. at 1524. 
 
351 Syracuse, Inspiring inmate turns life around behind bars, Nov. 22, 1999, 
http://lubbockonline.com/stories/112299/nat_112299040.shtml. 
 
352 See Rapaport, supra note 147, at 1523-24. 
 
353 See Clayton, supra note 108, at 758. 
 
354 See e.g., State of Tennessee Board of Parole, Application for Commutation, 
http://www.tn.gov/bopp/Docs/BP%200044%20Commutation%20Application.pdf (providing that 
rehabilitation is one factor that would be considered in issuing commutation); see also State of Montana, 
http://bopp.mt.gov/adminrules/admin_rule_20.25.901a.mcpx (rehabilitation used as a factor in 
commutation); Hoffstadt, supra note 344, at 580 n. 80 (noting that the Pardon Attorney regulations confirm 
the function of a pardon as a rehabilitative reward to prisoners who have demonstrated good conduct for a 
substantial period of time). 
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clemency on these three (or any other) grounds. Most of the state executives are allowed to commute a 
sentence with complete discretion, without objective criteria. 355  Such states do not provide explicit 
guidelines specifying in what circumstances a commutation would be granted, and allow applicants to set 
forth any reason that they think would warrant executive relief.356 Only the federal government and a very 
few states have promulgated statutes or regulations governing the administration of this executive power.357 
Some states provide strict circumstances that would warrant a commutation, such as innocence, 
rehabilitation, and justification for committing the crime, excessive punishment, or terminal illness.358 
Some states allow their Governors to consider any factors beyond the prescribed circumstances in issuing a 
commutation.359 On the federal level, according to the United States Attorneys’ Manual, the factors that 
would warrant a commutation include excessive punishment, terminal illness, and meritorious services.360 
                                                          
355 Scholars have noted that, clemency procedures are largely lacking in standards and that clemency 
decisions are highly discretionary. See Bedau, supra note 142, at 257; see also Gershowitz, supra note 148; 
Kobil, Quality, supra note 99, at 614 (proposing that the institution of clemency would be improved by the 
adoption of consistent, principled standards to govern the use of clemency); Mary-Beth Moylan & Linda E. 
Carter, Clemency in California Cases, 14 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 37, 48(2009). 
 
356 For example, the State of Arizona does not specify any factors that will be considered to issue a 
commutation. See 400.13.G ARIZONA BOARD OF EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY POLICY (2011). The State of 
Arkansas allows the applicants to explain the reasons why the applicants think the Governor should grant 
the relief requested. See Arkansas Pardon Department, Pardon Application, 
http://governor.arkansas.gov/office/Documents/executiveClemencyApp.pdf; the State of Virginia uses 
conditional pardon to commute sentences and require the applicants to submit an explanation of why the 
Governor should grant pardon. See Virginia Office of the Secretary of the Commonwealth, Conditional 
Pardon, http://www.commonwealth.virginia.gov/judicialsystem/clemency/conditionalPardon.cfm; The 
State of Michigan requires commutation applicants to state reasons why they should be granted a 
commutation. See Michigan Department of Corrections, Commutation and Pardon Application Instructions 
(July 2011), http://www.michigan.gov/documents/corrections/application_for_pardon_or_commutation_-
_current_prisoner_331014_7.pdf.  
 
357 See Kobil, Quality, supra note 99, at 605 n. 235 (listing state statutes regulating the exercise of 
clemency). 
 
358 For example, the State of Montana provides the possibility of commutation only to those who could 
prove innocence, rehabilitation, justification for committing the crime, or excessive punishment. See 
MONT. ADMIN. R. §20.25.901A (2) (2012). In the State of Tennessee, under the rules established by the 
Governor, commutation is only issued to one who 1) has made exceptional strides in self-development, or 
2) is suffering (or has a family member suffering) from a life-threatening illness, or 3) has been 
rehabilitated. See State of Tennessee Board of Parole, Application for Commutation, 
http://www.tn.gov/bopp/Docs/BP%200044%20Commutation%20Application.pdf. 
 
359 Washington sets no limitation on the factors that would be considered when determining the issuance of 
commutation. But the state lists examples of factors that the pardon board would consider in recommending 
clemency to the governor, which include (1) the seriousness of the offense, (2) the impact on the victims, 
(3) whether there is a significant and documented need for clemency, (4) acceptance of responsibility, 
remorse, and atonement, (5) personal development and positive life changes since the offense occurred, (6) 
the offender’s criminal history and other relevant background, (7) whether the individual has complied with 
all obligations imposed by the court, (8) the amount of time elapsed since the offense occurred, (9) the risk 
or benefit to the community. See Washington State Clemency and Pardons Board Policies (revised and 
adopted Dec. 7, 2012) http://www.governor.wa.gov/office/clemency/documents/policies.pdf. 
 
360 The Manual notes that appropriate grounds for considering commutation have traditionally included 
disparity or undue severity of sentence, critical illness or old age, and meritorious service rendered to the 
government by the petitioner, e.g., cooperation with investigative or prosecutorial efforts that have not been 
adequately rewarded by other official action. United States Attorney’s Manual § 1-2.113. 
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In 2014, the Obama Administration initiated a new plan with detailed criteria to expand the use of 
commutations to correct the excessive punishment imposed on those federal inmates who would have 
received a significantly lower sentence had it been imposed under the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010.361  
 
According to the current state and federal government practice, the considerations that would warrant 
the issuance of clemency are generally based on the three rationales as follows:  
 
 Enhancing justice: battered woman syndrome, 362  innocence,363  justification in committing the 
crime,364 or excessive or erroneous punishment;365 
 
 Benefiting state welfare: terminal illness, cooperation in prosecuting crime;366  
 
 Promoting the value of redemption: rewarding rehabilitation,367 or meritorious services.368 
                                                          
361 The inmates who are eligible for the new federal commutation plan must fit the following requirements: 
(1) currently serving a federal sentence in prison and, by operation of law, likely would have received a 
substantially lower sentence if convicted of the same offense today; (2) non-violent, low-level offenders 
without significant ties to large-scale criminal organizations, gangs, or cartels; (3) already served at least 10 
years of their sentence; (4) do not have a significant criminal history; (5) have demonstrated good conduct 
in prison; and (6) with no history of violence prior to or during their current term of imprisonment. 
See Remarks as Prepared for Delivery by Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole at the Press Conference 
Announcing the Clemency Initiative, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, April 23, 2014, 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/remarks-prepared-delivery-deputy-attorney-general-james-m-cole-
press-conference. 
 
362 California used to specify battered woman’s syndrome as a reason that would warrant a commutation or 
pardon. But in August 2013, California abolished the specification of factors that would warrant a 
commutation, and requires applicants to state the reasons for why a commutation should be issued. See 
Office of the Governor State of California, Application for Clemency (Feb. 2007), 
http://www.recordgone.com/public/templates/default/pdf/California-Pardon-Application.pdf; see also 
Application for Executive Clemency (Aug. 2013), 
http://gov.ca.gov/docs/Application_for_Executive_Clemency.pdf;  
 
363 Montana specifies innocence as a factor that would be considered in issuing a commutation. See Mont. 
Admin. R. §20.25.901A(2)(a) (2012). Other states similarly mention innocence as a factor, such as 
Virginia. See Virginia Office of the Secretary of the Commonwealth, Absolute Pardons and Writ of Actual 
Innocence, http://www.commonwealth.virginia.gov/JudicialSystem/Clemency/absolutePardon.cfm.  
 
364 This factor of justification in committing a crime aims to warrant commutation for those inmates whose 
explanatory defense was not considered during the trial. Battered women’s syndrome is a defense that has 
been a ground for commutation. Montana is one state that specifies a justification factor as one 
consideration in issuing a commutation. See Mont. Admin. R. §20.25.901A(2)(c) (2012). 
 
365 Texas provides that the commutation of a sentence could only be issued to the inmate who has been 
subject to excessive punishment. See 37 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 143.52 (d) (2012). Montana specifies the 
factor of excessive punishment as one consideration in issuing a commutation. See Mont. Admin. R. 
§20.25.901A(2)(d) (2012). 
 
366 Virginia grants a special form of pardon, named medical pardon, to inmates who are suffering terminal 
illness and with a life expectancy of three months or less. See Virginia Office of the Secretary of the 
Commonwealth, Conditional Pardon, 
http://www.commonwealth.virginia.gov/judicialsystem/clemency/conditionalPardon.cfm; see also William 
W. Berry III, Extraordinary and Compelling: A Re-examination of the Justifications for Compassionate 
Release, 68 MD. L. REV. 850, 885-87 (2012) (analyzing why state commutation would justify 
compassionate release, which includes terminal illness, debilitating physical conditions that prevent inmate 
self-care, and death or incapacitation of the only family member able to care for a minor child). 
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E. The Tension Between Certain Grounds for Commutation and a LWOP 
Sentence 
 
 As discussed above, there are three possible grounds for clemency that are appropriate, i.e., that are 
justified by something other than the executive’s personal predilections or interests:  (1) enhancing justice, 
such as correcting wrongful conviction or excessive punishment; (2) benefiting state welfare, such as 
releasing the inmates who are terminally ill; or (3) rewarding redemption, such as release of inmates who 
have shown significant rehabilitation or provided meritorious services. Any rationale outside these 
historically-established grounds are likely to devolve into personal politics, political payoffs, or simply 
countermanding the will of the legislature.  
 
But these established forms of clemency may raise tension in certain cases if applied to a LWOP 
inmate --- particularly the third established ground of rehabilitation.  
 
The sentence of LWOP distinguishes itself from all other term-imprisonment sentences for its 
particular feature of rejection of the rehabilitative ideal. The rehabilitative ideal was based on the premise 
that every offender deserves the chance of reintegrating back to society based on his/her good behavior. 
However, after more than a half-century’s experiment, the rehabilitative ideal was tempered as legislatures 
began taking into account the severity of offenses and the history of the offender. The more severe the 
crime and the more serious the criminal history of the offender, the less of a chance that rehabilitation 
would work, and therefore the less of a chance that parole should be available.  That balancing analysis led  
legislatures to an embrace of LWOP --- where the perceived seriousness of the crime and danger of the 
offender completely outweigh any interest in rehabilitation. Put another way, the likelihood of 
rehabilitation is considered so minimal in these circumstances that it is thought better to apply a bright-line 
rule of sentencing. That rule avoids case-by-case determinations and, moreover, could be perceived as 
promoting deterrence in the certainty of its application. For good or ill, legislators have made the 
determination that in certain circumstances a case by case approach to rehabilitation is not justified.   
 
Another consideration supporting LWOP sentencing, as discussed above, is that it operates as a 
political and social policy alternative to the death penalty --- part of the selling point of rejecting the death 
penalty, either in individual cases or as a state-wide policy, is that the LWOP defendant will never set foot 
on the streets. Policymakers could surely conclude that the rehabilitation ideal would severely undermine 
LWOP as a viable alternative to the death penalty. Indeed it could even be the case that a defendant who is 
subject to the alternative of the death penalty or LWOP would be disadvantaged if LWOP is not air-tight. If 
the jury thinks that there is even a possibility that the defendant could be released, they may opt for the 
death penalty.   
 
Consequently, as applied to LWOP, the three rationales supporting commutation need to be refined 
and altered, at least in part. There would appear to be no conflict with the policies of LWOP sentencing if 
the executive commutes the sentence for justice-enhancing reasons. It is of course possible that a LWOP 
sentence is imposed unjustly, or it is subsequently determined that the sentence of LWOP was excessive or 
erroneous. In such instances, it may occur that the LWOP inmate is not able to obtain judicial relief for any 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
367 Rehabilitation is one factor that is specified as relevant in issuing commutation in many states, such as 
Montana and Tennessee. See Mont. Admin. R. §20.25.901A(2)(b) (2012); see also State of Tennessee 
Board of Parole, Application for Commutation, 
http://www.tn.gov/bopp/Docs/BP%200044%20Commutation%20Application.pdf. 
 
368 In Massachusetts, under the Executive Clemency Guidelines, consideration of commutation is limited to 
four factors of rehabilitation, terminal illness, unjustified incarceration, and meritorious services. The state 
exemplifies meritorious services as cooperation with an investigation or prosecution that has not already 
been rewarded by other official action. See The Commonwealth of Massachusetts Executive Department, 
Executive Clemency Guidelines (May 27, 2007), http://www.mass.gov/eopss/docs/pb/patrick-clemency-
guidelines.pdf. 
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number of reasons --- such as new and less harsh sentencing laws do not apply retroactively.369 In these 
limited cases, the possibility of commutation appropriately works as a fail-safe mechanism to correct the 
injustice for which the judicial remedy is out of reach. The recent commutations by President Obama for 
those drug offense LWOP inmates, who were excessively punished by the out-of-date drug law,370 has 
perfectly demonstrated the justified use of commutation to LWOP inmates on the ground of enhancing 
justice. In such cases, the commutation of LWOP sentences on the ground of enhancing justice does not 
appear to intrude upon the sentencing policy of LWOP sentences. Rehabilitation is not involved in such a 
commutation decision; and any uncertainty in a LWOP sentence would not appear to be troubling because 
if the LWOP sentence is unjust it really should not have applied in the first place.  
 
Second, there appears to be no conflict with LWOP sentencing policy if a commutation were ever to 
be issued to a LWOP inmate on the unlikely ground of benefiting state welfare. As revealed in history, 
Presidents have from time to time issued pardons to preserve the peace of the nation.371 For example, 
President Andrew Johnson issued a full pardon and amnesty to persons who participated in insurrection or 
rebellion in the Civil War.372 It stretches the mind a bit to think of a possibility of issuing a commutation to 
a LWOP inmate for the purpose of promoting public policy. But there are two examples in current practice 
that appear sound. First is the use of commutation for inmates who are terminally ill and faced with 
imminent death.373 The release of dying LWOP inmates on the one hand benefits the state welfare by 
relieving the correction department’s fiscal pressure in prison health care cost, and on the other hand it 
would not increase any risk of public safety caused by the releasee’s reoffending (assuming it is found as a 
fact that the inmate’s death is imminent). The early release of terminally ill LWOP inmates would also 
promote the integrity of the state by expressing human sympathy to these dying inmates. In such cases, 
commutation of LWOP inmates on the ground of benefiting state welfare would not appear to conflict with 
the sentencing policy supporting LWOP. That is so for two reasons: 1) the release is not based on the 
rehabilitative ideal that has been rejected by the LWOP sentencing scheme; and 2) LWOP does not fail as a 
marketable alternative to the death penalty, because surely the public, or a jury, would not be concerned 
about the air-tight nature of the LWOP alternative if the only exception was that the inmate was terminally 
ill and presented no risk to the public.  
 
Another current example of a policy-based commutation is when the inmate, while in prison, has 
cooperated in the prosecution of crime. Consider a three-striker, sentenced to LWOP even though the 
underlying offenses are not severe, who is the only eyewitness of the murder of a prison guard. It is of 
course strong public policy to bring the perpetrator to justice. However the witness will probably be very 
reluctant to testify and understandably so. And the sanction traditionally employed on reluctant witnesses --
- contempt of court --- is unlikely to move our LWOP inmate because he is already in jail for good. So 
incentives may well be thought necessary to prosecute this serious crime. And given the stakes, a 
prosecutor might well find that prison-based incentives (privileges, etc.) are not enough to get our witness 
                                                          
369 The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 does not contain any express statement of retroactivity. Thus, all the 
federal courts have refused to grant relief to defendants already serving harsh sentences under the pre-FSA 
statutes. See Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010); see also Jeff 
Lazarus, Making the Fair Sentencing Act Retroactive: Just Think of the Savings … Clause, 61 CLEV. ST. L. 
REV. 713, 719 (2013). It could also happen that an error in sentencing is discovered after appellate and 
collateral review have run out. See, e.g., United States v. Gilbert, 640 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2011) (error in 
sentencing could not be adjudicated because the claim would have been made in a successive habeas 
petition).  
  
370 See supra notes 155-57 and accompanying text. 
 
371 See supra notes 343-44 and accompanying text. 
 
372 Andrew Johnson, Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction, May 29, 1865, Civil War Era NC, 
http://history.ncsu.edu/projects/cwnc/items/show/13 (last visited Jan. 11, 2015). 
 
373 See supra 347 and accompanying text. 
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to testify. An executive, considering all the costs and benefits, may conclude that it is worth the cost of 
commutation for the benefit of prosecuting a serious crime. This exception to the finality of LWOP can be 
found to be consistent with the LWOP sentencing policy, so long as a fair (and reviewed) finding has been 
made that the prosecution would founder without the witness’s testimony and that the importance of 
prosecuting the crime outweighs the societal cost of commutation of a LWOP inmate.374 Again, there is no 
conflict with the legislative decision that rehabilitation is irrelevant, because the commutation is not based 
on a finding that the witness has rehabilitated himself --- it is based on a finding that the benefits of 
prosecuting a serious crime outweigh the costs to society of releasing a LWOP inmate. And legislatures are 
surely aware of the fact that sometimes hard choices are necessary in trading one criminal off against the 
other --- indeed that is the basis of most prosecutions, and providing benefits for cooperation is a 
sanctioned practice, even if a witness has committed a serious crime.375 
 
Another possible public policy basis for commutation is prison overcrowding. As applied to LWOP 
inmates, the release on grounds of overcrowding is largely hypothetical --- if anyone is going to be released, 
it stands to reason that LWOP inmates are going to be the last ones out the door. But it is certainly a 
problem if the certainty and finality of LWOP sentencing is undermined by decisions made by the 
Executive to release LWOP inmates on grounds of overcrowding. That is simply an irrational system.  
 
So far the discussion has been limited to commutations for justice-enhancing and for public policy 
purposes. What about commutation that is redemptive, i.e., that recognizes a prisoner’s rehabilitation? Here 
there is a problem. When commutation is issued to a LWOP sentence on the ground of promoting 
redemption, there will be a serious conflict with the LWOP sentencing policy. In this circumstance, the 
commutation a) countermands the legislative determination that the crime and the offender are such that 
rehabilitation is not a legitimate possibility as a bright-line rule; b) countermands the legislative 
determination that the offender has committed crimes so serious that they should never be released 
regardless of rehabilitation, i.e., that LWOP is a punishment that fits the crime; and c) undermines the 
marketability of LWOP as an alternative to the death penalty, because the very reason it is a palatable 
alternative lies in the certainty that the inmate will not be released.  
 
As discussed above the redemptive use of commutation has been exercised to reward two types of 
post-conviction achievement that demonstrate an inmate’s positive personal transformation: rehabilitation 
and meritorious service.376 But these rehabilitative grounds have been rejected as relevant by the legislature 
                                                          
374  As to how such findings should be made, see the section on standards for commuting LWOP sentences, 
Part IV, infra.  
 
375  See United States Sentencing Guideline 5K.1: Upon motion of the government stating that the 
defendant has provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has 
committed an offense, the court may depart from the guidelines. 
(a)       The appropriate reduction shall be determined by the court for reasons stated that may include, but 
are not limited to, consideration of the following: 
(1)       the court's evaluation of the significance and usefulness of the defendant's assistance, taking into 
consideration the government's evaluation of the assistance rendered; 
(2)       the truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of any information or testimony provided by the 
defendant; 
(3)       the nature and extent of the defendant's assistance; 
(4)       any injury suffered, or any danger or risk of injury to the defendant or his family resulting from his 
assistance; 
(5)       the timeliness of the defendant's assistance. 
 
In Part IV, I make the argument that an executive considering commutation of a LWOP inmate on grounds 
of cooperation should undertake an analysis similar to that of the sentencing judge under Guideline 5K.1.  
 
376 See supra 348-50 and accompanying text. 
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that has adopted LWOP.377 Thus, unless the LWOP sentencing policy is changed by the legislature or 
struck down by the Supreme Court as unconstitutional, the executive power to commute a LWOP sentence 
should not be exercised on the ground of rehabilitation.378 In other words, commuting a LWOP sentence on 
the ground of rehabilitation simply defies the legislative determination by opening exactly the same door 
towards early release on rehabilitation that has been legislatively closed to LWOP inmates.379  
 
In sum, because legislatures have specifically rejected rehabilitation as a relevant ground for 
sentencing to LWOP, and because the certainty of LWOP sentencing promotes deterrence values and 
provides a public policy alternative to the death penalty, an executive should not commute a LWOP 
sentence on the ground of rehabilitation. Commuting a LWOP inmate on the ground of rehabilitation would 
send to the public a confusing message that a LWOP inmate, who is legislatively deprived of the chance of 
early release on parole, is still able to be released from prison through commutation --- a disguised parole. 
Overall, commuting a LWOP sentence constitutes a loophole against the LWOP sentencing policy when 
the commutation is parole-like, issued in whole or in part on the basis of the LWOP inmate’s rehabilitative 
behavior. 
 
 
  
                                                          
377 See the rationales for LWOP sentencing in part B of Section II, supra. 
 
378 Earl M. Maltz, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Power: The Case for a Modified Intentionalist 
Approach, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1, 9 (1988) (noting that the doctrine of legislative supremacy rests on the deeply 
embedded premise of the American political system that, within constitutional limits, the legislature has 
authority to prescribe rules of law that bind all other governmental actors within the system). 
 
379 The contention here is not that the power of commutation cannot be used to commute the sentence of a 
LWOP inmate on grounds of rehabilitation. The pardon power in both the Federal and State constitutions 
may raise constitutional separation of powers questions that are not discussed in this article. The contention 
is rather that an executive, as a matter of policy, should not undermine the legislative judgments supporting 
the certainty of LWOP sentencing by commuting a LWOP sentence on grounds that have already been 
rejected as irrelevant by the legislature.  
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III. The Need for a System of “Guided Discretion” in Commuting 
LWOP Sentences 
 
As discussed above, there are few guidelines for exercising the executive’s clemency power.  The lack 
of guidelines is especially evident when it comes to clemency decisions regarding LWOP inmates. Such 
decisions are not essentially unconstrained as to procedure; they are also bereft of any recognition of 
whether they are being made inconsistently with the established rationales for clemency. The lack of 
guidelines in regulating the commutation of LWOP sentences is likely not only to cause confusion and 
unfairness, but it may also lead to commutation decisions that undermine the very premises of LWOP 
sentencing.  
 
The goal of this section is to establish the importance of regulating the commutation of LWOP 
sentences. I will first describe the current situation and demonstrate that the unconstrained commutation of 
LWOP sentences is an unwise exercise of executive discretion. Second, I will argue that the most rational 
system of clemency is one that is analogous to the guided discretion that the judiciary exercises under the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines.   
 
 
A. Commuting LWOP Sentences: An Unfettered Discretionary Power 
 
Generally speaking, the clemency power is vested by state and federal constitutions in the executive 
without substantive or procedural constraints.380 At the Federal level, the Constitution provides that the 
clemency power is not made subject to legislative or judicial oversight.381 The Supreme Court has been 
reluctant to place any restrictions on the clemency power, reasoning that “clemency has not traditionally 
‘been the business of the courts’.”382 In the very few cases on the subject that the Court has reviewed, it has 
determined that the limitations of the clemency power should only be found in the Constitution itself.383  
Lower courts have applied the Supreme Court’s hands-off approach. For example, in Hoffa v. Saxbe, the 
federal district court held that the President’s pardon power is totally within his discretion.384  
 
What constraints on the clemency power might exist in the Constitution itself? In Ohio Adult Parole 
Authority v. Woodard, Justice O’Connor, in a separate opinion, argued that the Due Process Clause assured 
                                                          
380 See MOORE, supra note 116, at 217 (“[T]he President's [pardon] power remains unlimited, unchecked, 
and unreviewable.”); see also Duker, supra note 121, at 535 (“Alone among the powers enumerated in the 
Constitution, the power to pardon proceeds unfettered.”). 
 
381 See Ridolfi, supra note 100, at 52 (“[T]he pardoning power is part of the overall Constitutional scheme 
....”); Note, Executive Revision of Judicial Decisions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 2020, 2034 (1996) (noting that 
the pardon power “does not violate the constitutional scheme of separated powers but is rather an integral 
part of that scheme”). 
 
382 Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 284 (1998) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment) (quoting Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 464 (1981) 
(“Unlike probation, pardon and commutation decisions have not traditionally been the business of courts; 
as such, they are rarely, if ever, appropriate subjects for judicial review.”). 
 
383 Schick, 419 U.S. at 267 (“We therefore hold that the pardoning power is an enumerated power of the 
Constitution and that its limitations, if any, must be found in the Constitution itself.”). 
 
384 Hoffa v. Saxbe, 378 F. Supp. 1221, 1225 (D.D.C. 1974) (“We hold that the President may exercise his 
discretion under the Reprieves and Pardons Clause for whatever reason he deems appropriate and it is not 
for the courts to inquire into the rationale of his decision.”). 
 
 61 
“some minimal procedural safeguards” in state clemency proceedings in capital cases. 385  Justice 
O’Connor’s speaking by way of example, stated that judicial review over a clemency decision would “be 
warranted in the face of a scheme whereby a state official flipped a coin to determine whether to grant 
clemency, or in a case where the State arbitrarily denied a prisoner any access to its clemency process”.386 
So while judicial limitations on clemency decisions might be possible, it is clear that they would be very 
limited. 387 
 
Nor has Congress shown an inclination to try to regulate the executive clemency power. Congress has 
established the Administrative Procedures Act388 (APA) and the Freedom of Information Act389 (FOIA) to 
constrain the actions of executive agencies in carrying out the law through formal and open-to-the-public 
proceedings, such as conducting meetings involving primary decisionmakers in public, 390  publishing 
proposed agency rules in the Federal Register and soliciting public input,391 producing a written record 
justifying any rulemaking or adjudicatory decision that follows a hearing,392 and making available to the 
public their procedural rules, substantive policies, final opinions, and other decisional documents. 393 
However, as held by the Supreme Court, the President is not an “agency” for purposes of the APA.394 As a 
result, the APA and FOIA do not apply to the President’s discretionary power of clemency.  
 
It follows that whatever meaningful limitations on the clemency power should be established, they 
must come from the executive branch itself.  On the federal level, when the President grants clemency, he 
always seeks recommendations from the Justice Department's Office of Pardon. Although the process of 
the Pardon Attorney in reviewing clemency applications is subject to Justice Department regulations, the 
Attorney’s recommendations are purely advisory and thus the President could grant clemency for any 
                                                          
385 Woodard, 523 U.S. at 289 (1998) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) 
(emphasis omitted). 
 
386 Id. 
 
387 Besides the mild limitations imposed by due process, there is another constitutional provision that could 
logically constrain the President’s clemency power: the Equal Protection Clause. To take an extreme case, 
if a black and a white prisoner present identical cases for clemency, and the President, because of racial 
bias, grants clemency to the white prisoner but not to the black prisoner, then a court could conceivably 
grant relief. But it is clear that the constraints imposed by the Equal Protection Clause on the clemency 
power are mild. It would be difficult if not impossible to prove racial bias, as this is not going to be 
admitted by the Executive. And any inference of racial discrimination resulting from a pattern of decisions 
is unlikely to be found given the infrequent and random nature of clemency decisions. On the difficulty of 
showing that executive decisions regarding the criminal justice system violate the Equal Protection Clause, 
see United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (rejecting an equal protection claim of selective 
prosecution and noting the deference required when a court is asked to “exercise judicial power over a 
‘special province’ of the Executive.”).  
   
388 Administrative Procedures Act, Pub. L. 79–404. 
 
389 Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552; Pub. L. 89-487. 
 
390 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1994). 
 
391 Id. § 553. 
 
392 Id. § 557. 
 
393 Id. § 552. 
 
394 Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 796 (1992) (“[T]he President is not an agency within the 
meaning of the [Administrative Procedures] Act.”). 
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reason he considers appropriate. 395  On the state level, as discussed above, only a handful of states 
promulgate statutory or administrative standards regulating the use of the clemency power. 396  Such 
limitations include requirements about the permissible types of information in reference to the character, 
rehabilitation or other personality aspects of the clemency applicants,397 or due process rights for clemency 
applicants.398  
 
 In sum, the exercise of the clemency power is, in general, a standardless process. Mostly, executives 
can make clemency decisions on any substantive basis and under any procedure that is not completely 
arbitrary. And of course the lack of standards applies to commuting LWOP sentences as well. 
 
As discussed in the former section, commuting a LWOP sentence should be based only on two 
substantive grounds: 1) enhancing justice, such as correcting excessive or erroneous punishment, where 
judicial review has expired; and 2) benefiting state welfare, such as releasing inmates who have a terminal 
illness.399 In contrast, the rehabilitative function of clemency should not be extended to a LWOP inmate. 
But to date federal and state governments have not recognized that commutation as to a LWOP inmate 
should be limited to its proper substantive uses and should not extend to rehabilitation. 
 
 The absence of principled standards governing the exercise of commutation on LWOP sentences, 
(particularly that there is no prohibition on the rehabilitative use of commutation on LWOP inmates) has 
resulted in harmful impacts to the criminal justice system --- and to the political career of some executives.  
In the following part, I will focus on the positive consequences resulting from a rationalized and 
regularized process for commuting LWOP sentences. The argument here is not that clemency decisions can 
be constitutionally or statutorily constrained. Rather the argument is that executives should establish 
substantive and procedural standards on the decision whether to commute LWOP sentences --- in order to 
promote fairness and so as not to undermine the legislative determination establishing LWOP sentencing.  
 
 
 
                                                          
395 Department of Justice Executive Clemency, 28 C.F.R. §§ 0.035, 0.036, 1.1-1.11 (2000). Section 1.11 
provides: 
The regulations contained in this part are advisory only and for the internal guidance of Department of 
Justice personnel. They create no enforceable rights in persons applying for executive clemency, nor do 
they restrict the authority granted to the President under Article II, section 2 of the Constitution. 
 
396 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-17-102 (2012) (“Good character previous to conviction, good conduct 
during confinement in the correctional facility, the statements of the sentencing judge and the district 
attorneys, if any, and any other material concerning the merits of the application shall be given such weight 
as to the governor may seem just and proper, in view of the circumstances of each particular case, a due 
regard being had to the reformation of the accused.”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.728 (2010) (“The 
governor, upon recommendation from the clemency and pardons board, may grant an extraordinary release 
for reasons of serious health problems, senility, advanced age, extraordinary meritorious acts, or other 
extraordinary circumstances”). 
 
397 Such states include Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, Michigan, Nebraska, 
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Utah. See Dorne & Gewerth, supra note 102, at 435. 
 
398 States like Arizona, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Massachusetts, Montana, and Washington list 
some partial due process rights for pardon applicants, such as written notice, right to be represented by a 
privately hired attorney, right to be heard, right to a record of the proceedings, and so forth. See id. 
 
399 As discussed above, the use of the clemency power for state welfare purposes might extend to political 
decisions such as granting amnesty to draft-evaders or pardoning public officials. But it is extremely 
unlikely that such political considerations could ever extend to releasing an inmate who has committed 
crimes that justify a LWOP sentence. 
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B. The Historical Trend Toward Guided Discretion in Sentencing 
 
Historically executive discretion was necessary to adjust sentences after the fact400 at a time when 
punishment was not tailored narrowly by penal statutes to fit the individual defendant.401 However, in the 
modern sentencing regime, the court has discretion to tailor the imposed sentences to fit the character, 
social history, and potential for recidivism of the offender.402 This section describes that system of guided 
judicial discretion, in order to determine whether it can provide guidance for setting up a similar system of 
guided discretion for commutation decisions --- the argument being that if guided discretion works for 
setting a sentence at the outset, it should also work for determining the appropriateness of a sentence at the 
time a commutation is sought.  
 
1. Wide Judicial Discretion in the Indeterminate Sentencing Era 
 
Discretion in criminal sentencing has undergone great changes during the 20th Century. In the early 
20th Century, legislatures and courts began rejecting the concept that defendants convicted of the same 
crime should receive “the identical punishment without regard to the past life and habits of a particular 
offender.”403 Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders was the predominate penal philosophy.404 The 
indeterminate sentencing system was invented in order to impose individualized sentences that were fit for 
each offender’s progress towards rehabilitation.405 Sentencing judges had broad discretion in determining 
an individualized sentence;406 parole officials at the same time possessed unfettered discretion to decide 
                                                          
400 Alyson Dinsmore, Clemency in Capital Cases: the Need to Ensure Meaningful Review, 49 UCLA L. 
REV. 1825, 1833 (2002) (“When death sentences were mandatory, and therefore not individually tailored 
by definition, clemency served as a means of adjusting sentences post hoc.”). 
 
401 See supra note 114-16 and accompanying text. 
 
402 See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future of Sentencing Reform: Emerging Legal Issues in the 
Individualization of Justice, 73 MICH. L. REV. 1361, 1362 (1975).  An individualized sentence imposed on 
an offender is based upon a variety of considerations. These factors might include: (1) the need to protect 
society, (2) the need to deter both the individual defendant and other potential defendants generally, (3) the 
need (or desire) to "denounce" the violation of important social norms, (4) the need to reward the defendant 
who pleads guilty for his cooperation with the prosecution, (5) the inclination to punish the defendant if the 
judge is particularly repulsed by his actions or character, and (6) the need to maintain some degree of 
equality between the sentences imposed upon higher and lower income criminals. See HERBERT L. PACKER, 
THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 35-51 (1968). 
 
403 Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949). 
 
404 As stated in the Declaration of Principles promulgated by the National Congress of Prisons 1870,  
[Crime is] a moral disease, of which punishment is the remedy. The efficiency of the remedy is a question 
of social therapeutics, a question of the fitness and the measure of the dose .... [P]unishment is directed not 
to the crime but to the criminal .... The supreme aim of prison discipline is the reformation of criminals and 
not the infliction of vindictive suffering. AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION, TRANSACTIONS OF THE 
NATIONAL CONGRESS OF PRISONS AND REFORMATORY DISCIPLINE (1870). See, e.g., David Rothman, 
Sentencing Reform in Historical Perspective, 29 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 631 (1983). 
 
405 See Andrew von Hirsch, The Sentencing Commission's Functions, in ANDREW VON HIRSCH, ET AL., EDS, 
THE SENTENCING COMMISSION AND ITS GUIDELINES 3 (1987) (“[W]ide discretion was ostensibly justified 
for rehabilitative ends: to enable judges and parole officials familiar with the case to choose a disposition 
tailored to the offender's need for treatment.”). 
 
406 See MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 6 (1995) (“Subject only to statutory maximums and 
occasional minimums, judges had authority to decide whether a convicted defendant was sentenced to 
probation or to jail or prison.”). 
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when to release offenders. 407  Judges enjoyed wide discretion to impose a term of probation or 
imprisonment of any length within the high maximum penalties designated by the statutes.408 There were 
no standards to assist or confine the judge’s discretion in making the sentencing decision.409 Federal and 
state judges possessed full discretion to use any information about the offender and alleged prior crimes 
that they thought relevant in determining the appropriate sentence.410 Judges were not obliged to provide 
reasons for the sentence they imposed,411 and appellate review of sentencing decisions did not exist.412 
However, after about 75 years of practice under this system of indeterminate sentencing, which was 
designed to serve the rehabilitative needs of criminal defendants, it was apparent that there was an 
unjustified disparity in sentences imposed on similarly situated offenders 413 The findings of unwarranted 
sentencing disparity caused by unregulated judicial discretion soon prompted legislative response.  
 
2. Limiting Judicial Discretion in the Sentencing Reform Act 
 
Beginning in the 1960s, a wave of criticism was fired against the uses and abuses of unfettered 
judicial sentencing discretion.414 In the words of Judge Marvin Frankel, the judges who were making 
                                                          
407 See Victoria J. Palacios, Go and Sin No More: Rationality and Release Decisions by Parole Boards, 45 
S.C. L. REV. 567, 568 (1994) (“Traditionally, a parole board's unfettered discretion determined when an 
offender could leave prison. Within broad parameters set by the legislature, the authority of parole decision 
makers has been extensive and far-reaching.”). 
 
408 See, e.g., 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, OR, 
PLEADING, EVIDENCE, AND PRACTICE IN CRIMINAL CASES 606 (1866) (“[I]n some of our States the statutes 
fix only the maximum of punishment, leaving the court to go as low as it sees fit.”); see also STITH & 
CABRANES, supra note 50, at 11. For example, the federal bank robbery statute provided that an offender 
“shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.” Bank Robbery 
Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-235, § 2(a), 48 Stat. 783, 783. 
 
409 See FRANKEL, supra note 285, at 8. 
 
410 Williams, 337 U.S. at 245, 252 (holding due process not violated if sentencing judge considers 
defendant's prior criminal record without permitting witness confrontation on that subject). 
 
411 See Reitz, supra note 284, at 543. 
 
412 See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 50, at 9. 
 
413 A number of studies have revealed sentencing disparity in the indeterminate sentencing regime. A 1974 
study by the Federal Judicial Center presented clear evidence that disparities existed between the 
sentencing practices of individual judges under the then-existing indeterminate sentencing system. 
According to the study, 50 judges in the Second Circuit, who were presented with identical actual pre-
sentence reports, assigned widely different sentences based on the same facts, ranging from as much as 20 
years plus a heavy fine to 3 years and no fine. ANTHONY PARTRIDGE & WILLIAM B. ELDRIDGE, THE 
SECOND CIRCUIT SENTENCING STUDY 6 -7 (1974). Prominent scholars have also criticized the sentencing 
disparity caused by judges’ unwarranted discretion. See James M. Anderson et al., Measuring Interjudge 
Sentencing Disparity: Before and After the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 271, 274 
(1999) (defining “disparity” as “solely that variation caused by the identity of the decision maker”). 
Congress also concluded that sentencing disparities caused by the judicial preferences and biases were 
unfair. See S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 45 (1983) (“Sentencing disparities that are not justified by differences 
among offenses or offenders are unfair both to offenders and to the public.”). 
 
414 See, e.g., ALLEN, supra note 266; Fred Cohen, Sentencing, Probation and the Rehabilitative Ideal: The 
View from Mempa v. Rhay, 47 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1968); see also Marvin E. Frankel, Lawlessness in 
Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1972) (observing that sentencing judges, empowered with nearly 
unbridled discretion to sentence offenders to any penalty within a wide range afforded by statute, ultimately 
relegated the sentencing process to a subjective endeavor where the judge's individual predilections, not 
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sentencing decisions in the indeterminate sentencing regime were “[l]eft at large, wandering in deserts of 
uncharted discretion.”415 Judicial discretion was “terrifying and intolerable for a society that professes 
devotion to the rule of law.”416  
 
This judicial discretion was substantially limited when Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act 
of 1984.417 After a decade of debate, Congress chose to create an independent agency known as the United 
States Sentencing Commission to structure judicial discretion in federal sentencing.418 On November 1, 
1987, Congress enacted the Federal Sentencing Guidelines crafted by the Federal Sentencing Commission. 
These guidelines were intended to eliminate unwarranted sentencing disparity,419 and provided judges with 
explicit direction in the form of binding guidelines that prescribed the kinds and lengths of sentences 
appropriate for every class of federal offender. 420  Sentencing judges were required by the sentencing 
guidelines to consider the offense of conviction and the criminal history of the offender and determine the 
sentence within the provided sentencing grid.421 Judges were bound to follow the Guidelines except in two 
circumstances (known as “departures”): 422  (1) on the government's motion, based on a defendant's 
substantial assistance to authorities; 423  and (2) in “exceptional cases”, 424  in which the court found 
                                                                                                                                                                             
objective sentencing criteria, governed the sentencing process. The disparity in sentences that resulted from 
such a normless sentencing paradigm was substantial and ultimately led to a Guidelines-driven sentencing 
structure); JESSICA MITFORD, KIND AND USUAL PUNISHMENT (1973). 
 
415 See FRANKEL, supra note 285, at 7-8. 
 
416 See id. at 5. 
 
417 The Sentencing Reform Act of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 211-38, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) 
[hereinafter SRA], was part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984. 
 
418 The Commission is charged with the task of promulgating “guidelines ... for use [by] a sentencing court 
in determining the sentence to be imposed in a criminal case ....” 28 U.S.C. §§ 994(a)(1) (1988). 
 
419 See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE INITIAL SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS 8 (1987). 
 
420 Sentencing judges must carefully consider the Section 3553(a) factors and impose a sentence that is 
sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the statutory purposes of sentencing. 18 U.S. 
Code § 3553(a); see also Douglas A. Berman, A Common Law For This Age of Federal Sentencing: The 
Opportunity and Need for Judicial Lawmaking, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 93, 97 (1999) [hereinafter 
Berman, A Common Law] (quoting S. Rep. No. 98-225 at 51 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 
3234) (A sentencing Guidelines system is “intended to treat all classes of offenses committed by all 
categories of offenders consistently.”). 
 
421 See, e.g., U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (2013) (hereinafter U.S.S.G. (2013)). The sentencing table 
contained in the Sentencing Guidelines set the sentencing range for different crimes. The sentencing table 
takes two primary factors into consideration: the severity of the crime and the criminal history of the 
defendant. The offense levels are listed along the horizontal axis, which consists of forty-three offense level 
categories, and the criminal history categories are listed along the vertical axis, which consists of six 
criminal history categories. The sentence that should be imposed is listed where the two intersect on the 
table. 
 
422 The Commission set out in sections 5K2.1-2.16 of the Sentencing Guidelines Manual a number of bases 
for departure, which were not factored into the basic Guidelines calculations. 
 
423 U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 (2009); see also 28 U.S.C. § 994(n). 
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aggravating or mitigating circumstances “of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration 
by the Sentencing Commission.”425 The Sentencing Reform Act also required judges to state the reasons for 
an imposed sentence in open court, and to issue a written statement of reasons for sentences imposed 
outside the guideline range.426 The statement of reasons provided the groundwork for appellate review of 
departures.427 As the reform movement progressed, many states joined the trend in curtailing judicial 
discretion in sentencing and established sentencing systems with mandatory minimum sentences, 
presumptive sentences, and sentencing guidelines.428  
 
The Sentencing Commission intended to promote sentencing uniformity and avoid unwarranted 
sentencing disparity by establishing the mandatory sentencing matrix.  But the Commission also recognized 
the need of some limited sentencing flexibility, and so provided guided departure provisions that allowed 
the judges to exercise a limited amount of discretion in imposing a sentence outside the Guidelines’ 
range. 429  Although the Commission sent out a message that sentencing flexibility was welcome, the 
Commission also believed that departures would rarely occur, because the Guidelines were intended to be 
comprehensive, accounting for the factors that should be taken into account in sentencing; the Commission 
also contemplated that if departures were properly made, the Guidelines could be amended to account for 
the factors found relevant by sentencing courts, so that the need for departures would become less frequent 
over time.430 But given the rigid and mandatory nature of the Guidelines, and the limits on departures, it is 
                                                                                                                                                                             
424 U.S.S.G. §§ 5K2.1-2.16 (2009). These included such aggravating factors as death (§ 5K2.1), physical 
injury (§ 5K2.2), extreme psychological injury (§ 5K2.3), and such mitigating factors as victim conduct (§ 
5K2.10), coercion or duress (§ 5K2.12), and diminished capacity (§ 5K2.13). 
 
425 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1). 
 
426 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(c)(1)-(2). 
 
427  18 U.S.C. §§ 3742(a)-(b). 18 U.S.C. s 3742(a) provides that a defendant may appeal “an otherwise final 
sentence” if the sentence “was imposed for an offense for which a sentencing guideline has been issued by 
the Sentencing Commission ... and the sentence is greater than the sentence specified in the applicable 
guideline.” Similarly, under 18 U.S.C. s 3742(b), the government may appeal a sentence “imposed for an 
offense for which a sentencing guideline has been issued by the Sentencing Commission ... and the 
sentence is less than the sentence specified in the applicable guideline.”  
 
428 See Frank O. Bowman, III, The Failure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Structural Analysis, 
105 COLUM. L. REV. 1315, 1318 (2005); see also Douglas A. Berman, Reconceptualizing Sentencing, 2005 
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 10 (2005) (Minnesota became the first state to adopt comprehensively the guidelines 
reform model in 1978. Pennsylvania and Washington followed suit by creating their own guidelines in 
1982 and 1983 respectively. Many states created sentencing commissions to develop comprehensive 
guidelines schemes.). 
 
429 See Edward R. Becker, Flexibility and Discretion Available to the Sentencing Judge Under the 
Guidelines Regime, 15 FED. PROBATION 10, 10 (1991) (noting that “[t]he most widely recognized avenue of 
flexibility under the guidelines is the sentencing judge's ability to depart from the prescribed sentencing 
range”). 
 
430 “[T]he Commission believes that despite the courts' legal freedom to depart from the guidelines, they 
will not do so very often ... because the guidelines, offense by offense, seek to take account of those factors 
that the Commission's data indicate made a significant difference in pre-guidelines sentencing practice.” 
The Commission explained in its Manual, “The Commission is a permanent body, empowered by law to 
write and rewrite guidelines, with progressive changes, over many years. By monitoring when courts depart 
from the guidelines and by analyzing their stated reasons for doing so and court decisions with references 
thereto, the Commission, over time, will be able to refine the guidelines to specify more precisely when 
departures should and should not be permitted.” See U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A, at 6 (1995). 
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not surprising that most sentencing judges and scholars viewed the Guidelines as unduly restrictive 
limitations on “the judges” sentencing discretion.431 
 
3. Advisory Sentencing Guidelines After Booker 
 
Although the SRA was designed intended to implement a mandatory sentencing grid to bind judicial 
discretion in sentencing, the Supreme Court in United States v. Booker,432 struck down the provisions that 
made the Guidelines mandatory, as violating the Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee. The Court’s 
decision consists of two majority opinions. The first ruling came on the heels of the rule of Apprendi v. 
New Jersey433 and Blakely v. Washington434 in which the Court held that any fact (other than a prior 
conviction) that is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the legislature 
must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.435 The Booker “Sixth 
Amendment” majority found that the Sentencing Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment after Apprendi 
because they required sentences to be increased when judges at sentencing proceedings found certain facts 
(such as the amount of drugs involved or the amount of losses caused in a financial crime) --- and those 
findings would be used to raise the sentence beyond the Guideline for the basic crime for which the 
defendant was convicted.   
 
To correct the problem of the Sixth Amendment violation, the Booker “remedial” majority ruled that 
the proper remedy for the Sixth Amendment violation was to sever two provisions of the Sentencing 
Reform Act that made the Guidelines mandatory.436 The Court removed 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), thus 
rendering the Guidelines effectively advisory and outside the scope of Apprendi.437 The Court stated that in 
applying the advisory Guidelines, sentencing judges were required to “consider” the factors set forth in 
Section 3553(a) in imposing a sentence.438 Section 3742(e), which previously provided for de novo review 
                                                          
431 See Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury's Constitutional Role in an Era of 
Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 97 (2003) (noting that “[t]he Sentencing Guidelines make 
plea bargaining a cause for concern... because they curtail the judge's discretion”); see also Sharon L. 
Davies, Study Habits: Probing Modern Attempts to Assess Minority Offender Disproportionality, 66 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 17, 19 (2003) (recognizing an “age of sentencing guidelines which simultaneously 
limit the discretion of sentencing judges while conferring greater outcome-producing power on 
prosecutors”); Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the 
Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L. J. 1681, 1697 (1992) (“The Guidelines Manual is a code of changing 
regulations that substantially constrain the wide ranges within which judges formerly exercised 
discretion.”); Vincent L. Broderick, The Importance of Flexibility in Sentencing, 78 JUDICATURE 182, 182 
(1995). 
 
432  Unite States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 20 (2005). 
 
433 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 
434 Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
 
435 Booker, 543 U.S. at 244 (Stevens, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in part). 
 
436 Id. at 245 (Breyer, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in part). 
 
437 Id. at 259. 
 
438 Id. at 259-60. 
 
As provided by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall 
consider— 
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; 
(2) the need for the sentence imposed— 
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of a district court’s sentencing decision, was also excised, for it contained “critical cross-references” to the 
other excised portions.439  The Court noted that the standard of appellate review in the newly revised 
guidelines was review for “reasonableness”.440  
 
The subsequent Supreme Court cases of Gall v. United States441 and Kimbrough v. United States442 
clarified the role of appellate courts reviewing sentences for “reasonableness” and enhanced the legacy of 
Booker in expanding the discretion of district courts in sentencing.443 In Gall the Court held that courts of 
appeals may not presume that a sentence falling outside the range recommended by the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines is unreasonable. 444  Instead, appellate courts must apply a “deferential abuse-of-discretion 
                                                                                                                                                                             
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment 
for the offense; 
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; 
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and 
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other 
correctional treatment in the most effective manner; 
(3) the kinds of sentences available; 
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for— 
(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of the defendant set forth in 
the guidelines— 
(i) issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(1) of title 28, United States Code, 
subject to any amendments made to such guidelines by act of Congress (regardless of whether such 
amendments have yet to be incorporated by the Sentencing Commission into amendments issued under 
section 994(p) of title 28); and 
(ii) that, except as provided in section 3742(g), are in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced; or 
(B) in the case of a violation of probation or supervised release, the applicable guidelines or policy 
statements issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(3) of title 28, United States 
Code, taking into account any amendments made to such guidelines or policy statements by act of Congress 
(regardless of whether such amendments have yet to be incorporated by the Sentencing Commission into 
amendments issued under section 994(p) of title 28); 
(5) any pertinent policy statement— 
(A) issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(2) of title 28, United States Code, 
subject to any amendments made to such policy statement by act of Congress (regardless of whether such 
amendments have yet to be incorporated by the Sentencing Commission into amendments issued under 
section 994(p) of title 28); and 
(B) that, except as provided in section 3742(g), is in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced. 
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have 
been found guilty of similar conduct; and 
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense. 
 
439 Booker, 543 U.S. at 260. 
 
440 Id. at 264. 
 
441 Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007). 
 
442 Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007). 
 
443 See Ryan Scott Reynolds, Note, Equal Justice Under Law: Post-Booker, Should Federal Judges Be Able 
to Depart from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to Remedy Disparity Between Codefendants' Sentences?, 
109 COLUM. L. REV. 538, 560, 563-64 (2009) (noting that both cases expanded district courts' discretion 
and that some courts of appeals have responded by reconsidering their treatment of particular sentencing 
factors). 
 
444 Gall, 522 U.S. at 47. 
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standard,” according due respect to “the district court's decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, 
justify the extent of the variance [from the Guidelines].”445 
 
In Kimbrough, the Court held that judges, in applying the now-advisory Guidelines, were free to 
reject the Guidelines' 100-to-1 ratio that treated one gram of crack cocaine as equivalent to one hundred 
grams of powder cocaine.446 The Kimbrough Court determined that the Sentencing Commission did not 
exercise its “characteristic institutional role” in formulating the crack cocaine Guideline,447 and thus the 
district judge was better situated to formulate a sentence that met the requirements of Section 3553(a).448 
The Court indicated that the district courts are now free to impose a sentence outside the sentencing range 
“based solely on policy considerations, including disagreements with the Guidelines,” 449  provided the 
sentence was framed “in line” with the requirements of Section 3553(a).450  
 
In the above series of decisions, the Supreme Court has effectively made the Guidelines advisory. 
Under the advisory sentencing regime, the sentencing court still has to consider the Guidelines ranges, but 
the court is able to tailor the sentence above or below the Guidelines range in its discretion.  
 
As discussed earlier, the clemency power is essentially unconstrained by Federal and State 
Constitutions. In this sense, the executive’s power to exercise clemency is roughly analogous to a 
sentencing judge’s power to sentence under a system of indeterminate sentencing --- under that system the 
sentencing judge is free, with very few limitations, to set a sentence within very broad limits. An 
unconstrained system of clemency suffers similar infirmities as those found in indeterminate sentencing 
schemes --- disparity, subjectivity, and unfairness. As discussed above, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
remedied many of those problems of indeterminate sentencing, by implementing a system of guided 
discretion. This article advocates that for the same reason, an analogous system of guided discretion should 
be implemented to control the executive’s decision to commute LWOP sentences.    
 
 
C. Guided Discretion: The Cornerstone of Fair Sentencing 
 
The United States has spent the last century exploring how to establish a sentencing system that could 
deliver fair sentencing results. The basic problem is how to regulate judicial discretion in sentencing. Over 
the last century’s efforts in seeking a fair sentencing scheme, Congress has generally developed two 
approaches: “unguided discretion” and “guided discretion.” In this section, I will demonstrate that a 
“guided discretion” sentencing scheme is the best scheme to guarantee fair sentencing results; and that a 
similar approach of guided discretion will be the best way to assure fairness and justice in commutation 
decisions.  
 
1. Definition and Premise 
 
To conduct the following discussion, it is important to clarify a number of basic concepts.  
 
(a) Scope. The scope of the following discussion is confined to the correlation between the sentencing 
approach employed by sentencing judges and sentencing outcomes. The length of the sentence that an 
                                                          
445 Id. at 51-52. 
 
446 Kimbrough, 522 U.S. at 109-10. 
 
447 Id. at 109. 
 
448 Id. at 110. 
 
449 Id. 
 
450 Id. at 110-11. 
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offender actually serves is affected by inputs from multiple sources. These inputs include: 1) prosecutors 
have discretion to bring or drop the charges; 2) defense lawyers could provide effective or ineffective 
assistance of counsel; 3) the jury has the power to convict or acquit; 4) judges have discretion in deciding 
the length of sentence; 5) parole authorities in states with parole have the discretion to shape the sentence 
towards the prisoner’s rehabilitation; and 6) the executive has the discretionary clemency power to reduce 
an individual sentence. The analysis of correlation between the judicial sentencing approach and sentencing 
outcomes is necessarily limited to judicial sentencing decisions. It is the study of judicial sentencing 
decisions that will lead us to the analogy for guided discretion of clemency decisions.  
 
(b) Discretion. Trial judges are entrusted with sentencing discretion in announcing a particular 
sentence appropriate to the defendant. According to Dworkin, “The concept of discretion is at home in only 
one sort of context; when someone is in general charged with making decisions subject to standards set by 
a particular authority.... Discretion, like the hole in a doughnut, does not exist except as an area left open by 
a surrounding belt of restriction”.451 A sentencing judge’s sentencing discretion could be either “unguided” 
or “guided”. The “unguided discretion” sentencing approach was employed in the indeterminate sentencing 
era, as discussed above, in which sentencing judges acted completely on their own discretion (within very 
broad sentencing ranges established by the legislature) in considering any factors relevant to an individual 
criminal case. The “guided discretion” sentencing approach is that employed in the Sentencing Guideline 
era, under which judges refer to guidelines to consider the established factors relevant to an individual 
offender in reference to the severity of the offense and the offender’s criminal history.452  
 
(c) Sentencing outcomes. Sentencing outcomes in the following discussion refers to the sentences 
determined by sentencing judges for a convicted criminal defendant. The actual length of sentence, which 
is affected by decisions of the  parole board and executive commutation is not the relevant consideration for 
this discussion. The death penalty is also excluded from the discussion of sentencing outcomes, for there 
are particular proceedings directing whether to impose a death sentence in capital cases.  
 
(d) Sentencing goal. The ultimate goal of sentencing is to seek a fair and just sentence for each 
individual. Sentencing justice is comprised of three components: 1) Consistency (i.e., that similarly situated 
offenders are treated similarly);453 2) Individualized sentencing;454 and 3) Proportionality (i.e., that the 
punishment fits the crime, as determined in light of interests in retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, and 
incapacitation). 455 In the following section I argue that a system of guided discretion is superior to a system 
                                                          
451 See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 31 (1977). 
 
452 It must be conceded that Booker and its progeny have made the Sentencing Guidelines no longer 
mandatory, but merely advisory, thus allowing sentencing judges to impose a sentence outside the 
sentencing grids. See Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). In fact, whether the guidelines are mandatory or 
advisory, both types are within the “guided discretion” approach, for because even if only advisory, 
sentencing judges are required to consult with the guideline factors when making sentencing decisions. In 
other words, the advisory guideline is merely a revised “guided discretion” approach, which intends to 
make the guidelines more workable in delivering fairer sentencing outcomes. See section the part of 
C(2)(a)(ii) in section III, infra. 
 
453 See, e.g., FRANKEL, supra note 285 (emphasizing the need to avoid unwarranted disparities in 
sentencing).  
 
454 Jeffrey S. Sutton, An Appellate Perspective On Federal Sentencing After Booker And Rita, 85 DENV. U. 
L. REV. 79, 79-81(2007)  (noting the importance of individualization in sentencing and that it has always 
been a priority in federal sentencing). 
 
 
455 The concept of proportionality is embodied in the Sentencing Guidelines. As required by 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a), district courts should impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to meet the four 
purposes of sentencing set forth in subsection 3553(a)(2) --- retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and 
rehabilitation. 
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of unguided discretion in achieving these goals --- and thus that a similar system of guided discretion is 
superior in implementing a fair and just system of commutation decisions.  
 
2. Guided Discretion: An Approach That Better Promotes Consistency in Sentencing, Without 
Sacrificing Individualized Sentencing  
 
 The American experience with sentencing in the 20th Century provides a strong indication that the   
“guided discretion” approach is superior to “unguided discretion” in assuring sentencing consistency.  
 
The “unguided discretion” sentencing approach in the indeterminate sentencing era did not emphasize 
consistency in sentencing.456 Fueled by unbridled enthusiasm for the penal philosophy of rehabilitation, the 
goal of sentencing in that indeterminate era was merely to impose individualized sentence geared toward 
the offender’s rehabilitation. Judges could consider any sentencing factor they found relevant to the 
individual offender. 457  Arguably, the “unguided discretion” sentencing approach employed in the 
indeterminate era succeeded in achieving the sentencing goal of individualization. However, as revealed by 
pre-Guidelines sentencing practice and scholarship, such unguided discretion resulted in actual and 
perceived gross sentencing disparities, 458  and inevitably failed in achieving the sentencing goal of 
consistency.  
 
In response to the “unguided discretion” approach’s failure to achieve the sentencing goal of 
consistency, sentencing guidelines were invented to reduce sentencing disparities. 459  The sentencing 
guidelines system has in fact substantially reduced the unjustifiable sentencing disparities at both the state 
and federal level.460 And what makes the sentencing guidelines system a success in producing consistent 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
456 FRANKEL, supra note 285, at 25 (citing statistics showing significant disparities in federal sentencing 
decisions). 
 
457 See Gertner, A Short History, supra note 11, at 695-96 (2010) (“Crime was a ‘moral disease,’ whose 
cure was delegated to experts in the criminal justice field, one of whom was the judge… [I]t made no more 
sense to limit the kind of information that a judge should get at sentencing to exercise his or her “clinical” 
role than to limit the information available to a medical doctor in determining a diagnosis”. “Consistent 
with this view of judges as the sentencing experts, Congress took a back seat, prescribing a broad range of 
punishments for each offense, and intervening only occasionally to increase the maximum penalty for 
specific crimes in response to public demand”.). 
 
458 See Richard Singer, In Favor of “Presumptive Sentences” Set by a Sentencing Commission, 24 CRIME & 
DELINQUENCY 401, 402 (1978) (Unguided sentencing resulted in a “gross disparity in sentencing, with 
different sentences imposed upon similar offenders who have committed similar offenses by the same 
judges on different days, different judges on different days, different judges on the same day, and different 
judges in different jurisdictions.”); see also Tonry, supra note 406, at 7 (“Unwarranted disparities, 
explicable more in terms of the judge’s personality, beliefs, and background than the offender’s crime or 
criminal history, have repeatedly been demonstrated.”). 
 
459 Douglas A. Berman, Balanced and Purposeful Departures: Fixing a Jurisprudence that Undermines the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 21, 35 (2000) (noting that “reformers believed 
that sentencing guidelines, by codifying standards which would direct judges’ sentencing decisions in most 
but not all cases, could reduce sentencing disparities and maintain sentencing flexibility, while promoting 
the development of principled sentencing law and policy.”). 
 
460 Several credible studies have found that the guidelines system has reduced sentencing disparities. See 
e.g., Richard S. Frase, Is Guided Discretion Sufficient? Overview of State Sentencing Guidelines, 44 ST. 
LOUIS U. L. J. 425, 443 (2000) (“[G]uidelines systems in a number of states have succeeded in improving 
sentencing policy and practice reducing bias and disparity in sentencing….”); see also James M. Anderson, 
Jeffrey R. Kling & Kate Stith, Measuring Interjudge Disparity: Before and After the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, 42 J. OF LAW AND ECON. 271, 303 (1999) (concluding “the [Sentencing] Guidelines (and 
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sentencing outcomes is the “guided discretion” approach. Under the sentencing guidelines system, judges’ 
discretion in considering the sentencing factors are guided by the codified sentencing standards, especially 
in terms of the severity of the offense and the offender’s criminal history,461 and so similar cases are more 
likely to be treated similarly. Thus the “guided discretion” approach is better than the “unguided discretion” 
approach in achieving the sentencing goal of consistency.  
 
Meanwhile, the “guided discretion” approach’s ability in achieving the sentencing goal of 
individualization remains attainable. Under the Sentencing Guidelines system, judges can fashion a 
sentence by considering the specific aspects of an individual case, --- the nature and circumstances of the 
offense and the offender’s criminal history and characteristics --- because these factors can be incorporated 
into the standardized Sentencing Guidelines.462 Thus, different cases can be treated differently depending 
on the severity of the offense and the characteristics and criminal history of the offender. In other words, 
under the Guidelines system, judges still make individualized sentencing decisions by considering the 
factors relevant to the individual cases, as long as the factors are within the standardized factors prescribed 
by the Guidelines. That is a process far different from the “unguided discretion” approach employed in pre-
Guideline era, under which judges could consider any factors they wished.463   
 
It must be conceded that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines system has shortcomings in implementing 
a sentencing system that is both consistent and individualized. Most importantly, the Guidelines did not 
effectively codify the multitude of factors relevant to a well-tailored sentencing decision. For example, 
before Booker, under the mandatory Guidelines, individualized factors such as the defendant's family 
responsibilities, aberrant behavior, community ties, and diminished capacity could not be used to mitigate a 
punishment.464 However, this deficit does not prove that the “guided discretion” approach is incapable of 
meeting the sentencing goal of individualization. It simply shows that the Sentencing Guidelines as written 
are not comprehensive enough to allow sentencing judges, in certain cases, to consider individual 
circumstances that might well be necessary to assure sentencing that is sufficiently individualized. The 
problem is not in the Guidelines system itself, but rather in the choices made by legislators and the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
concomitant statutory minimum sentences) have been successful in reducing interjudge nominal sentencing 
disparity”.). 
 
461 As required by the SRA, in determining the “particular sentence to be imposed,” judges shall consider 
“the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,” “the need 
for the sentence imposed” to satisfy the purposes of sentencing, the “kinds of sentences available” by 
statute, the kinds and range of sentences set forth in the “guidelines,” “any pertinent policy statement,” and 
the “need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities” among similarly situated defendants. See 18 U.S.C. 
§3553(a)(1)-(6). 
 
462 In his dissent to the remedial decision in Booker, Justice Scalia reasoned that “logic compels the 
conclusion that the sentencing judge, after considering the recited factors (including the Guidelines), has 
full discretion, as full as what he possessed before the Act was passed, to sentence anywhere within the 
statutory range.” This assertion has truly indicated that Sentencing Guidelines, --- a “guided discretion” 
approach, --- by allowing judges consider the “recited factors” within the Guidelines, do not deny the 
sentencing goal of individualization. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 251 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 
463 See Williams, 337 U.S. 241 (1949) (noting that judges are unconstrained in both the sentencing factors 
to consider and the mode of proof for establishing those factors).  
 
464 See Sandra D. Jordan, Have We Come Full Circle? Judicial Sentencing Discretion Revived In Booker 
And Fanfan, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 615, 646 (2006); Myrna Raeder, Gender and Sentencing: Single Moms, 
Battered Women, and Other Sex-Based Anomalies in the Gender-Free World of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, 20 PEPP. L. REV. 905 (1993) (noting that Federal Guidelines did not take account of facts such 
as that mothers often have sole or primary responsibility for care of children, nor that they may have 
become involved in criminal activity because of social or cultural pressures). 
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Sentencing Commission to limit the consideration of factors that might be important to an individualized 
sentence.  
 
 In conclusion, of the two sentencing approaches, the “guided discretion” approach is better able to 
satisfy the sentencing goals of individualization and consistency; it is a better system for ensuring that 
sentencing justice is delivered via a fair sentencing procedure in each individual case. 
 
3. Guided Discretion:  An Approach that Better Guarantees Proportionality 
 
Besides ensuring consistency while yet allowing appropriate individualization, an optimal sentencing 
approach must also be able to deliver sentences that are proportionate to the individual offender’s crime.     
In the following analysis, I will argue that while there is no sentencing system that can produce a perfect 
outcome, a system based on “guided discretion” is most likely to reach sentences that are proportional to 
the individual offense.  
 
(a) Limitations in Codifying the Full Range of Sentencing Factors.  
 
It is true that under a “guided discretion” approach there will be a difficulty in establishing standards 
that encompass the full range of appropriate sentencing factors for every individual case. And theoretically, 
the “unguided discretion” approach could be able to cover a full range of sentencing factors, because that   
approach allows judges to consider every factor relevant to an individual case. However, the “unguided 
discretion” approach encounters the same infirmities in having sentencing judges apply the “full range” of 
sentencing factors. Such finiteness is caused by the limited personal knowledge of the individual judge, 
instead of the legislature, in considering what constitutes standardized appropriate sentencing factors. Since 
every single judge has a different personal understanding of what constitutes appropriate sentencing factors, 
it is impossible to expect that every sentencing judge is knowledgeable enough to apply, in every individual 
case, the supposed ideal full range of sentencing factors. In an “unguided discretion” approach, different 
judges will apply different personalized standardized sentencing factors, and thus unfair and disparate 
sentences will be produced in the cases where the sentencing judge did not consider the sentencing factors 
beyond his personal knowledge and predilection.  
 
(b) Errors in Presetting the Appropriate Sentencing Range.  
 
A significant problem in promoting proportionality in any sentencing system is how to determine the 
appropriate sentencing range or guideline. A prime example is the Sentencing Guidelines for drug offenses. 
As Congress prescribed high drug sentences and the Sentencing Commission established correspondingly 
harsh guidelines, both defendants and judges argued that the guideline sentences for many drug crimes 
were disproportionate to the crime.465 One might argue that this experience shows a deficiency in a system 
                                                          
465 Frank O. Bowman, Fear Of Law: Thoughts On Fear Of Judging And The State Of The Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 299, 338 (2000) [hereinafter Bowman, Fear of Law] (“[T]he 
honest application of the guidelines in drug cases tends to produce sentences so high that most judges in 
most cases do not consider a sentence higher than the bottom of the range to be a tenable option”.); see also 
Frank O. Bowman, III, Playing “21” With Narcotics Enforcement: A Response to Professor Carrington, 52 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 937, 980-81 (1995) (noting that drug sentences are often longer than can be 
rationally justified to achieve deterrence); Marvin E. Frankel, Sentencing Guidelines: A Need for Creative 
Collaboration, 101 YALE L. J. 2043, 2047 (1992) (“[T]he Commission produced guidelines that actually 
increase the overall severity [of federal sentences], taking particular aim at so-called white-collar offenders 
whom the Commission found (perhaps correctly) to have been treated with undue solicitude.”); Daniel 
Richman, Cooperating Clients, 56 OHIO STATE L.J. 69 (1995) (citing federal statistics showing a significant 
increase – after adoption of the Guidelines --- in both incarceration and the length of offense, and an 
increase in mean prison terms for drug offenses from 27 months to 67 months); Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 
815 (9th Cir. 1995) (Kozinski, J., concurring) (criticizing the fact that the Guidelines often provide harsher 
sentences for small-time drug offenders than for murderers and rapists). 
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of guided discretion in effectuating proportionality. But again the problem of disproportionality is not in the 
system of guided discretion but rather in the substantive decisions made by the legislature.  
 
It is noteworthy that the “unguided discretion” approach has the same problem of ineffectiveness in 
regulating or eliminating unduly harsh sentencing. It could be argued that in the “unguided discretion” 
approach, judges, without restriction on how to evaluate sentencing factors, could definitely enter a 
sentence that falls into their comfort zone. But because different judges have different perceptions of fair 
sentencing when evaluating the weights of sentencing factors, it is hard to say that the sentences entered by 
individual judges within their own comfort zone upon their personal perception are all fair and 
proportionate sentences. As revealed in the history of the indeterminate sentencing era, without any 
instruction on exercising discretion in how to evaluate the weights of particular sentencing factors, judges 
entered either lenient or harsh sentences that were disproportionate to the crime one way or another.466  
 
  In sum, any flaw in the “guided discretion” approach in obtaining proportionate sentencing stems 
from the imperfections of the legislature, whereas the flaw in the “unguided discretion” approach stems 
from the limited perception and individual predilections of the individual sentencing judge. 
 
(c) Potentiality of Producing Fair Sentencing Outcomes 
 
It is true that, as discussed above, the “guided discretion” sentencing approach carries deficiencies in 
presetting a perfect standardized sentencing regime with full range of sentencing factors and appropriate 
sentencing ranges. But the “guided discretion” approach is able to make adjustment within the mechanisms 
of the law towards the perfect regime. As noted by Professor Bowman, “Any system that aims to constrain 
human behavior within a web of rules will be subject to continuing adjustment …”.467 The development of 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines has demonstrated how the “guided discretion” sentencing scheme can 
continually make adjustment towards the perfection of the sentencing law. It is well known that, because of 
the inadequately crafted sentencing factors and inappropriately calculated sentencing ranges, Sentencing 
Guidelines were widely criticized and upset district judges, who were forced to enter unnecessary “harsh” 
or “unjust” sentences. 468  But, Booker and the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) have significantly 
modified the Guidelines system to better promote fair sentencing results. And the dynamic process of 
legislative input and Guideline amendment is available for further developments and fixes. The same 
cannot be said of a system of unguided discretion, which is the epitome of a disorganized approach to 
sentencing.  
 
(1) Booker, A Common Law Approach To Modify The Guidelines Regime 
 
At first glance, Booker may seem to pave the way for a discretionary sentencing regime, one that 
would allow the judges freely to impose a sentence inside or outside the Guidelines range. But such 
assessment is merely an illusion. Booker not only has not terminated the “guided discretion” approach 
employed in the Guidelines regime, but it also has fostered a common law approach of sentencing 
lawmaking and thereby will significantly contribute to the evolution of proportionate sentencing under the 
Guidelines regime.469 In this section, I will analyze how that common law approach promoted by Booker is 
                                                          
466 See Louis F. Oberdorfer, Mandatory Sentencing: One Judge’s Perspective--2002, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
11, 14 (2003) (“In the early 1970s, public outrage about increasing violent crime was growing; Congress 
and state legislatures were listening. From one segment of public opinion came complaints that some 
judges were too lenient .... From another segment came complaints that sentences were too long ....”). 
 
467 See Bowman, Fear of Law, supra note 465, at 357. 
 
468 See, e.g., Rhonda McMillion, Second Effort: ABA Supports Push to Restore Judicial Discretion in 
Sentencing, 90 A.B.A. 62 (2004). 
 
469 A suggestion for the need for a common law approach in the development of the federal sentencing 
guidelines can be found in Douglas A. Berman, Balanced and Purposeful Departures: Fixing a 
Jurisprudence That Undermines the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, see supra note 459. 
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an approach will improve the “guided discretion” sentencing regime and assure that it is a better system 
that than of “unguided discretion” in assuring proportionate sentencing.  
 
i) Judicial Development of Common Law In Advancing the Guidelines Regime  
 
The notion of a judicially-directed “common law of sentencing” was raised when the sentencing 
reformers drafted the sentencing guidelines model.470 Recognizing that the guidelines could not fully take 
into account all relevant sentencing factors in advance, reformers intentionally retained judicial discretion 
to depart from the Guidelines in the guidelines model.471 Reformers believed that, by requiring the judges 
to articulate the reasons for departure from the guidelines and instituting appellate review of the sentencing 
decisions,472 a “common law of sentencing”,473 as Professor Freed noted, would be formulated through the 
following process: 1) trial judges’ reasoned statements for departing from the guidelines; 2) appellate 
judges’ assessments of the reasons for departure; 3) a common law of justified departures from the 
Guidelines; and 4) amendment of the guidelines to codify the common law developments.474 Reformers 
believed that the collaboration of the commission designing sentencing guidelines and the courts 
developing a “common law of sentencing” would eventually lead to a system of fair and proportionate 
sentencing for each individual.475 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
470 See, e.g., Berman, A Common Law, supra note 420, at 96 (describing how the reformers designed a 
sentencing guidelines model that incorporated the mechanisms to promote a judicially-directed “common 
law of sentencing”). 
 
471 See Freed, supra note 431, at 1694 (noting that, when Congress passed the SRA, it “envisioned an 
interactive guidelines process involving federal judges …” Judges “would be authorized to individualize 
sentences and depart from the guidelines when a case did not fit the guidelines structure, or when 
Commission guidance failed to take adequate account of circumstances a court found compelling.”). 
 
472 PIERCE O’DONNELL ET AL., TOWARD A JUST AND EFFECTIVE SENTENCING SYSTEM 59-60, 94-95 (1977) 
(asserting that requiring the specific reasons for departures and instituting the appellate review for these 
departures provides “an ideally suited institutional mechanism to upgrade--through the gradual 
development of case law--the rationale and rationality of sentencing.”). 
 
473 See LESLIE T. WILKINS ET AL., SENTENCING GUIDELINES: STRUCTURING JUDICIAL DISCRETION xvii 
(1978) (discussing that the departures would provide “an informational feedback loop,” and “inject a 
continuous element of self-improvement and regeneration into the guidelines”); see also Robert Sweet et 
al., Towards a Common Law of Sentencing: Developing Judicial Precedent in Cyberspace, 65 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 927, 939-40 (1996) (urging the creation of a common law of sentencing founded on the work of 
sentencing judges through “written, published sentencing opinions”). 
 
474 Professor Freed has provided a clear and concise explanation of how judicial departure decisions would 
advance the federal sentencing guidelines: 
 
[Judges] would be authorized to individualize sentences and depart from the guidelines when a 
case did not fit the guidelines structure, or when Commission guidance failed to take adequate 
account of circumstances a court found compelling. Their statements of reasons would lay the 
foundation for appellate review. By reviewing large numbers of cases, courts of appeals would 
gain a sense of trial court sentencing practice and the parameters of agreement and disagreement 
with the guidelines. The appellate courts would define common law principles to resolve 
conflicts…. The Commission would watch this process closely. It would modify or “fine-tune” its 
guidelines as individual cases illuminated problems. 
 
See Freed, supra note 431, at 1694. 
 
475 See Berman, A Common Law, supra note 420, at 96 (“[A] central virtue of the guidelines model 
promoted by reformers was its sound institutional structure for addressing lawlessness in sentencing…. 
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Although the ideal judicial development of a common law of sentencing, which had been adopted by 
SRA in 1984,476 was disrupted by Congress’s passage of mandatory sentencing laws and the Sentencing 
Commission’s restrictive treatment of judges’ departure from guidelines,477 the Booker decision, which 
restored judges’ discretion to depart from the Guidelines, has reopened the possibility of a common law of 
sentencing that can lead to a flexible and fair system of sentencing while providing appropriate limitation 
on judicial discretion.478 By authorizing limited judicial discretion to depart from the Guidelines, Booker 
has placed the judges in the sentencing lawmaking process, specifically in the following two aspects: 1) 
supplementing the sentencing factors that the Guidelines had “not adequately taken into consideration”,479 
and 2) modifying the harsh or lenient sentencing ranges provided by certain Guidelines.  
 
In short, judicial development of a common law of sentencing would continuously modify the 
Guidelines to address the inadequacy or absence of certain sentencing factors and the harshness of others 
480 --- meaning that the “guided discretion” sentencing approach will gradually approach (even though it 
may not attain) the goal of proportionate sentencing in every case. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
From that point, to best take advantage of institutional competencies, the particulars of sentencing law 
would evolve through the collaborative efforts of an expert commission (providing a system-wide 
perspective) and an experienced judiciary (providing a case-specific perspective).”); see also Norval 
Morris, Towards Principled Sentencing, 37 MD. L. REV. 267, 283-85 (1977) (arguing that the sentencing 
guidelines model “would allow the sentencing commission to have a long-term formative and unifying 
effect on criminal sentences and yet preserve flexibility and provide an incentive for the essential process 
of judicial development of common law of sentencing”).  
 
476 Becker, supra note 429, at 10, 11 (stressing that Congress “intended that departures play a critical role in 
the ongoing process begun by the SRA” by providing “the Sentencing Commission with the feedback it 
needs to refine the guidelines over time”). 
 
477 See, e.g., Berman, A Common Law, supra note 420, at 99-102 (describing how the judicial role in the 
sentencing lawmaking process was disrupted by Congress and the Sentencing Commission). 
 
478 See Nancy Gertner, Supporting Advisory Guidelines, 3 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 261, 279 (2009) 
(“Efforts to develop a common law of sentencing at both levels will be mutually reinforcing. As lower 
courts begin to apply alternative sentencing frameworks to individual cases, post-Booker appellate review 
will begin to have more content. In turn, meaningful appellate review will help guide lower courts to make 
future sentencing decisions.”). 
 
479 See Freed, supra note 431, at 1699 (noting that the purpose of the departure provision of Section 
3553(b) is to authorize the courts to enter departure sentences on the condition that “the court finds that 
there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into 
consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence 
different from that described”). 
 
480 “Family ties and responsibilities” would be an example that indicates Booker’s contribution to the 
evolution of the Guidelines in covering the adequate range of sentencing factors. Family ties and 
responsibilities, under USSG § 5H1.6, used to be a “discouraged factor” in the pre-Booker era. But post-
Booker, family ties and responsibilities in certain cases may be considered as offender characteristics under 
§ 3553. See THE OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL OF U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, DEPARTURE AND 
VARIANCE PRIMER 32-33 (June 2013).  
 
“Crack cocaine” would be another example that indicates Booker’s contribution to the evolution of the 
Guidelines in modifying harsh sentencing. In the drug guideline, the Commission created the 100-to-1 
quantity ratio throughout the drug table. In Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007), the Supreme 
Court held it is not “an abuse of discretion for a district court to conclude when sentencing a particular 
defendant that the crack/powder disparity yields a sentence ‘greater than necessary’ to achieve §3553(a)’s 
purposes, even in a mine-run case.” 
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ii) Guided Discretionary Judicial Departures  
 
This is not to say that Booker has returned us to the chaotic days of indeterminate sentencing.  Judicial 
discretion post-Booker is not unconstrained but is rather a framed (guided) departure which is designed to 
create a common law of sentencing and according amendment of guidelines, rather than a series of 
patchwork and individualized decisions that was the hallmark of “unguided discretion.481 The Supreme 
Court imposed a “reasonableness” standard in Booker that appropriately establishes a system of “guided 
discretion” that differs in degree and not in kind from the pre-Booker procedure under the Guidelines.   
 
 Under the Booker “reasonableness” standard, a sentencing judge must “consider” the Guidelines as a 
“starting point” before “tailoring” them with the § 3553(a) factors.482  Thus, judges’ discretion is still 
guided by the preset listed factors. 
 
One could argue that the factors listed in Section 3553(a)483 are mostly generalized principles, and 
thus Section 3553(a) has left sentencing judges plenty of free space to exercise unwarranted discretion. But, 
in fact, the “reasonableness” standard has made the discretionary departure a guided departure. Framed by 
the “reasonableness” standard, the reasonable application of the § 3553(a) factors is required to bear a 
reasonable similarity to the Guidelines, which implies similar categorized sentencing factors listed in 
§3553(a) should be weighed alike to the Guidelines factors. Take “family ties” as an example: when 
sentencing judges applying §3553(a) consider “family ties”, --- a post-Booker judicially developed 
sentencing factor under §3553(a), 484  --- as a mitigating sentencing factor, the judges’ sentencing 
consideration is framed under the “reasonableness” standard in two dimensions: first, the “family ties” 
suffices to be a sentencing factor, for it is categorically similar to the Guidelines presetting factors in terms 
of the offender’s character; second, the weight of the “family ties” should be reasonably relevant to the 
weight of the like factors set in the Guidelines --- thus it cannot be given undue or outsized weight in 
reducing a sentence, in the absence of any other relevant factors. . 
 
 In sum, the judicial discretionary departures, as required by Booker’s “reasonableness” standard, are 
guided by the Guidelines (starting point of sentencing consideration) and Section 3553(a) (reasonable 
adjustment of sentencing consideration). As these guided judicial departures develop a common law of 
sentencing and consequent amendment of the guidelines, the “guided discretion” sentencing scheme will 
gradually approach the substantive sentencing goal of delivering fair sentencing results.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
481 Both judges and scholars agree that Booker did not bring judicial discretion back to the pre-Guidelines 
era of absolute discretion. See United States v. Jaber, 362 F. Supp. 2d 365, 370 (D. Mass. 2005) (courts 
should not view Booker as a return to the “‘free at last’ regime, or a return to pre-1984 indeterminate 
sentencing.”); see also Jordan, supra note 464, at 644 (“Courts that take the position that the Guidelines 
have been tossed aside in favor of a completely discretionary sentencing scheme are equally misguided”). 
 
482 See United States v. Biheiri, 356 F. Supp. 2d 589, 594 n.6 (E.D. Va. 2005) (Guidelines should be a 
“useful starting point in fashioning a just and appropriate sentence.”); United States v. Terrell, 445 F.3d 
1261, 1264 (10th Cir. 2006) (“The Guidelines continue to be the ‘starting point’ for district courts and for 
this court's reasonableness review on appeal.”). 
 
483 Section 3553(a) factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and 
characteristics of the defendant; … (3) the kinds of sentence available; … (5) the Guidelines and policy 
statements issued by the Sentencing Commission, including the advisory guidelines range; (6) the need to 
avoid unwarranted sentencing disparity; and (7) the need to provide restitution where applicable. 
 
484 Dan Markel, Jennifer M. Collins & Ethan J. Lieb, Criminal Justice And The Challenge Of Family Ties, 
2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1147, 1174 (2007) (In a post-Booker world, “‘[c]onsideration of family 
responsibilities’ may now be viewed as part of a defendant's ‘history and characteristics,’ and judges can 
assess those traits as reasons to mitigate the length of sentences.”). 
 
 78 
 
 b) FSA, A Statutory Law Approach To Modify The Guidelines Regime 
 
Besides the common law approach, the “guided discretion” sentencing regime is also open to 
adjustment via legislation. Legislatures retain the power to set punishment proportionate to crimes. When 
policy changes in response to evolving understanding of justice and social circumstances, the legislature 
retains the power to modify the punishment, and thereby the Sentencing Guidelines would subsequently 
reflect the statutory changes towards a more refined “guided discretion” sentencing scheme. The passage of 
the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 demonstrates that the sentencing guidelines regime is able to evolve 
towards a refined regime via legislative act. 
 
Congress, in 1986, enacted the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, which set forth the quantity thresholds that 
produced the 100:1 powder-to-crack cocaine ratio.485 A defendant involved with five hundred grams of 
powder cocaine would receive a five-year mandatory minimum sentence, whereas possession of five grams 
of crack cocaine implicated the same minimum term.486 In response to the Anti-Drug Abuse statute, the 
Sentencing Commission set offense levels to reflect the mandatory minimums set forth in the statute.487 
Over the following decades, the drug guidelines were attacked as disproportionate, especially towards the 
offenders involved in crack cases, most of whom were African-American.488 Congress responded with the 
passage of the Fair Sentencing Act in 2010, which increased the threshold amounts of crack cocaine that 
trigger the mandatory minimums, from five grams to twenty-eight grams.489 Shortly after the passage of the 
FSA, the Sentencing Commission promulgated an emergency amendment to the Guidelines, which made 
the Guidelines reflect the statutory changes.490 Thus, after the passage of the FSA, the drug sentencing 
guidelines will lead to drug sentences that are more close to fair sentencing results. This example shows 
that a Guidelines system can be flexible enough to remedy disproportionate results.  
 
(d) Conclusion 
 
The “guided discretion” sentencing scheme has been proved, not only by practical experience but also 
by theoretical analysis, to be preferable to the “unguided discretion” sentencing scheme in achieving fair 
sentencing goals on all count. The “guided discretion” sentencing scheme would function in a consistent 
manner in which similar cases would be treated alike. Sentencing judges would enter individualized 
sentences by considering the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the 
particular offense, which are preset in the standardized guidelines. The “guided discretion” sentencing 
scheme, by taking into account established sentencing guidelines and sentencing factors, and by 
continuingly making adjustment, would more likely guarantee that the sentence is proportionately to the 
crime.  
 
 
 
                                                          
485 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1002, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-2 to 3207-3 (1986) 
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2006)). 
 
486 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1002(1)(B), 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-3 (1986). 
 
487 Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321, 2327 (2012). 
 
488 See Kyle Graham, Sorry Seems To Be The Hardest Word: The Fair Sentencing Act Of 2010, Crack, And 
Methamphetamine, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 765, 766, ft. 7 (2013). 
 
489 Fair Sentencing Act, Pub. L. No. 111-220, § 2, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010). 
 
490 Fair Sentencing Act, Pub. L. No. 111-220, § 8, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010); Notice of a Temporary, 
Emergency Amendment to Sentencing Guidelines and Commentary, 75 FED. REG. 66, 188 (Oct. 27, 2010). 
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D. The Need for a “Guided Discretion” Scheme in Commuting LWOP 
Sentences 
 
 While the clemency power cannot be constrained as a matter of law, the question remains whether 
that power should be constrained as a matter of policy. The experience with sentencing systems based on 
guided and unguided discretion is rich with lessons for executive decisions on clemency. After all, the 
decision to commute the sentence of a LWOP inmate is not different in kind from the decision whether to 
sentence a defendant to life without parole in the first place. It is just made at a different time. Learning 
from the success of the implementation of the “guided discretion” sentencing scheme in the judicial 
sentencing system, it is certainly worth arguing that the executive clemency power to commute LWOP 
sentences should be instituted in a “guided discretion” scheme. In this section, I will conduct a comparative 
analysis of the judicial sentencing power and the executive clemency power, and argue that the exercise of 
the executive discretionary clemency power to commute LWOP sentences should be framed in a “guided 
discretion” scheme.491 
 
The executive branch and the judicial branch perform different functions under the regime of the 
separation of powers. However, when the executive exercises the clemency power to commute LWOP 
sentences, the executive performs the same function as the judicial branch in terms of determining 
appropriate sentences for the offenders, as follows: 
 
The same feature of discretionary power. The executive clemency power to commute LWOP 
sentences and the judicial sentencing power are both the discretionary power authorized to one person, who 
must make decisions under the law. The executives are authorized by the Constitution to make decisions 
whether to commute sentences for LWOP inmates. The judges are authorized by sentencing law to make 
decisions imposing punishment against offenders. 
 
The same functional area of criminal justice. Both the exercise of executive clemency power to 
commute LWOP sentences and the judicial sentencing power is to decide sentencing issues. The executives 
are empowered to decide whether to reduce or commute the LWOP sentences for an individual offender. 
The judges are empowered to decide the length of the sentence to be imposed on an individual offender. 
 
The same goal of sentencing justice. Both the exercise of the power to commute LWOP sentences and 
the judicial sentencing power are implemented with the goal of seeking justice. The exercise of executive 
clemency power, by commuting or reducing punishment of a LWOP inmate, provides the individual 
offender the last resort for relief for the purpose of effectuating justice at the back end. The exercise of the 
judicial sentencing power, by imposing the appropriate punishment to offenders, seeks sentencing justice in 
each individual case at the front end.  
 
The same pursuit of sentencing consistency, individualization, and proportionality. The judicial 
delivery of sentencing justice is accomplished when (1) the imposed sentence is tailored to the individual 
offender’s character and record and the circumstances of the particular offense; (2) similar cases are treated 
alike; and (3) the sentence is proportionate to the crime. The use of the clemency power to commute LWOP 
sentences should satisfy the same three goals: (1) the elimination or reduction of the sentence should be 
tailored around the individual applicant’s circumstances, such as innocence, mitigating factors, etc.; (2) 
applicants that apply for clemency with similar reasons should be treated alike --- a selective grant of 
clemency under the executive’s personal whim not only violates the principle of the rule of law, but also 
violates principles of procedural justice; and (3) the elimination or reduction of the LWOP sentence should 
be appropriate in light of the crime committed --- if the executive commutes or  reduces a LWOP sentences 
without the constraint of proportionality, it would violate not only the goal of sentencing justice for the 
                                                          
491 While this article focuses particularly on commuting LWOP sentences, the analogy from “guided 
discretion” sentencing schemes may be applicable more broadly to other clemency decisions such as a 
pardon. The analogy is not perfect, however, because the decision to commute a sentence deals with 
exactly the same issue as the sentencing determination, i.e., the length of a sentence.  
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sentence originally imposed, but also the principle of separation of power by interrupting the exercise of 
judicial and legislative power. 
 
Because the executive clemency power to commute LWOP sentences shares the same traits as the 
judicial sentencing power in delivering sentencing justice, there should be the same conditions in its 
exercise --- if not as a matter of law, then as a matter of policy.  Because the “guided discretion” scheme is 
the most advanced scheme of exercising the judicial power in delivering sentencing justice, the clemency 
power to commute LWOP sentences should be instituted subject to a “guided discretion” scheme as well. 
 
It should be clarified that instituting the clemency power in the “guided discretion” scheme does not 
mean the “guided discretion” scheme should be equipped with the exactly the same standardized 
sentencing guidelines prescribed for guiding the exercise of judicial discretion in sentencing. The “guided 
discretion” scheme is a principle, which simply requires that the exercise of power should be structured or 
framed by reasonable rules. Accordingly, the clemency power should be subject to “guided discretion” 
scheme, but certainly not by the same sentencing guidelines prescribed for the exercise of the judicial 
sentencing power.  
 
In conclusion, when the executive exercises the clemency power to commute LWOP sentences, the 
clemency power should be framed by a “guided discretion” scheme, which should be designed with unique 
guidelines rules sufficient to facilitate the exercise of clemency power to commute LWOP sentences in the 
pursuit of sentencing justice. The next section proposes a set of guidelines for this important task. 
 
It must be clarified that I am not arguing that guidelines can be legally imposed to restrain the 
executive’s clemency decisions. Rather, the point is that such guidelines should be imposed as a matter of 
policy --- otherwise the carefully constructed system of controlled discretion at the front end of the 
sentencing decision could be irrationally undermined by uncontrolled discretion at the back end. 
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IV. Guidelines for Commuting LWOP Sentences 
 
The previous discussion has demonstrated the inconsistent exercise of the clemency power in 
commuting LWOP sentences, and also the need to establish a system of guided discretion to regulate 
commutation that would be exercised arbitrarily. In this section, I propose a set of substantive and 
procedural standards that would guide the executive in making rational and reasonable commutation 
decisions for LWOP inmates.  
 
The substantive standards are derived from the discussion above on when commutation decisions 
would be consistent with the legislative determination that LWOP sentencing is justified --- and on the 
assumption that it is simply bad policy to have sentencing determinations on the front end undermined at 
the back end.  
 
The procedural standards are based on the principle that it is important (even though not 
constitutionally required) that commutation decisions are fairly and consistently made --- in order to avoid 
a signal to the public that they are nothing more than arbitrary political decisions. As Maryland’s then- 
Governor Robert Ehrlich stated: “By establishing a clearly defined process for Executive Clemency 
requests” the Executive will bring “a high-level of integrity to the process”--- thereby assuring that public 
that the Executive is acting “in an objective manner, and bas[ing] my decision fully and fairly on the merits 
of each individual case." 492 If the process appears fair and open, then the public will be more likely to 
accept the substantive result of any clemency decision --- and that can only work to the favor of the 
Executive, by shielding her from allegations that a grant of clemency is nothing more than a payoff or an 
act of political expediency. 493 
 
What follows is a set of model standards (with explanatory notes) for commutation of LWOP 
sentences. 
 
 
1. Grounds for Commutation 
 
1.1 Excessive Punishment 
 
The Executive may commute a LWOP sentence upon a finding that the sentence is now determined to 
be excessive in proportion to the crime for which the applicant was convicted. That finding can be made on 
one of three grounds.  
 
(a) the standards under which the petitioner was sentenced have been subsequently adjusted 
downward, but the new adjustments have not given retroactive effect, so the petitioner cannot be given 
relief in the courts; 
 
(b) the petitioner was sentenced erroneously to life without parole, but the error in sentencing cannot 
be corrected by the courts; or 
 
(c) the petitioner presents newly discovered evidence of mitigating sentencing factors, but the 
discovery was made after the expiration of the time period for filing a  motion to reduce the sentence. 
 
                                                          
492  Governor Ehrlich Clarifies Executive Clemency Process,  
http://msa.maryland.gov/megafile/msa/speccol/sc5300/sc5339/000113/001000/001015/unrestricted/200519
87e.html 
 
493 Both the substantive and procedural rules set forth below might well be applicable to other forms of 
clemency decisions (such as pardons) and to other kinds of punishment (such as the death penalty and 
sentences for a term of years) --- but this dissertation focuses on commutation of LWOP sentences and 
accordingly the standards are tailored to that decision.  
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Note: 
 
Section 1.1:  Commutation of a life without parole sentence may be justified if the punishment can, at 
the time of the commutation decision, be found to be excessive. In this narrow instance, the commutation 
power supports sentencing justice without undermining the policies of finality, certainty, and 
proportionality that the legislature found compelling in establishing the sentence of life without parole.  
Although judicial proceedings are usually available to remedy sentencing injustice, there still exist 
possibilities of sentences that can be found erroneous or unduly harsh at the time of the commutation 
decision, as to which the judicial system does not provide an effective remedy. In such a limited situation, 
commutation can properly fill the role of a fail-safe device to restore sentencing justice.  
 
Subdivision (a): An example of commuting a sentence based on subsequent reductions occurred at the 
federal level, under which a LWOP sentence could at one time be imposed on certain low-level drug 
offenses. Congress provided for lesser sentences in the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA). But the LWOP 
inmates who were sentenced before the passage of FSA were not eligible for sentencing reduction relief,  494 
because Congress did not make the FSA retroactive.495 In such cases, in which the pre-FSA LWOP inmates 
could not seek reduction of their sentences under the FSA, commutation would be the significant gateway 
leading to sentencing justice.496 
 
Such use of commutation is limited to the situation in which two conditions must be satisfied: (1) 
current law has provided less harsh sentences and (2) current law has no retroactive effect. If there is no 
current law providing less harsh sentences, there will be no legitimate foundation for the Executive in 
providing LWOP inmates relief for excessive punishment. Such a decision would amount to nothing more 
than disagreement with the legislature about the validity of the LWOP sentence --- and that disagreement 
should be vetted directly, rather than by using a particular individual as part of a political contest and 
undermining sentencing objectives at the back end.  Similarly, if the ameliorating sentencing changes have 
been made retroactive, then the proper avenue for relief is in the court system, not the Executive.     
 
Subdivision (b): Judicial errors in sentencing could result in an erroneous application of a LWOP 
sentence. One possibility is when a sentencing court applies an interpretation that is overturned by a 
Supreme Court decision in a different case, but that decision is not retroactively applicable.497 In such 
                                                          
494 All of the federal circuit courts, relying on the “general savings statute” have refused to grant relief to 
defendants who are sentenced prior to the passage of the Fair Sentencing Act.  
 
See Jeff Lazarus, Making The Fair Sentencing Act Retroactive: Just Think Of The Savings . . . Clause, 61 
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 713, 719 (2013). The savings statute, 1 U.S.C. § 109, provides: 
 
The repeal of any statute shall not have the effect to release or extinguish any penalty, 
forfeiture, or liability incurred under such statute, unless the repealing Act shall so 
expressly provide, and such statute shall be treated as still remaining in force for the 
purpose of sustaining any proper action or prosecution for the enforcement of such 
penalty, forfeiture, or liability. 
 
 
495 The Fair Sentencing Act did not explicitly state whether it could apply retroactively to those imposed 
with harsh sentences under the old drug sentencing law. Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 
124 Stat. 2372 (2010). 
 
496 Such use of commutation has been corroborated by President Obama’s recent issuance of commutation 
to the LWOP inmates who would have been sentenced to a shorter time under the FSA. See supra note 
155-57 and accompanying text. 
 
497 For example, in Wofford v. Scott, the court held that, under 28 U.S.C. §2255(e), “the only sentencing 
claims that may conceivably be covered by the savings clause are those based upon a retroactively 
applicable Supreme Court decision overturning circuit precedent”. Wofford v. Scott, 177 F.3d 1236, 1245 
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circumstances, commutation should function to provide relief for erroneously sentenced LWOP inmates. 
However, where the sentencing error can be corrected through judicial relief, exercise of the commutation 
power is unnecessary and intrusive.  
 
Subdivision (c): Under federal and state practice, new trial motions based on newly discovered 
evidence are valid only if the motions are filed before the expiration of the statutory time limitation. The 
Supreme Court, in Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993), observed that there is no judicial relief for a 
habeas petitioner’s claim of innocence based on new evidence discovered after the expiration of the time 
limit for filing new trial motions,498 and suggested that clemency could provide a remedy for the claim of 
innocence based on new evidence discovered too late to support a new trial motion.499 Although Herrera is 
a case in which the petitioner claimed innocence, the same problem could arise with a petitioner claiming 
that a LWOP sentence must be reduced due to newly discovered evidence of mitigating factors. In such a 
situation, commutation should provide the fail-safe remedy for those LWOP inmates, who are subject to 
excessive punishment that cannot be corrected in the court system. 
  
The newly discovered evidence should satisfy the requirement of “due diligence”: it must have been 
unknown and not reasonably discoverable at the time of sentencing.500 The policy of applying the “due 
diligence” principle is to encourage the petitioner to make adequate efforts in proving his claim during the 
judicial proceeding and to discourage the petitioner from strategically making use of the clemency 
proceeding --- which the petitioner might think maintains a looser scheme for making sentencing findings. 
That is, the “due diligence” standard must be applied to assure that the petitioner is not seeking to evade 
judicial review through the clemency process. 
 
 
1.2 Battered Woman Syndrome 
 
The Executive may commute a sentence of life without parole upon a finding that: 
 
a) the petitioner suffered Battered Woman Syndrome at the time of the crime, as established by 
reliable expert evidence; 
 
b) the Battered Woman Syndrome would be recognized as a ground for mitigating a sentence if the 
petitioner were tried at the present time; and 
 
c) the petitioner has already served sufficient time for the crime in light of the mental condition under 
which the petitioner committed the crime.  
 
Note:  
 
Under this rule a sentence of life without parole may be commuted as to a petitioner claiming that she 
had a valid claim of battered woman syndrome (BWS) that would mitigate the punishment if the case were 
tried at the time of the commutation decision. Before the mid-1970s, battered women who killed their 
                                                                                                                                                                             
(11th Cir.1999); see also, e.g., United States v. Gilbert, 640 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2011) (error in sentencing 
could not be adjudicated because the claim would have been made in a successive habeas petition). 
 
498 Herrera, 506 U.S. at 409.  
 
499 Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417 (noting clemency is the traditional “fail safe” remedy “for claims of innocence 
based on new evidence, discovered too late in the day to file a new trial motion,”). 
 
500 See John A. Glenn, What Constitutes "Newly Discovered Evidence" Within Meaning of Rule 33 of 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Relating to Motions for New Trial, 44 A. L. R. FED. 13, 21, § 2[a] 
(1979) (noting that a particular matter constituting “newly discovered evidence” must satisfy the “due 
diligence” principle).  
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abusers usually either pled guilty or claimed insanity, temporary insanity, or diminished capacity. In the 
late 1970s, BWS evidence began to be used by courts in some states as evidence in support of a self-
defense claim.501 But even where such evidence was theoretically recognized, it was often rejected for lack 
of relevancy,502 or inability to aid the jury503 or some other exclusionary principle. 504  Moreover, even 
allowing BWS evidence did not all guarantee that juries would be convinced that it was sufficient to 
establish the defense of self-defense.  
 
Under this Rule, commutation, instead of pardon, is available to LWOP inmates, whose claim of self-
defense based on the BWS evidence failed at trial, but who would have been eligible for a reduction in 
sentence, either due to sentencing leniency or a finding of guilt on a lesser included offense. 505  The 
remedial policy is based on the premise that the Executive exercising the commutation power should 
refrain from intruding into the substantive law’s determination of guilt and justification, but could provide a 
remedy to alleviate harsh sentences in light of new thinking about domestic abuse and the plight of battered 
women. 
 
BWS, is an increasingly accepted theory to explain why a woman killed her abusive husband, but it 
has not been entirely accepted by the legislatures or courts as a ground for acquitting the battered woman 
under traditional self-defense law. Although every jurisdiction has accepted expert testimony on BWS to 
support claims of self-defense,506 battered women’s claims of self-defense based on the BWS evidence 
mostly fail in the non-confrontational situation, in which the battered woman killed the abuser at the time 
when she was not under direct attack. In these cases, judges or juries usually refuse to find that the battered 
woman’s killing is consistent with the requirement of traditional self-defense law of reasonable belief of 
                                                          
501 See Elizabeth M. Schneider & Susan B. Jordan, Representation of Women Who Defend Themselves in 
Response to Physical or Sexual Assault, 4 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 149, 159 (1978); see also Jeffrey B. 
Murdoch, Is Imminence Really Necessity? Reconciling Traditional Self-Defense Doctrine With The 
Battered Woman Syndrome, 20 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 191, 191 (2000). 
 
502 See, e.g., People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (the court upheld the exclusion of 
testimony in a case in which a battered woman shot her sleeping husband. The trial court ruled that battered 
woman syndrome is not relevant to the issues of imminence of harm and reasonableness of response to 
deadly force.) 
 
503 See, e.g., Buhrle v. State, 627 P.2d 1374, 1377 (Wyo. 1981) (holding that, because the defendant could 
not demonstrate that a reasonable expert opinion could be rendered, testimony would not aid the jury). 
 
504 Prior to 1991, in Maryland, a battered woman who killed the abuser was unable to present the BWS 
evidence at trial. Trial judges refused to hear testimony about domestic violence and battered spouse 
syndrome on the ground that evidence of the battered woman’s state of mind was irrelevant if the woman 
was the first aggressor. See, e.g., Friend v. State, No. 88-483 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. filed Dec. 12, 1988) 
(affirming the defendant's conviction of murder in the second degree for the shooting death of her husband. 
The court agreed that evidence on the syndrome was properly excluded because once evidence proves 
aggressor status, the honesty and the reasonableness of the defendant's belief that her actions were 
necessary to defend herself are utterly immaterial). Maryland has rewritten the law and admitted the 
evidence of the battered woman syndrome “notwithstanding evidence that the defendant was the first 
aggressor, used excessive force, or failed to retreat at the time of the alleged offense.” Md. Code Ann., Cts. 
& Jud. Proc. § 10-91(b) (Supp. 1992). 
 
505 See Charles P. Ewing, Psychological Self-Defense: A Proposed Justification for Battered Women Who 
Kill, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 579, 580 (1990) (noting that although most battered women who kill their 
abusers plead self-defense, they are frequently convicted of murder or manslaughter). 
 
506 Lauren Champaign, Criminal Law Chapter: Battered Woman Syndrome, 11 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 59, 
59-60 (2010). 
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imminent harm.507 Although scholars advocate for the expanding interpretation of traditional self-defense 
law to accommodate the self-defense claims of battered women in the non-confrontational cases,508 courts 
and legislatures generally have not yet accepted the solution of expanding the interpretation of self-defense 
law to accommodate battered women. But until the legislature codifies a justification for a battered 
woman’s killing of her abuser, it is inappropriate for Executives --- by pardoning LWOP inmates with 
BWS who are denied the claim of self-defense at trial --- to use the back door of clemency to establish a 
substantive defense of self-defense. Any general application of the substantive law of self-defense should 
be made by legislatures and courts to the victims as a class, rather than to individual claimants by way of 
random grants of pardon.  
 
However, an executive’s commutation of the sentence of a battered woman who was sentenced to 
LWOP --- and who has already served a sufficient amount of prison time in light of the crime and her 
mental condition --- constitutes an appropriate use of the commutation power. If BWS had been properly 
recognized at the time of the crime, the defendant may well have qualified for a lesser sentence due to 
impaired mental state; 509  or the judge at sentencing could have considered the BWS evidence as a 
mitigating factor that would have reduced the sentence.510 A defendant who was denied those opportunities 
is a proper candidate for commutation based on changes in societal attitude toward criminal sentencing --- 
similar to defendants who were sentenced under drug laws that were thought appropriate at the time but 
found to be harsh due to changing circumstances. See Rule 1.1. 
 
Importantly, a petitioner is not eligible for relief under this rule if the syndrome evidence that was 
either presented or barred at trial was insufficient to establish the petitioner as a battered woman.511  
 
 
1.3 Substantial Assistance to Authorities 
 
Upon petition of the government stating that an inmate serving life without parole has provided 
substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed a serious 
offense, the Executive may commute the inmate’s sentence of life without parole. The commutation 
decision will be determined for reasons that that may include, but are not limited to, consideration of the 
following:  
 
                                                          
507 See North Carolina v. Norman, 324 N.C. 253 (1989) (reversing the appellate court requiring a self-
defense instruction when there were non-confrontational circumstances). 
 
508 See Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 
MICH. L. REV. 1, 59 (1991) (suggesting that a better judicial understanding of the “separation assault” 
phenomenon could help to have the battered woman’s non-confrontational killing satisfy the self-defense 
law’s requirement of the reasonable belief of imminent harm.); see also Richard A. Rosen, On Self-
Defense, Imminence, and Women Who Kill Their Batterers, 71 N.C. L. REV. 371, 372, 402 (1993) 
(suggesting the traditional self-defense standard should be expanded to accommodate the battered woman’s 
non-confrontational killing situations.) 
 
509 See Schneider & Jordan, supra note 501; see also Elizabeth M. Schneider, Equal Rights to Trial For 
Women: Sex Bias in the Law of Self-Defense, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 623, 636 (1980). 
 
510 See, e.g., United States v. Whitetail 956 F.2d 857, 864 (8th Cir. 1992) (the court ruled that a federal 
court could consider testimony on the syndrome as a mitigating factor at sentencing despite the jury's 
verdict that such testimony had not warranted a finding of self-defense). 
 
511 See, e.g., Pruitt v. State, 296 S.E.2d 795, 797 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982) (upholding the lower court's exclusion 
of expert testimony during a bench trial because there was no evidence that the defendant was a battered 
woman). 
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a) the significance and usefulness of the petitioner's assistance, taking into consideration the 
government's evaluation of the assistance rendered; 
 
b) the truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of any information or testimony provided by the 
inmate; 
 
c) the nature and extent of the inmate's assistance; 
 
d) any injury suffered, or any danger or risk of injury to the inmate or his family resulting from his 
assistance; 
 
e) the timeliness of the inmate's assistance;  
 
f) a comparison of the seriousness of the crime for which the inmate is serving a life without parole 
sentence and the seriousness of the crimes that are prosecuted as a result of the inmate’s substantial 
assistance; and 
 
g) the amount of time that the petitioner has already served on the LWOP sentence.  
 
Note:  
 
In order to prosecute crime, it is often, indeed usually, necessary to establish incentives to cooperate 
on the part of those who participated in or otherwise know about the crime. In extreme cases --- e.g., a 
murder of prison personnel by an inmate --- it may be necessary to provide incentives to prisoners to 
cooperate. That may even include LWOP inmates in cases where the crime is of the highest priority and 
cannot otherwise be prosecuted. Of course, cooperation is usually incentivized by reduction in sentences of 
those cooperating. As to LWOP inmates, if there is no possibility of reducing the sentences, it is unlikely 
that there would be sufficient incentives to get the inmate to cooperate --- especially given the risk of 
reprisal for cooperators in prison.  
 
The rule adapts Sentencing Guideline 5K.1 to the situation of cooperation of LWOP inmates. The 
Executive should give careful consideration to the trade-off being made. The rule specifically states that the 
Executive should weigh the seriousness of the inmate’s crime with the seriousness of the crimes the 
prosecution of which the inmate is providing assistance. That comparison factor is not included in 
Guideline 5K.1 but it is surely of the utmost importance in deciding whether to commute the sentence of 
LWOP, as such commutation at the very least raises questions of safety to society and undermining the 
finality and certainty of the LWOP sentence. Moreover, given the fact that the award of commutation for a 
LWOP inmate is a grave and costly act, the Executive should determine that the assistance provided is truly 
significant, and also that the inmate has served a substantial time on the offense for which he was convicted.  
 
 
1.4 Terminal Illness 
 
The Executive may commute a sentence of life without parole if: 
 
a) the petitioner  suffers from a terminal illness and is faced with an imminent death;   
 
b) the petitioner has family or other responsible persons willing and capable to assume the 
responsibility for the petitioner’s care; and 
 
c) the finding of terminal illness is made by two physicians appointed by the Executive, who both 
conclude that the petitioner’s illness will result in death within twelve months from the date of the 
physician’s report.  
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Note: 
 
The policy of commuting the sentence of a LWOP inmate based on the ground of terminal illness is to 
promote the value of benefiting the state welfare. The release of dying LWOP inmates promotes state 
welfare by relieving the correction department’s fiscal pressure in prison health care cost, without any risk 
of public safety caused by the releasee’s reoffending. Additionally, the early release of terminally ill LWOP 
inmates would promote the integrity of the state by expressing human sympathy to these dying inmates. 
 
The rule assures that claims of medical release are justified by findings of qualified medical experts.  
 
 
2. Prohibited Grounds for Commutation  
 
2.1 Rehabilitation 
 
A life without parole sentence may not be commuted on the ground of the inmate’s rehabilitation.   
 
Note: 
 
The legislature, in instituting a sentence of life without parole, has made the determination that the 
inmate should never be released on the ground of rehabilitation. A life without parole sentence is 
completely inconsistent with any consideration of rehabilitation, because LWOP by definition “forswears 
altogether the rehabilitative ideal.”512 Whether one agrees with that policy or not, it is clear that legislatures 
opting for a LWOP penalty have embraced principles of finality, certainty, and just deserts --- and have 
rejected the rehabilitative ideal. It makes no sense for a sentencing system to be based on finality and 
certainty at the front end, only to have the Executive undermine that policy at the back end. Any change to 
the policy should come through an Executive’s work with the legislature, so that changes if any can be 
made on a class basis, rather than through individual determinations that reject legislative policy to the 
benefit of certain convicts and not others. Accordingly, the Executive should not use the clemency power to 
commute a LWOP inmate’s sentence on the ground of rehabilitation.   
 
Commuting LWOP inmates on the grounds of rehabilitation will not only undermine the legislative 
objective, but it will also have a negative effect on defendants in capital punishment jurisdictions where life 
without parole is an alternative to a death sentence. If there is a possibility that a LWOP sentence can be 
commuted, then there is a possibility that the prosecutor can convince the jury in a capital case that a 
LWOP sentence will not be a perfect alternative that would control the defendant’s future dangerousness . 
 
There is surely a concern about how to control the behavior of LWOP inmates who have no incentive 
to behave or improve if deprived of the rehabilitation reward of sentence reduction. But sentence reduction 
is not the only possible incentive for good behavior. Prison systems can provide other incentives such as 
prison privileges that, while certainly not as strong as sentence reduction, can be used to encourage good 
behavior --- while not undermining the legislative determination that animates LWOP sentencing.  
 
  
2.2 Meritorious Services 
 
A life without parole sentence may not be commuted on the ground of the inmate’s meritorious 
services while incarcerated. 
 
Note: 
 
Meritorious services refer to good works in prison, such as providing medical care assistance, 
providing assistance in preventing other inmates’ unruly behavior, etc. These services are the 
demonstration of the inmates’ efforts towards rehabilitation. For the reasons expressed in the note to Rule 
                                                          
512  Graham, 560 U.S. at 82.  
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2.1, these meritorious services are deserving of reward --- but not in the form of commuting a LWOP 
sentence.  
 
2.3 Prison Overcrowding 
 
A life without parole sentence may not be commuted on the ground of prison overcrowding.  
 
Note: 
 
There is concern that the accelerating population of LWOP inmates contributes to the problem of 
prison overcrowding. It is true that providing early release to certain prisoners would be a solution to 
alleviating prison overcrowding, but it is difficult to conclude that commuting LWOP inmates would be a 
justified solution to the problem of overcrowding.513 Indeed the question of releasing LWOP inmates to 
alleviate overcrowding seems to be theoretical. Assuming that prisoners are going to be released due to 
overcrowding, it stands to reason that LWOP inmates will be the last to go --- not only because they are 
presumably the most serious criminals, but also because there are thousands of better examples for release, 
including defendants serving lengthy sentences on mandatory minimums and for minor drug offenses. 
Moreover, LWOP inmates constitute a relatively small (but admittedly growing) fraction of the entire 
prison population.514 If a class of inmates is going to be released and have a strong effect on alleviating 
overcrowding, the sheer numbers of drug defendants make them better candidates.515  
 
More importantly, the whole idea of LWOP sentencing is grounded in the premise that certain crimes 
are so grave that they must be treated with finality and serious and certain punishment. It goes without 
saying that LWOP inmates are not expected by the legislature and public to be freed back into society due 
to a lack of prison facilities. If commutation is used to alleviate prison overcrowding by setting early 
release to a certain number of inmates, it is better to release the non-LWOP inmates who are supposed to be 
released back to society someday, than it is to undermine the policy of LWOP sentences. If the problem is 
allocation of resources --- a policy problem --- then it should be addressed by the legislature directly rather 
than by the Executive’s individualized determination that a certain LWOP inmate should be released.  
 
 
3. Written Reasons 
 
The Executive, in deciding whether to commute the sentence of a LWOP inmate, should state the 
specific reason for the decision to grant or deny the petition. 
 
                                                          
513 Prison overcrowding is a complex problem, for which there might be many causes, including 1) failure 
of the legislature to fund prison expansion; 2) expansion of criminal laws, such as drug laws; 3) legislatures 
enact harsh sentencing laws with longer imprisonment; and etc. Such a complex problem is unlikely to be 
solved by setting free LWOP inmates by commutation. 
 
514 Commuting LWOP inmates, a group of 3.1% of the total inmates population (as calculated in Section I, 
see Table 2 and Table 3 in Section I and accompanying analysis) has less effect in relieving prison 
overcrowding than would commuting non-LWOP inmates --- and it would seem perverse to release the 
most serious criminals in any case. 
 
515 As noted by the Chair of United States Sentencing Commission, Chief United States District Judge, Patti 
B. Saris, “Drug offenders make up about a third of the offenders sentenced federally every year and a 
majority of the prisoners serving in the federal Bureau of Prisons, so they are in many ways the key to the 
size and nature of the federal prison population.” See Honorable Patti B. Saris, A Generational Shift For 
Federal Drug Sentences, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 1 (2015) (internal citation omitted). According to the 
data collected by Federal Bureau of Prison, by the end of 2014, drug offense inmates in federal prison went 
up to 96,544, 48.7% of the federal prison population. Inmate Statistics, FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISON 
http://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/statistics_inmate_offenses.jsp (last updated Dec. 27, 2014). 
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Note: 
 
A statement of written reasons derives from the requirement of the guided discretion clemency 
scheme. The exercise of the commutation power in a rational way will not be accomplished without 
requiring the commutation reasons to be clearly stated and published for public review. 
 
 
4. Procedures for Considering Commutation Petitions 
 
 (a) A petition for commutation may be filed any time after the petitioner exhausts all judicial 
remedies. 
 
 (b) The Executive should appoint a special master to investigate and determine whether the petitioner 
has stated grounds for relief under Rule 1.  
 
(1) Appointment. 
 
A special master must not have a relationship to the petitioner, attorneys, any interested 
government official, or the Executive that would require disqualification of a judge, unless the 
interested parties, with the Executive's approval, consent to the appointment after the master discloses 
any potential grounds for disqualification. 
 
(2) Special  Master’s Authority. 
 
A special master shall: 
 
(A) when conducting any evidentiary hearing, exercise the power to compel, take, and record 
evidence; 
 
(B) regulate all proceedings; 
 
(C) take all appropriate measures to perform the assigned duties fairly and efficiently;  
 
(D) make any necessary finding of fact; and 
 
(E) determine an appropriate sentence reduction, if any, after reviewing similar cases and 
consulting with relevant sentencing guidelines. 
 
(3) Special Master’s Orders. 
 
A special master who issues an order must file it and promptly serve a copy on the petitioner and 
any interested government official. The order must also be submitted to the Executive’s office, 
together with an explanation of reasons for the order and a transcript of any proceedings. 
 
(c) The Executive, after reviewing the special master’s order, should grant or deny commutation in 
accordance with the order, unless the Executive determines that the special master has abused discretion. If 
the Executive rejects the special master’s order, any grant or denial of relief should be accompanied by an 
explanation of reasons.   
 
Note: 
 
Subdivision (a): Most jurisdictions require a petitioner to serve a certain percentage of his/her 
sentence or serve a certain amount of time in prison before being able to seek commutation. Such a waiting 
period makes sense when the petitioner files a commutation petition on the ground of rehabilitation, 
because the petitioner’s rehabilitation achievement could not be proved up to the Executive without a 
substantial period of good behavior during incarceration. However, rehabilitation is not a ground for 
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LWOP inmates filing a commutation petition. See Rule 2.1. Accordingly, it is unnecessary to require a 
waiting period for LWOP inmates filing a commutation petition for the permissible grounds set forth in 
Rule 1. It is true that if the petitioner’s ground is substantial assistance, the Executive will of necessity take 
into account the amount of time that the prisoner has served under Rule 1.3 --- but that is a flexible inquiry 
and no independent time limitation is necessary or advisable. The same is true for commutation based on 
Battered Woman Syndrome --- the amount of time the inmate has served is relevant but that will be a 
flexible enquiry. See Rule 1.2. 
 
The rule retains an important condition --- that commutation is not available unless the petitioner has 
exhausted all forms of judicial relief. Commutation should not be used as an evasion of judicial review. It is 
a fail-safe for when judicial review is unavailable.  
 
Subdivision (b): The facts and issues pertinent to a commutation decision should be decided by an 
independent person with expertise in factfinding and interpreting and applying the law. It is not appropriate 
to vest the power to the Executive to command the trial court to open a new trial. In accordance to the 
separation of power principle --- which requires that each branch maintain the independence of exercising 
its core function --- the Executive branch does not maintain the power to order a trial court to retry a case. 
It is also not appropriate to appoint a political official or administrative board to make the commutation 
determination, because of the risk that the decision will be on political grounds rather than on fact and 
reason. The best solution for evaluating the claim to commutation is to submit the matter to a special master 
to conduct any necessary evidentiary hearing and to make the necessary findings and recommendations. 
   
Subdivision (b) (1): The rule tracks the procedural requirements for appointing special masters that 
are found in Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A special master exercises the power to make 
a finding as a court would do. However, the special master’s finding does not constitute a judicial finding. 
The special master is appointed by the Executive to assist the Executive in making a clemency decision. In 
that sense, the special master’s finding constitutes a part of the Executive decision and should not be 
subject to judicial review. Instead, the special master’s finding is subject to the review of the Executive. 
 
The Executive must carefully review the special master’s order because the Executive is responsible 
for the master’s decision, and the Executive may be legitimately concerned about the  “potential reaction of 
the news media, political allies and adversaries, special interest groups” and crime victims based on the 
Executive’s commutation decision.516 It is conceivable that the Executive is more likely to stray from a 
reasoned review of a special master’s order during the Executive’s last term of office, because at that point 
there is little political constraint on the commutation decision. However, such lack of constraint on the 
Executive power occurs in every field in which it is exercised during the Executive’s last term of office. 
The requirement that the Executive must provide written explanations for why she believes the special 
master abused discretion is intended to limit the risk that the Executive will grant or deny commutation as a 
result of outside influence or for completely personal reasons, especially when political constraints are mild.  
 
 
 Subdivision (b) (2): The evidence rules should apply in the hearing on Battered Woman Syndrome. 
The issue to be decided, which is about the potential justification of the petitioner’s wrongful conduct, 
warrants a rigid application of the rules of evidence --- which would assure the petitioner’s guilt or 
innocence is reasonably and fairly determined. Thus the rules should be no looser than the evidence rules 
applied in the judicial proceeding. The policy of applying rigid evidence rules is to prevent the petitioner 
from strategically making use of the clemency procedure to seek a better chance of acquittal or sentence 
reduction in a clemency proceeding employing more flexible rules. 
 
The evidence rules should not rigidly apply in the hearing of excessive punishment or substantial 
assistance to authorities. The Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply in sentencing proceedings.517 Because 
                                                          
516 See Breslin & Howley, supra note 206, at 232. 
 
517 See FED. R. EVID. § 1101. 
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the issues to be decided regarding substantial assistance or excessive punishment are about sentencing 
factors, the commutation proceeding on sentencing issues is essentially a sentencing proceeding at the back 
end. As with sentencing proceedings, while the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply, the special master 
should be regulated by basic principles of relevance and reliability.518 
 
The special master should make the decision of commutation consistent with the relevant sentencing 
ranges and guidelines, and in light of other similarly situated petitioners, in order to satisfy the sentencing 
goal of individualization, consistency and proportionality. The sentence reduction could be to time served 
(e.g., from LWOP to time served) or to a shorter period of time (e.g., from LWOP to 20 years, or from 
LWOP to life with parole). 
 
Subdivision (b) (3): The special master’s order should be filed with the Executive’s office and subject 
to public review. A system of commutation based on guided discretion cannot be achieved if no record is 
kept for public review. Public review assures that the Executive’s decision has not been subject to 
inappropriate outside influence or bare politics.  
 
Subdivision (c): It is true that the Executive’s power to commute a sentence is essentially 
unconstrained by law. But while the Executive has the unconstrained power to commute or not to 
commute, these procedural requirements are based in the policy that a system of guided discretion is 
necessary not only to assure fair results, but also to protect the Executive from charges of improper 
influence, personal whim, or bare politics. Therefore the Executive should adhere to the order of the 
unbiased special master, unless the Executive can provide stated reasons for concluding that the special 
master has abused discretion. A system of guided discretion is based on the principle that the Executive 
will not grant or deny commutation without any specific reason or for a reason that is not prescribed in the 
commutation guidelines. 
 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
518 See, e.g., United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1990) (hearsay rule does not apply at 
sentencing proceeding but hearsay cannot be considered if it is clearly untrustworthy).  
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V. CONCLUSION 
 
This article proposes a system of guided discretion, with detailed procedural guidelines, to control the 
Executive’s decision on whether to commute the sentence of a prisoner sentenced to life without parole. 
The constraints of guided discretion cannot be found in the state or federal constitutions. But they can be 
found in the need to provide some standards for an Executive decision that could otherwise be seen as one 
based on rank politics, improper outside influence, or perhaps even worse as an attempt to undermine 
legislative and judicial determinations.  
 
The sentence of life without parole, for good or ill, is one based on finality, certainty, and a legislative 
determination that the sentence is proportionate to the crime and that rehabilitation is irrelevant. There are 
certainly valid arguments against LWOP as a sentencing policy. It is probably fair to state that LWOP was 
little more than a knee-jerk reaction to the War on Drugs, the death penalty, and the War on Crime, and that 
it should at some point be reconsidered. But any reconsideration should come through the processes of 
legislative and judicial action that will apply across the board. It should not come by way of individualized 
commutation decisions. For that reason, this article contends that rehabilitation should not be considered as 
a ground for commuting LWOP sentences.  
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